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One could make a remarkable collection of quotations from famous authors and of poems written 
by despairing people preparing for their death with a certain ostentation. During the marvelously 
cold-blooded moment which follows the decision to die, a kind of infectious enthusiasm is 
exhaled from these souls and flows on to paper, even among classes which are bereft of all 
education. While they compose themselves for the sacrifice, whose depth they are pondering, all 
their strength is concentrated so much as to gush out in a warm and characteristic expression. 
 
Jacques Peuchet, quoted in Karl Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 1846 
 
 
We find in modern literature an intense and sustained preoccupation with suicide. In 
Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, Svidrigailov shoots himself. In Demons, Kirillov 
follows suit while Stavrogin, like Smerdyakov in The Brothers Karamazov, hangs. In “The 
Judgment” and “The Bridge,” Franz Kafka’s protagonists drown themselves while in Virginia 
Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, Septimus Smith impales himself on a fence. In The Waves, Rhoda 
jumps off a cliff. Within the United States, we find Faulkner’s Quentin Compson and Salinger’s 
Seymour Glass and Teddy McArdle. Miller’s Willy Loman ends his life by car crash. In Ralph 
Ellison’s Invisible Man, Tod Clifton suffers suicide-by-cop while in Nella Larsen’s Passing, 
Clare jumps out a window? Perhaps. Maybe she’s pushed? We aren’t sure, but suicide cannot be 
excluded. Both James Baldwin and Toni Morrison open novels with a protagonist’s suicide. This 
list is not exhaustive. Suffice it to say, writers of our modern era have been preoccupied with 
suicide.1 
Yet modernist representations of suicide distinguish themselves from romantic ones. 
Unlike Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, for instance, modernist writers like Dostoevsky, 
Woolf, and Baldwin, for instance, do not represent suicide as a gesture toward some romantic 
achievement of selfhood or toward some fantasy of individual transcendence of life’s cruel 





suicide novel because it directly critiques dominant European discourses about human subjects 
as objects of scientific knowledge that came to influence Russian thought toward the end of the 
nineteenth century. Although Kirillov’s suicide might be framed as romantic, insofar as the 
“duty” of his suicide is to “proclaim self-will to the fullest point” in the service of recognizing 
that “there is no God,” thereby “open[ing] the door” to a new era of human development, 
Stavrogin’s suicide cannot.2 The circumstances surrounding Stavrogin’s suicide and its fallout 
are quite different. As Dostoevsky closes his novel: “Our medical men, after the autopsy, 
completely and emphatically ruled out insanity.”3 While the predominance of romantic suicide 
had come to a close, mental illness had emerged a direct opponent for many modernist writers, 
ceasing to sufficiently explain the cause of suicide in our modern era. 
 Modernist representations of suicide offer reflections on one’s situatedness within one’s 
history, one’s way of relating to and being-with others, and most importantly, one’s response to 
the various forms of power under which we suffer capitalist modernity. This dissertation 
examines two propositions about modern representations of suicidality, neither of which ought to 
surprise anybody. Or, at least that’s what I risk. Neither are new. They have been culled, 
extended, and developed, in turn, from the critical works of four theorists of modernity—Karl 
Marx, Walter Benjamin, Virginia Woolf, and James Baldwin—all of whom criticized modern 
capitalist power either directly or indirectly by way of representations of suicide. 
First, this dissertation argues that the suicidality represented in much of modernist 
literature rehearses contradictions rooted in the capital relation. Such contradictions are found 
not only within the immediate processes of production and circulation, but also within the 
various institutions that interpellate subjects into bourgeois ideology. By suicidality, I mean 





forms of suicidal ideation, moments of imagining one’s self-inflicted death or another’s. And by 
“rehearsal,” I mean mainly two things.  
As a theatrical metaphor, a rehearsal presupposes a script or various scripts with which 
the performer is already familiar. Chapter one traces the bourgeois script that capitalist subjects 
are asked to embody and perform, one characterized by the absurd commodification of reified 
human energy.  
Day in and day out, we are asked to rehearse, to re-enact, to re-present ourselves to one 
another and to ourselves in various scenes in which our “value” is, as Marx argues, “fixed in 
advance.”4 Instead of seeing our activity as something that makes us human, as the very source 
of our humanity and our capacity to connect both with others and with the world around us, 
capitalism forces us to view our energy as a “thing” that must be sold in exchange for the 
resources we need to survive. As if we were commodities, something Marx came to call “dead-
labour,” we then rehearse our circumscribed roles in their creation and find our “value” realized 
only in relation to them. In many ways, as Boots Riley has it, we are to “Stick to the Script,” as if 
our rehearsals, bound as they are to the capital relation, are themselves those of dead labor.5 We 
then only see the effect return to us as “dead” in the form of the commodity itself. Thus, the 
modern subject is surrounded not by signs of life-affirming activity, but instead by “dead 
labour,” and modernist suicidality is a way of rehearsing this deadening scene of estrangement.  
But, of course, we’re not commodities. We are commodified, and our rehearsals of our 
bourgeois scripts are performances practiced repeatedly in the service of maintaining and 
expanding the function of the capital relation. It’s exhausting. And this performative nature of 
rehearsal is apt to describe suicidality. As we will see, the suicidal figures examined in this 





is not punctual or heroic in this way. Instead, modernist suicidal characters re-rehearse their 
social roles in the form of suicidal ideation that punctuates, interacts with, and alters the diegetic 
nature of the narrative in critical ways. In this regard, suicidality in modernist literature is 
recursive. As Michel Foucault has it, “there is no more beautiful form of conduct which, as a 
result, merits reflection with such great attention, than suicide. It would be a case of working on 
one’s suicide for all of one’s life.”6 The recursive character of rehearsal, its performative nature, 
and the ways in which through each performance we repeat, re-enact, and re-present the 
absurdity of the capital relation in different moments, situations, and in various social scenes 
provides us with opportunities to re-engage with the bourgeois absurdities of capitalism, making 
real for us our condition of estrangement under it. 
Which is to say, this dissertation contends that modernist representations of suicidal 
rehearsal amplify our modern condition of estrangement exacerbated by industrial capitalism in 
the middle nineteenth century and intensified throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
By amplify, I mean that our structural estrangement under capitalism has not only fueled our 
tendency toward thinking about our own self-inflicted death, but that suicidality extends and 
intensifies the logic of estrangement under capitalism onto bodily sites of fatalistic self-
estrangement. In short, suicide self-estranges us from our structural estrangement itself. We must 
contend with the fact that suicide holds this power, itself a power amplified by the many 
contradictions of our life under capitalism.  
By acknowledging suicidality in terms of the organization of our social lives under 
capitalism we may resist the predominant biopolitical tendency to frame suicide as a mere 
personal problem. As Ian Marsh writes, “suicide is now read, almost always, as a tragedy, one 





and management” in the service of “a compulsory ontology of pathology in relation to suicide.”7 
By acknowledging suicide as a social problem, we may open a space to challenge discourses 
about suicide in the mental health sciences that otherwise preclude suicidality as reflecting what 
is problematic and depressing about modern social life in the service of imagining it differently. 
Secondly, this dissertation argues that representations of suicidality invite us to imagine 
new forms of social reproduction—our creative energy, our capacity for creative action, for 
affection, affiliation, and freedom—in short, all the things that make life worth living. As 
Friedrich Nietzsche insisted, for instance, “[t]he thought of suicide is a powerful comfort: it helps 
one through many a dreadful night.”8 Or, as Walter Benjamin wrote: “In a dream I took my life 
with a gun. When it went off, I did not wake up but saw myself lying for a while as a corpse. 
Only then did I wake.”9 Neither calls upon suicide in terms of morbidity. Rather, both highlight 
suicidal thinking as a life-affirming practice. This dissertation privileges and amplifies the lively 
tendency found in suicidal representation throughout modernist literature. 
By acknowledging representations of suicidality as an active mode of social engagement, 
we may challenge our tendency to think of it as a rejection of or escape from each other or our 
world, on the one hand, and on the other, we may avow such representations as a method of 
imagining new forms of social reproduction, the conditions of possibility for which might 
already be here. As Donald Winnicott might insist, we may encounter a potentiality within our 
world “waiting to be created,” a potentiality that’s already there.10 In sum, representations of 
suicidality stage dynamic, sensuous affirmations of our creativity fueled by, yet resisting our 
lived estrangement under modern capitalist power with which we may better strive to imagine, 






By drawing out the criticality of suicidality and its representations, however, we cannot 
but confront its messy difficulties. And to be sure, in no way does this dissertation look to 
exhaust ontological and epistemic issues related to suicide.11 Rather, I would like to show how 
modernism anticipates and responds to a set of key difficulties explored by others throughout the 
long twentieth century. The first concerns critical differences between examining acts of 
corporeal suicide versus various forms of suicidal ideation.  
In Cruising Utopia, for instance, José Muñoz examines the aesthetics of the dancer Fred 
Herko’s 1964 suicide. After a bath in the apartment of his friend, Johnny Dodd, Herko performed 
a nude dance to Mozart’s Coronation Mass in C Major concluding in what Dodd recounted as a 
perfect jeté through the window down toward Cornelia Street. In contrast to normative ideas of 
surplus value associated with, as Muñoz describes, the “functionalism of capitalist flows,” he 
privileges the value of Herko’s a-capitalist “aesthetic excess” immanent in his suicidal 
performance. Yet toward the end of his chapter, Muñoz reflects, offering us a caveat about the 
implications of a politics of suicide. He writes, to “write or conjecture about suicide as a queer 
act, a performance of radical negativity, utopian in its negation of death as ultimate 
uncontrollable finitude, and not to think about what it symbolizes for a larger collectivity would 
be remiss.”12 And of course he is right; corporeal suicide often has destructive effects on the 
groups in which a person lived, loved, and connected. While tending to the critical value of 
suicidal performance, it would be irresponsible to suggest a positive politics of material, 
corporeal suicide. In light of the difficulties of such acts—acts which situate, as does capitalism 
itself, life in-the-balance—this dissertation examines something different, something I approach 






In thinking of the key concepts about what might be critical about the life-and-death 
stakes of modern suicidality, I have been inspired by Karl Marx’s almost extempore question in 
his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. In one of his conversations about the 
estranged relationship of the worker to the activity of labor, Marx asks, “for what is life but 
activity?”13 By “life,” what he means of course is one’s “physical and mental energy.” In relation 
to suicidality, I am interested in all the activity that appears to lead up to such an end. Which is to 
say, where the moment of corporeal suicide marks an end to one’s life, what about the diverse set 
of non-fatal acts I simply call suicidal activity—suicidal daydreaming, fantasy, and planning all 
the way to acts of non-fatal physical violence against one’s body, each and all conscious or 
otherwise? Moreover, what about modern suicidality’s literary representation—not only the 
writerly acts of producing such representations, but also the readerly acts of encountering them?  
My question is simple: Is not all this, too, lively activity? Consider, as Maurice Blanchot 
has it, the “attention to minutiae often symptomatic in those who are about to die” figured in the 
suicidal characters found throughout modernist writing? What of “the love for details, the 
patient, maniacal concern for the most mediocre realities”?14 What of, for instance, the ways in 
which Alexei Kirillov’s suicidality drives Dostoevsky’s Demons forward with disparate and 
fleeting affects and ideas that come together at various moments in the form of a question?  
During one of many scenes in which Dostoevsky’s cast of revolutionaries struggle to 
enact their mysterious plans, Kirillov is interrupted from a moment of suicidal ideation by 
Shatov who reminds Kirillov of their more immediate concerns: “‘Ah, yes,’ [Kirillov] 
remembered suddenly, as if tearing himself away with effort, and only for a moment, from some 
idea that held him fascinated, ‘yes…an old woman, right? I remember; I went; the old woman 





moments of eternal harmony?’” Not only is Kirillov’s moment of suicidal non sequitur 
humorous in its display of detail—“Take the pillow”? His explanation for his distraction, fallen 
on deaf ears, is poignant: 
Kirillov came to himself and—strangely—began to speak even far more coherently than 
he usually spoke; one could see that he had long been formulating it all, and perhaps had written 
it down: 
“There are seconds, they come only five or six at a time, and you suddenly feel the 
presence of eternal harmony, fully achieved. It is nothing earthly; not that it’s heavenly, but man 
cannot endure it in his earthly state. One must change physically or die. The feeling is clear and 
indisputable. As if you suddenly sense the whole of nature and suddenly say: yes, this is true. 
God, when he was creating the world, said at the end of each day of creation: ‘Yes, this is true, 
this is good.’ This…this is not tenderheartedness, but simply joy. You don’t forgive anything, 
because there’s no longer anything to forgive. You don’t really love—oh, what is here is higher 
than love! What’s most frightening is that it’s so terribly clear, and there’s such joy. If it were 
longer than five seconds—the soul couldn’t endure it and would vanish. In those five seconds I 
live my life through, and for them I would give my whole life, because it’s worth it.”  
 
In the conversation that follows, Shatov tries to diagnose Kirillov and convince him that his 
encounter with some alternate temporality is symptomatic of the aura experienced by epileptics, 
something from which Dostoevsky himself suffered, or enjoyed, as it were. Shatov warns, 
“Watch out, Kirillov, I’ve heard that this is precisely how the falling sickness starts…Watch out, 
Kirillov, it’s the falling sickness!,” to which Kirillov responds, chuckling softly, reminding 
Shatov that he is not to worry, for Kirillov is planning to kill himself: “It won’t have time.”15 
Modernist writers frame such moments, rich with detail, that demand further analysis. 
Or in another way, what of Jacques Peuchet, as the epigraph suggests, who writes of the 
“warm and characteristic expression,” that “kind of infectious enthusiasm” expressed “by 
despairing people preparing for their death”? What about, for instance, the felicitous effect of the 
suicidal fantasies of Septimus Warren Smith as he sits in Regents Park (developed further in 
chapter three)?  
He had only to open his eyes; but a weight was on them; a fear. He strained; he pushed; 
he looked; he saw Regent’s Park before him. Long streamers of sunlight fawned at his feet. The 
trees waved, brandished. We welcome, the world seemed to say; we accept; we create. Beauty, 





the railings, at the antelopes stretching over the palings, beauty sprang instantly. To watch a leaf 
quivering in the rush of air was an exquisite joy. Up in the sky swallowing swooping, swerving, 
flinging themselves in and out, round and round, yet always with perfect control as if elastics held 
them; and the flies rising and falling; and the sun spotting now this leaf, now that, in mockery, 
dazzling it with soft gold in pure good temper; and now and again some chime (it might be a 
motor horn) tinkling divinely on the grass stalks—all of this, calm and reasonable as it was, made 
our of ordinary things as it was, was the truth now; beauty, that was the truth now. Beauty was 
everywhere… 
He would turn around, he would tell them in a few moments, only a few moments more, 
of this relief, of this joy, of this astonishing revelation—16 
 
Both Dostoevsky and Woolf understood the aesthetic value of suicidal activity and the worlds 
that can be imagined from within such moments—expressions of felicitous solicitude. I want this 
dissertation to amplify our encounters with those worlds. What of that mode of activity, the 
liveliness inspired by entertaining one’s own or another’s death by suicide? Oughtn’t that too be 
thought a lively activity?  
Throughout the modern literature this dissertation examines, I am interested in the 
critical, aesthetic value of suicidal thinking and imagining. In sum, this dissertation is interested 
in suicidal activity as a mode-of-being-modern. It is not, of course, that to be modern, we must 
kill ourselves. Rather, it is that there is something critically and aesthetically valuable about 
suicidal activity and the signification of suicidality. As Benjamin has it in his later work, 
“modernity must stand under the sign of suicide.” 
* 
The second difficulty I would like to address about the study of suicide is a contemporary 
one whose legacy stems from a long material history situated at the intersection of capitalism, on 
the one hand, and the biopolitical discourse of the mental health sciences on the other. In 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx gestures toward everyday life outside 
the production and circulation processes of capitalism, highlighting the ways in which, when 





Political economy therefore does not recognize the unoccupied worker, the working man in so far 
as he is outside this work relationship. The swindler, the cheat, the beggar, the unemployed, the 
starving, the destitute and the criminal working man are figures which exist not for it, but only for 
other eyes—for the eyes of doctors, judges, grave-diggers, beadles, etc. Nebulous figures which 
do not belong within the province of political economy. Therefore as far as political economy is 
concerned, the requirements of the worker can be narrowed down to one: the need to support him 
while he is working and prevent the race of workers from dying out.17 
  
In The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault extends further an examination of our conditions of 
life “outside [the] work relationship,” as Marx suggests. Spotlighting various forms of regulation 
from within institutions such as the hospital, the prison, the school, and from within scenes of 
modern discourse involving race and sexuality, Foucault argues that such regulatory forms 
“incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize and organize the forces under it.”18 Foucault argues 
that in the historical shift from juridical power to modernized forms of biopower, modern power 
seeks to manage, administer, and control life, rather than threaten death.  
Foucault reads the development of regulatory forces of biopower alongside developments 
in capitalist modes of production in a mutually reinforcing way. As he writes, the “adjustment of 
the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the 
expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in 
part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application.” Foucault argues, 
“bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism.”19 
And while speaking about modern biopower, the idea of suicide was at the forefront of 
Foucault’s mind.  
In his final section of The History of Sexuality, “Right of Death and Power over Life,” 
Foucault foregrounds his examination of modern power by remarking, “death is power’s limit: 
the moment that escapes it.”20 Foucault gestures toward the historical relationship between 






It is not surprising that suicide…became, in the course of the nineteenth century, one of the first 
conducts to enter into the sphere of sociological analysis; it testified to the individual and private 
right to die, at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life. This 
determination to die…was one of the first astonishments of a society in which political power had 
assigned itself the task of administering life.21 
 
Inasmuch as this new form of power was about the administration of life—disciplining the body, 
especially its biological and mental processes in the service of capital—death, then, became a 
newly compelling form of resistance to it such that suicide described an escape from such power. 
Social scientists sought to make suicide itself into an object of knowledge.22 Late nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century psychiatric and sociological sciences name two significant regulatory 
institutions of power that have dominated the meaning of “le mal du siècle” with which 
modernist writers responded, contended with, and critiqued.23 And although Foucault only 
briefly discusses these forces in terms of suicide, historical scholarship on the conceptual 
modernization of suicide extends his claims whose raison d’être we still feel today.24 
In the United States, as of 2017, suicide has been one of the second-leading causes of 
death among people aged 10-34, and fourth among those 35-54.25 Suicide is clearly a problem. 
And the biopolitical problem surrounding discourse on suicide is tied to it. The problem is two-
fold, concerning the tension created by resisting stigma, on the one hand, while forestalling risk 
on the other. Anyone who’s listened to American public talk radio in the month of September, 
for instance, will know that the common idea about suicide prevention is that we need to resist 
the stigma surrounding suicide by insisting upon a productive conversation about it in the service 
of mitigating its frequency. However helpful this may be for some, for others, there’s a catch. 
Suicidal subjects are called upon to generate language about their suicidality that is then 
used to fuel biopolitical, pro-capitalist ideologies of subjection at the expense of alternate 
formulations. When suicidal subjects are called upon to voice their concerns, those concerns are 





their own suicidality while reinforcing discourses dominated by the compulsory ontology of 
pathology mentioned from the outset. In short, a person cannot entertain ending one’s life, a 
sickness does.  
By lodging the agency of suicidality only as something pathological, mental health care 
professionals limit the voices of the very people with whom they try to come to terms. As Lisa 
Lieberman writes, those in the medical sciences historically have “felt no qualms about 
disregarding the stated motivations of potential suicides in order to rid them of their delusions.”26 
By using the vocabulary of contemporary mental health science, we are left hearing a 
compulsory chorus of passive victims of some sort of pathological self-destruction. The 
biopolitical message is clear: It’s OK to be sick. Ascent to pathology supersedes fear of stigma.  
 Which leads me to the second bit. By lodging the agency of suicidality in terms of some 
pathogen, not only do we tend to remain blind to the value of alternative logics of suicidal 
subjects, but we simultaneously tend to frame that pathogen in terms of the stuff of contagion. 
Suicidality comes to name a bug we can catch.27 
One of the most insistent takes on suicide-as-contagion is found in Jennifer Michael 
Hecht’s Stay: A History of Suicide and the Arguments Against It, whose otherwise heartfelt 
contribution to the discourse on suicide-prevention indeed stands apart. In her book, Hecht 
responds to the devastating loss of two of her close friends. Hecht suspects a connection between 
the two suicides, the second one two years after the first, and in her historical account of suicide, 
she describes phenomena understood in sociological and epidemiological study as “suicidal 
clusters,” various moments throughout history during which we indeed observe waves of 
suicides.28 Hecht writes, “whether you call it contagion, suicidal clusters, or sociocultural 





who knew the person and among the strangers who somehow identified with the victim.” What’s 
more, Hecht is so convinced about suicide as a contagion that she tries to convince her readers 
that “suicidal influence is strong enough that a suicide might also be considered a homicide.”29 
Her work, like so many others in the field of suicidology, is painfully moralistic. For however 
uncomfortable it is to witness a writer describe her two close friends as murderers, I would also 
like to highlight that there is another sort of discomfort found in her work with regard to suicidal 
ideation. 
Throughout her otherwise well-researched book about suicide and its prevention, Hecht 
acknowledges, yet dismisses the value of suicidal ideation as a preventative measure against 
corporeal suicide itself. Of suicidal ideation, she writes,  
Sometimes when a person is feeling very bad and perhaps very scared, it can be a comfort to 
know that if she ever comes to a place where the pain is too much, she would have an out. I have 
no wish to deprive anyone of consolation, especially since most people whom the option would 
comfort are unlikely ever to follow through with the act…Maybe such thoughts are harmless, but 
maybe they are not. Would it not be better, and more useful, for that fearful person to comfort 
herself by remembering that the intelligence and strength that got her through past trials are apt to 
get her through further trials as well?30 
 
By suggesting that “most people whom the option would comfort are unlikely ever to follow 
through with the act,” Hecht acknowledges the potential value of suicidal ideation for a suicidal 
subject. And while I am grateful for the shout out, Hecht’s contempt for the value of suicidal 
ideation outshines her otherwise sharp observation. For although she suggests that suicidal 
ideation might prove “harmless,” nowhere does she suggest that it might prove helpful. Nowhere 
in her work can suicidal activity be understood itself as a mitigating factor for the frequency of 
corporeal suicide.  
Hecht’s stance, here, is muted. Her book, from which this passage comes, itself has a 
history. In the painful events that led her to this passage, she has written other dismissive and 





suicides, Hecht took to a blog, The Best American Poetry, and published in January 2010 what 
she describes as an “open-letter essay,” titled “On Suicide.” In the essay, Hecht casually 
proclaims, “I’m issuing a rule. You are not allowed to kill yourself.” I admire her boldness! In 
addition to her proscription, however, Hecht then insists to her readers, “you are going to like 
this,” and offers a behavioral prescription to whom she assumes may be her potentially suicidal 
readers, again, one we are supposed to “like.” She writes, “next time you are seriously 
considering suicide you can dismiss it quickly and go play a video game.”31  
While I am convinced of Hecht’s good intentions in desiring a sort of modern prohibition 
against that which caused her pain while searching for anything at all for a suicidal person to do 
rather than engage in suicidality, her prescription risks a sort of daftness, whose glib tenor, 
especially for a suicidal person, may infuriate. This is precisely the sort of approach Donald 
Winnicott abhorred when he wrote, 
It is no good offering cheer to a depressed person or jogging [them] up and down, offering sweet-
meats and pointing to the trees and saying: ‘See the lovely shimmering green leaves.’ To the 
depressed person the tree looks dead and the leaves are still. Or there are no leaves and there is 
only the black and blasted heath and the barren landscape. We only make fools of ourselves if we 
offer good cheer.32 
 
Rather than tell the suicidal person how to behave or what to think, or not, oughtn’t we first 
acknowledge, as had Winnicott, that symptoms are only problematic when they don’t work for 
somebody?33 All of which is to say, of the calls to speak suicide’s name, a stigma still remains, 
namely, we are not supposed to think about suicide. The predominant idea is that there is nothing 
productive to say from the position of the suicidal subject other than something regretful. Or, in 
yet another way, the discourse on suicide and suicidal ideation suggests that we have nothing to 
learn from the suicidality of the suicidal subject other than something pathological. This 







By resisting stigma while forestalling risk, the biopolitical abjection of the critical voices 
of suicidality functions as a powerful mechanism of repressive control that simultaneously 
produces an active mute, or troublesome blind spot. I have found this blind spot best illuminated, 
and as such resisted, by Drew Daniel, whose comments on the demand for different lines of 
inquiry into suicidal ideation have amplified my own ability to speak and influenced the mode of 
address this dissertation takes. 
In response to and on the very day of Anthony Bourdain’s death, Daniel worried about 
the challenges of his own academic work on suicide. He writes: 
As some of you know, I’m writing a book about suicide. This means that every time there’s a 
massively publicized suicide, I have to reflect again about why I keep going with this project and 
the risks of that. It’s hard to talk about and that is part of why I am working on it. Here’s some of 
my recent worrying at the topic: The standard alibi when we want to write about a subject, and 
especially a painful and violent topic, is to claim that our first and foremost goals are compassion 
and understanding. Thus the critic is valorized as an ethical agent replacing ignorance with 
insight, cruelty with clarity. But suicide radiates certain distortion effects that trouble this critical 
narrative by pitting understanding and compassion against each other. Chiefly, to articulate why 
someone would want to kill themselves is to potentially increase the risk that someone else will 
kill themselves. To talk about suicide at all is to risk “romanticizing” the subject for an imaginary 
someone who is thus constituted as vulnerable. Talking someone off a ledge becomes the 
paradigm for public speech about suicide; the other is framed as at risk, in need of manipulation 
away from their own projected desires and tendencies. This is more than a little paternalizing, 
and, worse, it surrenders a subject to protocols that reify the control of a “chemocratic” 
administered world in which the pathologization and medicalization of suicide has become an 
irrefutable conversation-stopper. These normative assumptions stop the full exploration of 
suicide, and [make] certain statements off-limits. Some would respond that if the result is that one 
less person commits suicide, then that outcome would justify such cordon-ing off of the topic. 
But when the subject is the history of representations of suicide, the critical exposition of suicidal 
ideation requires that we inhabit its dark nest of images, ideas, and assumptions.34 
 
Of all that is admirable in Daniel’s thinking—the self-awareness of the critic, the compassionate 
consideration of whom he would describe as self-killers and others like them, the contempt for 
pathologization and medicalization, and the imperative to keep thinking—what is most notable is 
the way in which Daniel acknowledges that we have more yet to learn about suicidality. 





through and over the biopolitics about suicide from within one’s suicidal ideation. Few ever call 
upon us to speak of that “dark nest of images, ideas, and assumptions.” And almost no one insists 
that we “inhabit” them in an effort to understand them. Which is to say, not only does Daniel 
acknowledge the pedagogical value of suicidal ideation—what the suicidality of suicidal subjects 
can teach us. He also understands that value as something better understood by way of our social 
relation, by way of our solicitude of, toward, and for one another. His call to “inhabit” the 
histories of suicidality, its “dark nest of images, ideas, and assumptions,” presupposes that we all 
can play a part in better understanding and contending with corporeal suicide. In sum, Daniel’s 
rejoinder frames the burden of understanding suicidality as something we all share, for his call 
names a requirement for compassionately understanding the ways in which “suicides remind us 
of the constraints built into our freedom.” 
* 
In many ways, I want this dissertation to tell a story, one whose mode of address is 
influenced not only by Daniel’s sensitivities, but also by the concept found in Benjamin. As he 
writes: “A story does not aim to convey an event per se, which is the purpose of information; 
rather, it embeds the event in the life of the storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to 
those listening. It thus bears the trace of the storyteller, much the way an earthen vessel bears the 
trace of the potter’s hand.”35 
As I said from the outset, what I have to say in this dissertation oughtn’t surprise 
anybody—anybody who knows me. I inhabit and have been inhabiting those dark nests of 
images, ideas, and assumptions since my middle teens. I have driven at, and past, those trees. I 
have made sure the coasts have been clear, positioning my various cars in front of those various 





unprotected from those in our lot who may drive. I have loaded and chambered those little, 
dangerous things into those other dangerous, little machines. I have stared at the currents and 
eddies. I have even fantasized, upon running out of eggs, especially on my budget, violent trips 
to grocery stores set in motion by the need to secure those missing ingredients for my partner’s 
dinner cooling on the countertop. I have fallen asleep too many times to count to the noun 
phrase, ‘a bullet through my head.’ I have been, am, and by all indications, will continue to be 
symptomatic of that which I study. Yet throughout my suicidal activity, I cannot but be inspired 
by the words of other fellow travelers, fictional or otherwise. 
On August 10, 2018, for instance, Richard Russell, a baggage handler, commandeered his 
employer’s Embraer Q400 airplane and took off from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, 
alone. Just over an hour later, he landed what had become his plane on Ketron Island in the 
Puget Sound, effectively ending his life. In the interim, air traffic control contacted Russell in an 
effort to understand his motives and ultimately, to coerce Russell to bring the plane down on 
their terms. From within his suicidal performance, enjoying all the views of the Puget Sound 
from above, Russell responded, “Yeah, I’m not quite ready to bring it down just yet.” Taking in 
“all the sights” during his “moment of serenity,” Russell even flirts with air traffic control, 
asking after the cite of an event he’d recently heard about in the news. He exclaims: “Hey! I 
want the coordinates of that orca with the…you know…the mama orca with the baby? I wanna 
go see that...” He even asked for advice on how to perform some specific maneuvers before 
completing, successfully, a series of aerial acrobatics.36 In the joyous moments before his death, 
Russell’s suicidal activity, like that of so many others, amplified him. 
Which is to say, I would like to highlight the ways in which suicidal activity can reveal a 





of social reproduction—has reconnected me to the potential for a world that might already be 
there, if only our relations to it were activated differently. By way of my suicidal mode of 
engagement, the social protocols of normative, capitalist engagement have momentarily fallen 
away. As Marx has written, the “properties of a thing do not arise from its relation to other 
things, they are, on the contrary, merely activated by such relations.”37 I argue that suicidality 
describes an alternate mode of activation—activating a way of re-imagining our relationship to 
materiality and to one another—through which we may encounter our worlds otherwise. 
Like Septimus, as I have encountered that tree, the tree “brandished,” ceasing to be the 
city’s tree planted on that tree lawn. Rather the tree exhibits the shape, texture, and materiality of 
its bark.38 In anticipation of my decreased proximity to the wall of the big box store, that 
concrete wall ceases to function as some unit of mere fixed capital. Likewise, the pole ceases to 
mediate mere, commodified electrification, while the dumpster’s chipped paint presents itself not 
as some component of cost. Rather, I have been struck by images of the binding capabilities of 
cement, the curiosity of circuitry, and what my bumper’s mark would contribute to the waste of 
capitalization, the archive of scars monumentalized on that vessel of constant capital. Of the 
interstate bridge abutment? The threat of cold-war kabooms dissolve into an appreciation of our 
deployment of physics—our ruse on gravity. A fucking egg? How ludicrous it is to feel trumped 
by a single-cell ingredient I cannot afford—that particular ingredient that would satisfactorily 
complete my partner’s workday, setting the stage for yet another, the potency of that re-
potentialized ovum sought after to reproduce our sociality? 
My suicidal activity has offered me an alternate mode of sensuous engagement, not only 
with our materiality, but also, and especially, with our solicitude. The expression on my dog’s 





herself with that brass, that lead, the scent of that poison permeating the chamber, all in the 
service of straightening that tilted head known of courageous dogs struggling to confront their 
own fears. But then I anticipate the effect of that sound—the effect for which I will not prime 
her, let alone her potential encounter with my corpse. I mean, while alone, I anticipate what my 
body might appear like swirling around in circles in that eddy. I have wondered whether I’d 
appear to those who find me as peacefully as I would like. But what of the risk of presenting a 
different image in the minds of my captors? Were I to kill myself, I’d damn sure get it right, you 
know? My anticipation has set in motion such anxieties, and from within those moments fraught 
with anxiety, I realize how little any of it is about me. 
Heidegger seemed to know this too. In a passage I’ve not seen referenced enough, he 
wrote of the value of the anticipation of our death that suicidality can make available: 
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the 
possibility of being itself…in an impassioned freedom toward death—a freedom which has been 
released from the Illusions of the ‘they’, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.39  
 
And of course, Heidegger argues that such anxiety also names care. For it is difficult to deny that 
whatever I have imagined suicide might do for me, it might also do something else, something 
different, to others. And again, I am reminded of my fellow traveler, Richard Russell, who 
exclaimed to his air traffic controller during his suicidal flight, “I’m sorry about this. I hope it 
doesn’t ruin your day.”40 Or better yet, as MC Ride insists in his aesthetic representation of 
suicidality-as-solicitude, “All the nights I don’t die for you/Wouldn’t believe how many nights I 
ain’t died for you on GP.”41 If only such a principle could be generalized.  
Yet voicing my own suicidality is not the unsurprising part, or rather, the unsurprising 
part that I risk. As Daniel writes, the “protocols of censure or evasion are incompatible with the 
sympathetic investments that” “literary critical interpretations…require on their way to synthetic 





others in such ways that I no longer sing some kind of suicidal solo-act, but rather risk, in this 
dissertation, narrating a story about an age-old chorus of suicidality found throughout modernist 
literature. In this dissertation, I am not alone, and there’s less risk here. 
* 
“Under the Sign of Suicide” highlights the ways in which representations of suicidality in 
modernist literature indicate the degree to which capitalist modernity has been felt as so 
totalizing and complete that efforts to imagine escaping from such powerful forces has invited 
fantastically violent escapes from life itself. Yet by reading a little more closely and paying 
attention to the varied, yet subtle conditions of possibility for the amplification of suicidality 
under capitalism, we may understand modern suicidality as a mode of perception of our modern 
world, on the one hand, and on the other, as a mode of productive performance—a rehearsal—
that invites us to imagine how we might begin to repair our broken relation to this world.  
Although developed more thoroughly in chapter two, these two operations—perception 
and production—name what Benjamin describes as the mimetic faculty, a theoretical concept 
central to my thinking.42 Benjamin argues that the mimetic faculty is a basic human capacity 
whose operations perceive and produce similarities. At its most innocuous, Benjamin invites us 
to imagine the child miming the function of some object, a “windmill.”43 We encounter the 
child’s arms, stretched out, beginning to rotate. We may laugh. We may play along, as well, 
reminding the child how windy it is today in an effort to amplify the child-windmill’s 
performance—and enjoyment. And ours. But in the process, we may also become more aware of 
something, a risk. We may warn the child-windmill to be careful not to damage the blades, or 
those gears. Our response may be playful, but we know the child’s mimetic performance has 





productions can remind of our humane materiality. We are asked to mime machines all the time. 
But through that mimicry, we can remind ourselves that we are still, indeed, embodied people. 
And we mime a lot. Yet the lot of mimetic centers and mimetic objects may be difficult 
to identify as such. As Benjamin writes, “not only are the objects of this mimetic force 
innumerable, but the same thing may be said of the subjects, of the mimetic centers that may be 
numerous within every being.”44 What he means is that everything exists in a relation of 
similarity. Everything is in a condition of being-similar in one way or another, and he wants to 
attune us to those mimetic centers rather than have us struggle with lines of incommensurability, 
on the one hand, and equivalence and exchangeability, on the other. What’s more, Benjamin 
argues that not all mimetic productions are obvious to us, nor innocuous. What happens, for 
instance, when we mime a problem, a contradiction, or all the forms of nefarious relations we 
encounter throughout our daily lives under capitalism? What happens when we mime the 
egregious horrors of the bourgeoisie? Or a loss? By tending to the ways in which the mimetic 
faculty plays a part in the rehearsals our interactions with various objects, scenes, situations, 
problems, contradictions, and on and on, we must simultaneously remind ourselves of our 
relationships to the world that situate us within our lived histories in critical ways. Our close 
proximity to our mimeses, however, may make this difficult. We sometimes require critical 
distance in the service of productive criticism. 
An acknowledgement of the critical value of the mimetic faculty can be made vivid, 
however, by tending to the aesthetic products made possible by its various operations throughout 
history. We have an archive. Although set in motion by their various engagements with the 
world, the mimetic productions of modernist writers offer us something distinct, allowing us to 





Literary productions establish for us a critical distance from our own mimetic performances such 
that they can invite us—through our own mimetic reception—to better analyze, evaluate, and 
ultimately better understand the various ways in which different social problems are imbricated 
in different mimetic productions themselves. Which is to say, modernist literature names a 
valuable resource for identifying the critical projects in which our mimetic faculties may 
participate. 
The chapters that compose this dissertation are connected by a shared preoccupation with 
deathly and suicidal thought images whose externalization and objectification in literary form 
make available to readers an opportunity to encounter, inhabit, analyze, and evaluate the ways in 
which our liveliness, framed through deathly and suicidal imagery, may be imagined in new, 
more critical and productive ways. 
Chapters one and two are intimately related, as both set up a more theoretical approach to 
the historical conditions of possibility for modernist representations of suicidality, on the one 
hand, and on the other, set up the terms by which chapters three and four then explore aesthetic 
expressions of the criticality of suicidality in modernist fiction. 
Chapter one examines works by and attributed to Karl Marx and argues that modern 
suicidality follows a similar course as our estrangement under capitalism. Marx briefly examined 
suicide as a social problem in his 1845 translation, “Peuchet: On Suicide.” Yet it is in his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 where he emphasizes the ways in which we 
affectively encounter capitalism on a more subjective level, on the one hand, and it is throughout 
Capital where he mediates the structural mechanisms by which people have become estranged 
on the other. By drawing from each, I put in conversation our more subjective experience of 





ways in which persistent deathly and suicidal thought-images function as a way of tracing our 
experience under capitalism as it has moved throughout history—the ways in which we 
encounter, as Marx insists, the “rule of things over man, of dead labor over the living.” By 
examining the history of capitalism in terms of estrangement, we may better understand the ways 
in which the commodification of reified human activity that makes capitalism possible also sets 
in motion the appearance of an “I” that labors, a mimetic reproduction of dead labor 
misidentified as our corporeal bodies upon which suicidality tends to direct its aggression. In 
short, chapter one argues that our suicidality rehearses the contradictions bound up in the capital 
relation through which we may avow the violent conditions of our estranged life under 
capitalism.  
Chapter two draws out the dissertation’s most significant theoretical claims. Inspired by 
Walter Benjamin, whose own suicidal activity influenced his later writing, I develop further 
Benjamin’s work with the mimetic faculty and trace the ways in which Charles Baudelaire, one 
of Benjamin’s protagonists, engages in suicidal mimeses that exhibit an allegorical function, 
revealing the absurdity of the commodification of reified human activity, on the one hand, while 
giving lie to the affective apprehension of death implicit in our experience of capitalist 
modernity, on the other. I argue that Baudelaire’s mimetic immersion within the Paris Arcades 
names a critical mimesis of the deathly logic of the capital relation drawn out in chapter one. By 
approaching suicidality as an allegorical, critical mimesis, we may better understand suicidality 
within our lived histories under capitalism; we may better acknowledge the ways in which the 
allegorical value of suicidal activity affirms our humanity; and we may help mitigate the 






Chapters three and four examine such critical portrayals by analyzing two key modernist 
novels whose representations of suicide stake claims in the changing and localized 
materialization of power and resistance in terms of class, gender & sexuality, and race.  
Chapter three examines Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway and highlights the relationship 
between Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway’s suicidal mimesis which take the form of 
fantasy. Septimus, a queer, working-class, shell-shocked veteran of the European war, struggles 
to engage with predominant biopolitical prescriptions in relation to his suicidality. Against his 
doctors’ best wishes, he engages in suicidal fantasies that mimic his involvement in the Great 
War in strikingly therapeutic ways that then only further invite and exacerbate medical 
surveillance and control. Although his suicidal mimeses provide him with affective 
empowerment, Septimus eventually kills himself in the face of intensified medical pressure, an 
event through which Clarissa identifies and subsequently reflects on her own bourgeois life, 
mired in biopolitical surveillance. Where keeping suicidal fantasy close in mind momentarily 
helps Septimus, I argue that Clarissa’s own suicidal mimeses have become her method of 
psychic and affective survival in the face of her own losses, her key to her being-alive. 
Chapter four examines James Baldwin’s Another Country. From the outset, readers are 
invited to accompany Rufus Scott as he engages in suicidal ideation. Wandering the streets of 
New York, readers quickly realize that Rufus—a jazz musician—is out of work, out of friends, 
and too humiliated to face his family in Harlem. Most importantly, we realize Rufus is 
improvising from within a mimetic immersion organized by various forces of heteronormative, 
white supremacy through which he internalizes his blackness and queerness as a problem. 
Despite his improvisational, suicidal mimeses, Rufus’ experience with the violence of 





Within this white-supremacist, heteronormative world, readers accompany Rufus as he climbs 
atop the George Washington Bridge. And with his “eyes toward heaven,” Rufus asks, “Ain’t I 
your baby, too?” Rufus’ suicide names not only a mimetic figuration of the violence of white 
supremacy from within capitalist modernity, but also a strong critique of that world itself. Rufus’ 
suicidality stands as an imperative to imagine another world, or “another country,” as Baldwin’s 
title suggests.  
* 
In closing, while drafting this dissertation I have had to wager what I must imagine as an 
unsurprising risk, one that has helped me speak to you. While my suicidal activity in no small 
part informs the presentation of this writing, this dissertation tells more than a mere story. It also 
wagers an assumption about its audience based on an observation in Marx. In his 1844 
manuscripts, Marx writes, “in so far as [people], and hence also [their] feelings, etc., are human, 
the affirmation of [an] object by another is also [one’s] own gratification.”45 Which is to say, if I 
have found a value in suicidal activity amplified by modernist literature, what about others?  
What about you?  
Might I risk such an assumption? I mean, I already have. But might I risk pretending, at 
least, that more people tend to engage in suicidal activity than we may otherwise tend to 
acknowledge? And, might I risk that we probably tend to like it, at least a little—at least some 
bits of it? The part, every now and again, when we affirm our sensuous engagement with the 
world, our liveliness, and our solicitude? I know I like that bit. It’s helped me stick around. 
I am reminded of Naked Lunch, in which William S. Burroughs repeatedly asks, in a not 
dissimilar context, “Wouldn’t you?”46 I mean, in the face of suffering, yet surviving our lived, 





and in addition, in the face of suffering and surviving the various mechanisms of biopower that 
organize our lives, wouldn’t you think about suicide, your own or another’s? Or, perhaps more 
strongly, haven’t you? Or, won’t you? 
You have my sympathies. And I beg your pardon alongside those of the corporeal 
suicides, as all of this is quite messy.  
But I wager that those who have engaged in suicidal activity have something to teach 
us—that we may learn from those of our lot. Again, “for what is life but activity?” So, what 
about suicidal activity? Despite the pain, or precisely because of suicidal reactions to it, oughtn’t 
that activity be thought lively? And mightn’t that activity, framed as a lively one, help mitigate 
that pain? 
I like these kinds of questions, because among other things, they demonstrate the value of 
thinking in auxiliary modes. Questions like these can help us by way of the auxiliary function of 
their verbs, also sometimes called modal verbs. Modal verbs express necessity and/or possibility, 
and in the face of the most predominant, modern mode of production, modal verbs like these—
would, have, will, may, might, ought, and on and on—especially when combined with suicide, 
enable an encounter that may help us avow the necessity of thinking about our liveliness in new 
ways, namely, in the service of imagining and creating other, possible modes of social 
reproduction. For suicidal activity, perhaps surprisingly, I wager, names one mode of lively 
activity under capitalism that may help us point toward other, better modes of production, 
perhaps some less suicidal.  
I can only anticipate.  





But I’d gladly risk the painful part of my tendency toward suicidal activity, which is to 








“A Mysterious Antithesis”  
Capitalism and Suicidality 
 
The supersession [Aufhebung] of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-
estrangement. 
 
Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 
 
 
I want that epigraph to read differently. As suicide itself names one form of self-
estrangement, I want that epigraph to suggest that understanding our condition of estrangement 
under capitalism is necessary for contending with modern suicidality. Ultimately, I want it to say 
that our suicidality tends to follow a similar course as our estrangement under modern 
capitalism—that each phenomenon is connected. And while Karl Marx briefly examines suicide 
as a social problem of estrangement in his 1845 article, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” the epigraph 
comes from Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. For it is there where he 
emphasizes more thoroughly the ways in which we affectively encounter capitalism on a more 
subjective level. Capital, then, mediates more carefully the structural mechanisms of 
estrangement in the modern era. By drawing from each, I look to put into conversation the 
tendencies of our more subjective experience of capitalism, on the one hand, with those of our 
structural economic conditions, on the other, all in the service of highlighting the ways in which 
persistent deathly and suicidal thought-images function in anti-capitalist thought as a way of 
capturing how it has felt to suffer capitalism throughout its history. I argue that by examining the 
historical development of estrangement under capitalism, we may better understand the ways in 
which the reified human activity that makes capitalist production possible sets in motion the 
appearance of an ad hominem “I” that labors, a fantastical, bourgeois subjectivity misidentified 





tendency toward suicidality is a way of avowing the violent conditions of our estranged life 
under capitalism.  
I am also, and perhaps more, interested in the ways in which we fall short of corporeal 
suicide, namely, our suicidal activity—nonfatal behavior characterized by suicidal daydreaming, 
fantasy, ideation, and planning, all the way to nonfatal acts of physical violence against one’s 
body. I argue that literary moments of suicidal activity often reveal a somewhat surprising 
affirmation of the power to live, the power, even, of joy, as Spinoza might have it.1 I am curious 
about the extent to which such moments of suicidal activity may be understood as modes of 
utopian thinking, imagining our conditions in the world other than they are in the service of 
material, social change. By way of illustration, I offer Marx’s and Engel’s slight, but illuminating 
analysis of Eugène Sue’s character, Fleur de Marie, whose suicidal activity confirms her 
estrangement under capitalism on a more subjective level, but also functions as a lively mode of 
being-in-the-world that helps her stay in her world. This chapter is interested in the ways in 
which suicidal activity may draw our attention to our social structures while revealing a 
relatively unexamined way of reconnecting with our worlds. I argue that modern suicidal activity 
can function not only as a way of confirming our collective estrangement. More importantly, 
suicidal activity can also function as a de-reifying affirmation of the possibility of imagining new 
forms of social reproduction. 
 
ENTFREMDUNG & SUICIDE 
 
…because each is a stranger to himself and all are strangers to one another. 
 







In Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx asks, “for what is life but 
activity?,” a question whose volume has tended to deafen us toward the necessity of answering in 
the affirmative, as if we haven’t been able to listen.2 Embedded in this simple, rhetorical question 
(Hey, look what I did?), and its necessary affirmation (Oh, how lovely!), is what I understand as 
Marx’s approach to value in general. Value names our enjoyment of objectified human activity, 
powered by life’s energy, reflected back to us from within our worlds. At times, this reflection 
appears to us in the form of an affirmation by another (Oh, how lovely!). At others, it appears to 
us by way of our historically sensuous apprehension of our worlds themselves, as Marx famously 
stated, “The senses have therefore become theoreticians in their immediate praxis.”3  
And, of course, value is more than that. Or, rather, the character of value can manifest in 
different ways. It depends on its mode of production. And what I mean is that, throughout his 
work, Marx lucidly defines value as the historical externalization and objectification of human 
activity, a seemingly innocuous process capable of nefarious manipulation. Slavery names one 
mode of that nefariousness, as does feudalism. Capitalism, of course, names yet another. In other 
words, in his more mature work, which takes capitalism as its focus, Marx defines the character 
of value not only as the externalization and objectification of human activity, but as the nefarious 
effect of labor-power. Labor-power, in other words, is Marx’s translated idiom for that which 
produces value under capitalism. As such, value names “nothing other than objectified labour” 
produced by “self-acting, value-creating labour-power, living labour.”4 Marx argues, value 
“appears in all forms in the shape of a thing, be it an object or be it a relation mediated through 
the object.”5 Yet under capitalist modes of production, this relation has taken aberrant forms. 





the commodity itself generates its own value, masking its cause. In short, capitalism names an 
aberrant mode of objectification, the effects from which we have become estranged.  
And to be sure, by estrangement, I mean to emphasize less the effects of the innocuous 
activity of externalization and objectification, or the more problematic conditions of alienation 
(Entäusserung), as labor had become more formally subsumed under capital.6 Rather, I mean to 
emphasize estrangement (Entfremdung). As Benton explains, “Entfremdung suggests more 
strongly than Entäusserung that man is opposed by an alien power which he himself has 
produced but which now governs him.”7 Yet, before unpacking that suggestion, I would like to 
argue that embedded within conditions of estrangement is a key to understanding modern 
suicidality.  
* 
In the middle 1840s, Marx too was preoccupied with such connections. In 1844, Marx 
had begun highlighting the subjective effects of our structural estrangement under capitalist 
modes of production. For Marx, estrangement manifests in four ways: workers find themselves 
estranged from the products of our activity, from productive activity itself, from our own 
humanity, and from each other. And in each section of “Estranged Labour” in which Marx draws 
out estrangement’s four-part materialization, we find estrangement described in ways that 
resonate with death and suicidality. Marx describes estrangement from the products of labor as a 
“loss of reality;” from productive activity as “self-sacrifice;” from humanity as a “tear[ing] 
away” from one’s “own body;” and from one another as a process in which our “vitality” stands 
“as a sacrifice of life.”8 In each of his four analyses, Marx’s language sets in mind deathly, 
suicidal thought-images that, I argue, have become compelling and precise ways to characterize 





By 1845, just one year later, Marx examined corporeal suicides themselves most 
explicitly as historical sites of criticality vis-à-vis our estrangement under capitalism. “Peuchet: 
On Suicide” is an inspiringly odd document.9 
Unlike Marx’s other short articles, “Peuchet: On Suicide” functions as both a critical 
article and a translation of the French critic, revolutionary, physician, economist, police 
administrator, and police archivist, Jacques Peuchet’s 1838 memoir, Mémoires tirés des archives 
de la police de Paris, pour sevir à l’histoire de la morale et de la police, despuis Louis XIV 
jusqu’à nos jours. Marx plays specifically with chapter fifty-eight, “Du suicide et de ses causes,” 
“Suicide and its causes.” By plays, I mean that in addition to offering a German translation, 
Marx also includes a brief introduction; he rearranges Peuchet’s original text; he adds italicized 
emphases; and he altogether changes some of Peuchet’s meanings here and there. At moments, 
he interjects with brief digressions. At others, he omits entire sentences and adds his own 
substitutions.10 For instance, where Peuchet announces his purpose, “[w]ithout engaging in any 
theoretical investigation, I shall try to adduce facts,” Marx instead offers, “I found that any 
attempts short of a total reform of the present order of society would be in vain.”11 Close 
enough! “Peuchet: On Suicide” is perhaps best understood, as Kevin Anderson writes, as an 
“edited” translation, to which I might add—à la manière du matérialisme historique.12 Like 
many of Marx’s earlier works, it’s a fun read. 
In Marx’s article, we learn that Peuchet’s position within the police administration asked 
him to respond to suicides as part of his responsibilities, and in his memoir, he wrote about a host 
of then contemporary suicides. He examines most specifically those of three young women and 
one young man. All were French bourgeoisie. The first details a daughter of a tailor who “rushed 





with her fiancé. The next, a young creole’s sister-in-law, had also “drowned herself” after 
suffering years of confinement and torture on the behalf of her wealthy and jealous husband. The 
third Peuchet describes as a niece of a Paris banker who, after failing to secure the abortion of 
her married lover’s fetus, “had slipped and fallen into a brook on the estate of her guardians at 
Villemomble and had drowned.” And finally, a guard in the royal palace, after losing both his 
job and failing to secure any future prospects, despite his best efforts, “killed himself.”13 Peuchet 
does not disclose the man’s method.  
But rather than detail these incidents with the moral fervor of his contemporaries, 
Peuchet’s characterization of these victims stood apart.14 In addition to offering great detail about 
the social circumstances of each suicide, he describes all of the victims as exhibiting “this 
energetic driving force of personality” with an “infectious enthusiasm” and “excellent spirit.” 
Peuchet continues, that maintaining a “greatness of soul,” each testifies to the ways in which 
their suicides “rebel against the thought of occupying a place of honour among the hangmen.” In 
short, Peuchet describes these suicides as embodying, albeit tragically, a critical “love of life 
itself” in stark contrast to then predominant French attitudes toward suicide.15 As Peuchet 
describes: 
“Everything that has been said against suicide goes round and round in the same circle of ideas. 
People cite against it the decrees of Providence, but the existence of suicide is itself an open 
protest against her indecipherable decrees. They talk to us of our duties to this society without 
explaining or implementing our own claims on society, and finally they exalt the thousand times 
greater merit of overcoming pain rather than succumbing to it, a merit as sad as the prospects it 
opens up. In short, they make of suicide an act of cowardice, a crime against the law…and 
honour.”16 
 
Resisting the French tendency to moralize suicide at the time, Peuchet describes his intention, as 
mentioned above, to avoid “engaging in any theoretical investigation.” Rather, he frankly states, 





writing, we learn that he merely “wished to learn whether among the causes motivating [the 
suicides] there were any whose effect could be obviated.”17  
Peuchet was a sympathetic person. Marx agrees. He comments that Peuchet evinced “the 
warmth of life itself, broadness of view, refined subtlety, and bold originality of spirit, which one 
will seek in vain in any other nation.”18 Which is to say, “Peuchet: On Suicide” is inspiringly odd 
in another way. As Eric A. Plaut writes, “[w]hat most commonly stimulated [Marx] to write was 
disagreement with someone.” “In contrast,” Plaut continues, Marx’s “view of Peuchet is clearly 
favorable.”19 Yet despite Peuchet’s attempts to establish some critical, amoral distance from his 
subject, of course, this form of sympathy is not all we find. Peuchet indeed makes an argument—
not surprisingly, a sympathetic one. 
 In the five moments where we may be tempted to adduce Peuchet’s thesis, Marx’s 
intervenes three times. In addition to the moment mentioned above where Marx speaks to the 
need for the “total reform of the present order of society,” Peuchet argues that suicide “must be 
regarded as a symptom of the faulty organisation of our society.”20 In other words, for Peuchet, 
suicide was an expression of a social problem.21 For Marx it was an expression of the social 
problem of estrangement examined in greater theoretical detail just months earlier, as we shall 
see. Roughly half-way through, Peuchet makes a similar claim, but with Marx’s added, italicized 
emphasis: “The classification of the various causes of suicide would be the classification of the 
very defects of our society.” The fourth is Peuchet’s alone: “One perceives that for want of 
something better, suicide is the extreme resort against the evils of private life.”22 Marx, perhaps 
obviously, saw no reason to intervene.  
And that fifth? If Peuchet’s purpose, and by proxy, Marx’s, was to expose the ways in 





translation extended the spirit of Peuchet’s argument about French social life into German social 
and intellectual life as well. As Anderson sharply acknowledges, not only was Marx “moving 
toward…more empirically grounded investigation[s] of the real social and economic conditions 
of modern society.” His edited translation also demonstrated to his German readers that “it is not 
only the workers, but the whole of bourgeois society that suffers under dehumanized social 
relations.”23 But in reframing the fifth of Peuchet’s main arguments, I argue, Marx intervened 
most significantly and brings Peuchet’s interests in corporeal suicide in harmony with his own.  
Marx’s translator writes, “[t]aken by Marx from the description of another case of suicide 
given by Peuchet,” “Marx gave a free rendering” to Peuchet’s claim and added its “concluding 
words.”24 Where Peuchet concludes that “[o]pinion [about suicide] is too much divided by 
people’s isolation, too ignorant, too corrupt,” Marx offers up its premise, “because each is a 
stranger to himself and all are strangers to one another.”25 Not only, then, had suicide named for 
Marx a symptomatic expression of our estrangement, but the discourses that inform and organize 
our understanding of suicidal activity itself demanded an avowal of our condition of 
estrangement under capitalist modes of production. 
 
 
THE RULE OF DEAD LABOR OVER THE LIVING 
 
Hence the rule of the capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over man, of dead labour 
over the living. 
 
Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I, circa 1866 
 
 
I want to return, now, to an earlier question, namely, how can externalized, objectified 
life-energy function as an alien power that governs us? In other words, how can an object and its 





does this have to do with our subjective experience of estrangement, and ultimately, deathly, 
suicidal thought-images? 
Marx examined capitalism in its historical development, and observes, on the one hand, 
what he calls the “formal subsumption of labor under capital,” an early development in that 
history.26 As more and more production processes began to take capitalist shape, commodities 
increasingly came to name the form value has taken, both as use-value and exchange-value. Yet 
a most peculiar “irrationality” appeared in the process.27 Capitalists fixed a price on that which 
produces value as if that value-producing power itself has a value as a commodity. Human labor-
power, the wage, names “a magnitude fixed in advance”28 both of production and circulation 
throughout the cycles of capitalism. To say the absolute least (and I feel absolutely foolish saying 
it), reification has been a problem. As a result, Marx argues, “the creative power of labour” itself 
has appeared to “possess the qualities of a thing,” a quite unfortunate absurdity.29 Workers have 
become reified through the dominant gaze and control of capitalists as mere variable capital.  
Once purchased on the labor market, reified labor-power has then been put to use in the 
service of the capitalists who both own the means of production and have deployed reified 
human labor-power to enchant the means of production as they have seen fit. Workers have 
encountered little, if any, creative control over their creative activity such that they have come to 
feel less and less empowered as the value-producing agents they in fact are, and feel more and 
more “valuable” only in relation to the predominant, fetishized form value takes, namely, the 
commodity-form. Or worse yet, workers have felt “valuable” only in relation to that “special 
commodity” by which they have come to be treated by capitalists, as absurdly reified labor-
power.30 Not only, then, have workers become estranged from the products of their labor, as they 





their own productive activity itself. Suffice it to say, this tends to hurt. In other words, the 
reification of human activity has set in motion not only the appearance of an “I” that labors 
(reified labor-power), but also an “I” that comes back to us as a dead thing (the fetishized 
commodity). As Marx wrote in 1844, labor constitutes a “loss of [one’s] self.”31  
And what’s worse, this has become a particularly lonely and violent game for workers. 
Compelled to offer for sale reified labor-power as legally “free” proprietors on competitive labor 
markets, workers have appeared as self-estranged from one another.32 As Marx’s earlier writings 
of 1844 suggest, the “competition among [workers] has become all the more considerable, 
unnatural, and violent.”33 By 1848, Marx and Engels wrote of workers’ violent tendencies to 
“direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the 
instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their 
labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force 
the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.”34 And by the 1860s, Marx (again, with 
the help of Engels) began to write of such instances as expressions of various “industrial 
pathologies.”35 Suffice it to say, the history of capitalism, let alone History, illustrates well the 
ways in which reactionary violence too often misapprehends its target. 
Under processes of the formal subsumption of labor under capital, commodities have 
appeared less vividly as the creative and productive effect (objectification) of a person’s life-
energy, but more and more mistakenly as something “external and accidental to the individual,” 
a manifestation of their fetishization.36 As capitalism has come to name the predominant mode of 
production, then, the concomitant way to encounter creative, value-producing power has been in 
relation to the production of the commodity-form, mere, fetishized artifacts haunted by 





some functional proximity to the commodity in its various fetishized or reified forms, what 
Marx, as early as the middle 1840s, began to describe in terms of death. In 1844, Marx describes 
commodities as “dead capital.”37 He would soon alter his idiom to emphasize the position of 
workers in their relation to capital. 
* 
As capitalism expands and intensifies throughout history, Marx theorizes, on the other 
hand, a development whereby the formal subsumption of labor under capital normalizes, 
ushering in what he describes as the “real subsumption of labor under capital.” Although 
capitalism has expanded and intensified unevenly, this has surely become the condition of our 
present (at the very least in the United States). Marx argues, “living labour does not realize itself 
in objective labour which thereby becomes its objective organ, but instead objective labour 
maintains and fortifies itself by drawing off living labour.” Rather than continue to describe 
commodities as dead capital, however, Marx began more regularly to refer to commodities as 
“dead labour.” More poignantly, he began to refer to the capital relation as a process driven by a 
deathly thought-image—a process he curiously describes as “dead labour over the living.” And 
what’s worse, Marx argues, labor has become “one of the modes of existence of capital.”38 The 
death of workers’ life energy has come to function as an expression of the mode of existence of 
production itself. Under increasingly normalized capitalist modes of production in our modern 
world, humanity has ceased to be the “aim of production.” Rather, the capitalist mode of 
production itself—a mode of production predicated on the death of workers’ collective life 
energy—has increasingly appeared “as the aim of mankind.”39 Capital has appeared, then, to take 
the place of the subject while human beings and their lives’ energy have merely appeared and are 





What is crucial to understand, and what I develop further in chapter two, is that under the 
real subsumption of labor under capital, within our present, “all the social productive forces of 
labour,” our lives’ energy, “appear as the productive forces of capital, as intrinsic attributes of 
capital,” as dead labor.40 Or in yet another way, all lively, creative activity has come to appear 
“as something independent of the workers and intrinsic to the conditions of production 
themselves,” as dead labor over the living.41 Described as the “mystification[s] of capital,” this is 
where we may begin to observe the ways in which an alien power that people have produced has 
been experienced most intensely as a collectively-estranged specter that governs us.42 In sum, if 
the bourgeois commodification of reified labor-power has absurdly insisted that labor-power, our 
lives’ energy, is a thing, and if under the real subsumption of labor under capital all forces of our 
lives’ energy have appeared as forces of capital, then we may most fully understand the ways in 
which we have become structurally estranged from our humanity—what Marx means when he 
describes the capital relation as “the rule of things over man, of dead labour over the living.”43 
Capitalism haunts us with the corpse of our collective death. 
 
 
THE AD HOMINEM CAPITAL RELATION, OR, CAPITALISM: SUICIDAL FOR THE 
WHOLE OF MANKIND 
 
Far from leading to permanent peace, capitalism has led to two world wars and risks a third one, 
suicidal for the whole of mankind. 
 
Ernest Mandel, “Introduction,” Capital, Volume III, 1981 
  
 
Marx’s deathly thought-images function as expressions of his historical patterns of ad 
hominem that transform throughout his writings. And although his ad hominem characterizations 
focus mostly on capitalists and capitalism, Marx’s ghosts have taken many sides. “A spectre is 





argumentation as a way to attack a person rather than the intellectual position that that person 
may take, Marx’s uses of ad hominem perform different rhetorical functions that I understand as 
expressions of the radicalism of his youth and the literary sophistication of his adult life. In his 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, for instance, Marx wrote,  
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be 
overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped 
the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and 
it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical.45  
 
By way of example, around the middle 1840s, Marx and Engels began to describe property 
owners as “vampires.”46 Marx and Engels sought simply to risk an assumption, namely, that the 
bourgeoisie had used their property as the means of production to which the life-force of social 
labor had been put to work, as another’s blood to a vampire. In Marx’s more mature writings, 
however, his use of ad hominem began to take more sophisticated shapes. With the publication 
of Capital, volume one in the middle-1860s, Marx continues to use the ad hominem “vampire” 
on three occasions.47 Yet in each, he uses it not to characterize capitalists so much as capital 
itself in its fetishized, subject-appearance in more advanced stages of its development. To better 
understand the sophistication of Marx’s ad hominem, it might be best to examine ad hominem 
itself. 
Ad hominem functions as a transliteration of a late sixteenth-century Latin expression that 
literally means “to the person.” The prefix “ad-” translates as the preposition “to,” but can also 
suggest several meanings at once: a motion or direction toward something; an addition, increase, 
or intensification of something; or lastly, a reduction or a change into something. In its 
prepositional form, the ad of Marx’s ad hominem gestures toward the historically changing 
appearance of the capital relation. As mentioned above, as capitalist modes of production both 





to maintain and fortify themselves by drawing off living labor, as might a vampire to another’s 
blood—which brings us to Marx’s object-personification. Hominem literally translates as 
“person.” As Marx began referring to capital as a vampire rather than capitalists, Marx plays 
with the ways in which, under capitalism, we encounter our world not as innocuous extensions of 
our own activity (objectification), but rather as menacingly oppositional, disembodied forces. 
Marx’s ad hominem not only resonates with the historical appearance of the fetishized subject-
character of capital, but it also functions as a savvier ad hominem idiom. For where capitalists 
are people, capital, like a vampire, is always-already a corpse. By risking the assumption of a 
vampiric, spectral place-holder, Marx’s ad hominem contends with the ways in which capitalism 
has made its otherwise absent subject a problem for us. In other words, if the appearance of the 
“I” that labors names ad hominem the fetishized, subject character of reified human activity, then 
Marx’s ad hominem, “vampire” functions in his later writing as his own literary idiom. It 
functions as his way of rhetorically re-fetishizing the deathly subject-character of always-already 
dead labor, or fetishized capital. And it will change shape, again. 
Although volume three of Capital continues to describe capitalists and workers in ad 
hominem ways, as “embodiments and personifications of capital and wage-labour,”48 the deathly 
thought-images begin to transform as volume three examines capitalism in more systematic 
ways. No longer do we read explicitly about capitalism’s “dramatis personae” in such vivid 
language as we do in volume one. Which is to say, although Marx indeed examines capitalism as 
a process in the first two volumes, the capitalism about which we read in volume three is more 
than that of the activity of people within the factory or the market. No longer do we read about 
various manifestations of the “‘free-trader vulgaris’”—the capitalist as “one who smirks self-





brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but – a tanning.”49 The ad 
hominem of volume three details more the tendential, spectral motions between entire classes of 
actors and of broadly abstracted monetary functions. It focuses on the mystifications of capital 
themselves at their most abstract, systemic levels. It meditates on the commodity fetish at its 
peak. And although volume three doesn’t explicitly say it, the logic of this disembodied, ad 
hominem subjectivity appears suicidal.  
I can offer no more concise explanation of capitalism’s ad hominem suicidality in volume 
three than by way of Ernest Mandel. He identifies its research question in a curiously laconic 
way, “Whither capitalism?”50 Summing up the three main moves in volume three, i.e., the 
discovery of 1) the rate of profit, 2) the tendency towards the equalization of the rate of profit, 
and 3) the law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit, Mandel writes: 
From his definition of the average rate of profit as the sum total of surplus-value produced during 
the process of production divided by the sum total of capital, Marx derives the central ‘law of 
motion’ of the capitalist mode of production. Since that part of capital which alone leads to the 
production of surplus-value (variable capital, used to buy labour-power) tends to become a 
smaller and smaller part of total capital, because of the fundamentally labour-saving tendency of 
technical progress – the gradual substitution of dead labour (machinery) for living labour – and 
because of the gradual increase of the value of raw materials in that of total output: since, in other 
words, the organic composition of capital in its value expression tends to increase, there is an 
inbuilt tendency for the average rate of profit to decline in the capitalist system.51 
 
As capitalism has intensified and expanded, its vampiric blood-lust after surplus-value 
(especially surplus-profit) has simultaneously denied those who produce value from the outset—
real, living, breathing people. Marx had suspected this tendency for a long time. In 1844, Marx 
wrote, “So although political economy, whose principle is labour, appears to recognize man, it is 
in fact nothing more than the denial of man carried through to its logical conclusion.”52 And, as 
Mandel argues, capitalism names “a process which constantly realizes itself by negating itself”—
as mentioned above, “suicidal for the whole of mankind.”53 In other words, if deathly thought-





hominem fashion for thinking about how capitalism intensifies and expands throughout history, 
then by the 1880s, I argue, suicidal thought-images more poignantly describe the ad hominem 
characterization of capitalism as expressed in Capital, volume three. By the 1880s, the logic of 
capitalism describes a disembodied, suicidal subjectivity. 
* 
Yet this requires a little de-mystification itself, as we of course know that history, 
unfortunately, has not played out this way. And, it is tempting to risk, following that younger 
Marx, a little unsophisticated ad hominem. If Marx observes, to be “radical is to grasp the root of 
the matter,” and continues, but for “man the root is man himself,” what, then, about people 
themselves—those embodiments of capital and personifications of wage-labor?54 Haven’t real, 
living, breathing capitalists invented and continue both to invent and deploy what volume three 
calls “counteracting influences” to the law of the tendential (suicidal) fall in the rate of profit, 
“checking and cancelling the effect of the general law and giving it simply the character of a 
tendency”? Which is to ask, haven’t capitalists increased the exploitation of laborers by 
“prolonging the working day” and or by “making work more intense;”55 haven’t capitalists 
reduced wages below their “value” and don’t they continually try to cheapen the elements of 
constant capital;56 and as Mandel adds, haven’t capitalists deployed measures spanning from 
simply finding new things to commodify all the way to engaging in colonial and imperial 
conquest, waging the violent wars associated with both;57 and I would add, haven’t capitalists 
also, by way of their political involvement, adjusted tax rates, interest rates, and increased the 
debt ceiling and government spending that those adjustments set in motion? Suffice it to say, 
haven’t capitalists deployed mechanisms at their disposal to resuscitate capitalism’s logical, 





Although Marx has demonstrated that the structural logic of the capital relation indeed 
names a violent relation both deadly and suicidal, the ways in which its various mystifications 
take shape make it difficult to see which actors engage in which acts of historical violence. In 
other words, it is easy to forget that the capital relation indeed names a relation.  
For instance, in thinking about capitalism’s suicidal, structural tendencies, I have long 
enjoyed the temptation to reframe these tendencies in different ways. I have wanted to say that 
capitalism cannot be suicidal, for it names ad hominem the mere fetishized appearance of the 
activity of a synthetic, self-same subject. In other words, it has no self-same subject to kill. And 
besides, under capitalism, our labor-power is always-already “freely” dead. But don’t those 
capitalists reek of murder? Perhaps it’s more entertaining as an exclamation? Capitalism, in its 
historical materialization, cannot be suicidal; but those capitalists sure do look murderous! Or 
better, perhaps they’re necrophilic! But this, too, would be a mystification, as murder and 
necrophilia, too, name a relation. Which is to suggest, if capitalism, in its historical 
materialization, cannot be suicidal, and if capitalists, by definition, cannot be necrophilic 
murderers, then where does that leave us?  
In Capitalist Realism, Mark Fisher gestures toward the disembodied, fetishized 
subjectivity of capitalism while avowing its affective realization in people, as he reminds us of 
the nature of the capital relation. He writes, “[w]hat needs to be kept in mind is both that 
capitalism is a hyper-abstract impersonal structure and that it would be nothing without our co-
operation.”59 Like Fisher, we in criticism tend to be really good at avowing a mystification, as 
Fisher writes of capitalism, “the ultimate cause-that-is-not-a-subject: Capital.” We also tend to be 
really good at identifying impasses of various sorts, as has Fisher, that “it is only individuals that 





errors is corporate, systemic.”60 But perhaps we can begin to learn a bit better from our 
tendencies toward ad hominem.  
After acknowledging the demystification of capital’s subject-appearance in peak Marx-y 
ad hominem, Fisher then describes the ways in which capitalism’s mystifications feel. He writes: 
“Capital is an abstract parasite, an insatiable vampire and zombie-maker; but the living flesh it 
converts into dead labor is our own, and the zombies it creates are us.”61 Fisher’s ad hominem, 
attributing to-the-person the character of a zombie, resonates. I feel it. And so too had Marx. In 
1844, Marx wrote of the feeling of laboring for a capitalist: “labour is external to the worker, i.e. 
does not belong to his essential being; …he therefore does not confirm himself in his work, but 
denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical energy, 
but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind.”62 Or, perhaps more directly, we feel as if we have 
“become,” as Marx insisted, “the tense essence of private property.”63 I understand Fisher and 
Marx, here, as suggesting that estrangement under capitalist modes of production has made the 
otherwise innocuous absent subject of innocuous objectification appear, ad hominem, as a 
problem not only for us, but of us. Our bodies don the corpse of the “I” that labors. It’s no 
wonder that in that tension we often feel as if we are zombies—or worse yet, as if we are already 
dead. 
* 
But we are not dead. Rather than suggest ad hominem that we feel as if we are already 
dead, however, we sometimes try to offer evidence for such a claim. Sometimes we tend to 
suggest that we feel as if our lives aren’t worth living. Or perhaps, we feel as if our lives have no 





have life, as Adorno writes, as if “there is life no longer.”64 And worst, sometimes we say we 
can’t imagine life outside of its organization under capitalism. 
I suspect that this feeling is often felt as the affective fodder that then sets in motion the 
ad hominem inference—we are already dead. And yes, some of us try to prove it. I suspect that 
those among us—those in our suicidal lot—may say things like this while we simultaneously 
sense the lie. We livelily pronounce our death! For saying things like this is the stuff of suicidal 
activity, and suicidal activity is a lively activity; our living, breathing utterances betray it. Yet 
this lie surely hurts.  
 Or in another way, to suggest that we are already dead, or that our lives don’t have value, 
I argue, are also fantastical ad hominem expressions organized and exacerbated by our 
estrangement under capitalist modes of production. And it is not that there is some “who” or 
some “we who” speak these things—that there is some grand Being with whom we may be 
romantically reunited if only we could shed that corpse. As Marx writes, people “are still 
engaged in the creation of the conditions of their social life, and they have not yet begun, on the 
basis of these conditions, to live it.”65 It is rather that capitalism’s aberrant processes of 
objectification have made our humanity appear ad hominem as a problem of our Being. For 
rather than engage in processes of mere objectification—(Hey, look what I did?) the innocuous 
activity of engaging with our world whose affirmations set in motion the innocuous solicitude of 
being-with one another (Oh, how lovely!)—we have encountered capitalism, aberrant processes 
of engaging with our world whose character sets in motion not only nefarious ways of being-
with one another, but also necrophilic processes of fucking-with our humanity that invite the 
problem of Being itself. Suggesting that “we feel as if we are already dead” or “we feel as if our 





rather…Feeling! These lively exclamations, however, have become distorted as they are 
repeatedly mediated—rehearsed—through the corpse of abstract labor—human affects mumbled 
through the ignorant, bourgeois, ad hominem “I” of our fantastically inarticulate subjectivities 
produced by capitalism.  
 These subjectivities suggest we have no value, that we are already dead, and for good 
reason. We encounter them as suggestions from a corpse. As Marx suggests in a similar context, 
our experience of estrangement affects our “human relations to the world.” And what he means 
is “our seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, sensing, wanting, 
acting, loving,” and on and on. These media of sensuous relations, for Marx, enable “the 
confirmation of human reality.” These sensuous relations, “all the physical and intellectual 
senses,” mediate our being-with one another in our world. When they become estranged under 
capitalist modes of production, what they tend to confirm is the reality of the rule of our 
estrangement. They confirm that we feel as if we are already dead. And again, for good reason. 
As Marx provocatively claims, perhaps ad hominem, “[p]rivate property has made us so stupid 
and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital.” And 
what’s worse, “private property conceives all these immediate realizations of possession only as 
means of life; and the life they serve is the life of private property, labour and capitalization.”66 
As mentioned above, the “rule of the capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over man, of 
dead labour over the living.” Capitalism produces our shared corpse. 
But we are not dead. Under capitalist modes of production, we merely encounter each 
other, ourselves, and our world as some-deadened-thing, as Heidegger might suggest, as 
something “present at hand.”67 We feel merely estranged, deadened, as if we’re engaged in a 





(suicide). If capitalism refuses to avow the human activity of its twin processes of reification and 
fetishization, then it simultaneously sets in motion a preoccupation with our very humanity as a 
problem of our being such that our affects seek a confirmation of the reality of our estrangement. 
Modern suicide is a rehearsal. The suicidal “I” names, ad hominem, an “I” whose 
tendential function is to confirm our estrangement through another form of estrangement. In 
feeling the force of the absent cause in capitalism, we rehearse the bourgeois script by placing 
our bodies, misidentified as that ad hominem “I,” at the absent center of our estrangement—a 
misidentified I, however, whose suicide is capable of eliminating our suffering. In many 
bourgeois ways, we realize ourselves by negating ourselves. Suicide names one way: it estranges 
us from our estrangement. Or, as Marx never quite said, suicidality tends to follow a similar 
course as our estrangement under modern capitalism.  
But if private property has made us “so stupid and one-sided,” what of the other side—
the side that encounters our world-of-things, not as an ignorant bourgeois, but rather the side that 
encounters our world-of-things humanely?  
 
 
FLEUR DE MARIE’S MYSTERIOUS ANTITHESES 
 
…but then I would gaze at the flowers and the sun and say to myself: the river will always be 
there and I am not yet seventeen years old. 
 




Shortly after writing Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx and Engels 
wrote and published The Holy Family. In it, Marx and Engels examine several writings of the 
Young Hegelians and argue that their approach to criticism reflected a mere ideological, 





developing fidelity to historical materialism, mixed with a fair share of ad hominem radicalism, it 
is a fun, albeit vertiginous read. 
 In chapter VIII, Marx and Engels criticize a work by Herr Szeliga, a pen name for F. Z. 
Zychlinski. He had written an article, “Eugène Sue: Die Geheimnisse von Paris,” which lauds 
Sue’s novel Les mystères de Paris, itself a “sentimental social fantasy” that traces the moralistic 
adventures of Rudolph, “Prince of Geroldstein.” Disguised as a French worker, Rudolph takes 
under his protection both a working-class criminal, Chourineur and a prostitute, Marie. He 
attempts to reform each by way of some image of Christian piety.69 For those unfamiliar, I will 
save the detail, as I think it is fair to say that we can anticipate where Marx and Engels land. 
There is, however, a specific moment in their critique that I would like to highlight. 
As Marx and Engels approach the character of Marie, rather than maintain their critique 
of Szeliga, or even their critique of Sue by proxy, they make clear that they want Marie to speak 
for herself. In some ways they do. They provide several passages of her dialogue from the novel. 
In other ways they don’t, as they intervene, offering their own theorizations about Marie’s life 
activity. It’s a rare moment of Marx’s and Engels’s literary criticism. Nonetheless, Marx and 
Engels insist, we shall “not follow Herr Szeliga in his further description of [Marie].” Rather, we 
shall “leave her the satisfaction…of constituting,” they argue, “the most decisive antithesis to 
everyone, a mysterious antithesis.”70 It is Marie’s “mysterious antithesis,” or rather, her 
mysterious antitheses that, I would like to argue, exhibit the surprisingly reparative value of 
suicidal activity under conditions of estrangement. 
The first of Marie’s antitheses is obvious. Her life’s energy names one unit of social labor 
reified in the service of private capital accumulation. She has nothing but her labor to sell, a 





through and to the “I” that labors, at times “blames herself,” Marx and Engels argue that Marie 
“considers her situation not as one she has freely created,” but rather “as a fate she has not 
deserved.” They frame her suffering as an effect of the “bad fortune” of her “inhuman 
surroundings.”71 
But Marie herself insists, “I have never done any harm to anyone.” Which is to say, 
despite laboring for the capitalist proprietress of the tavern, Marie, like all of us, exhibits a 
second antithesis. She reserves some energy apart from her reification. She has a reserve on that 
other side. As Marx and Engels write, “she preserves a human nobleness of soul, a human 
unaffectedness and a human beauty that impress those around her, raise her to the level of a 
poetical flower of the criminal world and win for her the name of Fleur de Marie.” No doubt, 
Fleur de Marie is estranged. Yet “in spite of her frailty,” she “at once gives proof of vitality, 
energy, cheerfulness resilience of character—qualities which alone explain her human 
development in her inhuman situation.”72 
And she can “put up a fight.” As evidence, Marx and Engels point out the ways in which 
“she does not appear as a defenceless lamb who surrenders without any resistance to 
overwhelming brutality.” After being “ill-treated” by Chourineur, for instance, Fleur de Marie 
“defends herself with her scissors.”73 To emphasize further the humanity that Marx and Engels 
observe, I quote at length. In reference to the “good in me” that Fleur de Marie acknowledges 
that she sees in herself, Marx and Engels write, 
Good and evil, as Marie conceives them, are not the moral abstractions of good and evil. 
She is good because she has never caused suffering to anyone, she has always been human 
towards her inhuman surroundings…Her situation is not good, because it puts an unnatural 
constraint on her, because it is not the expression of her human impulses, not the fulfilment of her 
human desires; because it is full of torment and without joy… 
In natural surroundings, where the chains of bourgeois life fall away and she can freely 
manifest her own nature, Fleur de Marie bubbles over with love of life, with a wealth of feeling, 
with human joy at the beauty of nature; these show that her social position has only grazed the 






Marx’s and Engels’ repeated appeal to Fleur de Marie’s humanity functions as reverberations of 
1844. The “unnatural constraint” Marie feels, the “torment” and lack of “joy” she suffers evince 
her estranged condition. Yet apart from her “I” that labors, Fleur de Marie maintains that reserve 
on the other side. For “her social position has only grazed the surface.” Her “wealth of feeling,” 
her affects, reveal that her social conditions, her “mere misfortune,” names the effect of that 
aberrant mode of otherwise innocuous objectification from which she has become estranged. But 
she still maintains a capacity to “bubble over with love of life…with human joy at the beauty of 
nature.” It is in her “natural surroundings” that she knows that “she herself is neither good nor 
bad, but human.” And I would like to argue that despite her inhuman situation, Fleur de Marie 
retains what appears as a mysterious antithetical reserve, an affective affirmation amplified by 
the activity of her repeatedly suicidal past. 
In reference, not to Szeliga, nor to Sue’s novel itself, but rather to the character of Fleur 
de Marie herself, Marx and Engels illustrate her third antithesis, the surprising value of Fleur de 
Marie’s lively suicidal activity, if only for a moment:  
Let us accompany Fleur de Marie on her first outing with Rudolph.  
“The consciousness of your terrible situation has probably often distressed you,” Rudolph 
says, itching to moralise. 
“Yes,” she replies, “more than once I looked over the embankment of the Seine; but then 
I would gaze at the flowers and the sun and say to myself: the river will always be there and I am 
not yet seventeen years old. Who can say?75  
 
Fleur de Marie apprehends value from within her world. Rivers are, prima facie, enchanting 





throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. As Georges Minois points out, “drowning” had named one 
of the most common “means of death” for suicidal women throughout modern French history. 
And what’s more, Minois continues, the “Paris statistics show” that “certain spots along the 
Seine were notorious for [such] drownings.”76 But for Fleur de Marie, this practice names 
something more than that which can be reflected back by dead data from the social sciences. For 
it is not once that she has “looked over the embankment of the Seine,” but “more than once.” She 
has engaged in suicidal activity as a lively practice—a rehearsal—a reoccurring affective 
encounter with her river, organized, informed, and set in motion, I argue, by her estrangement 
under capitalist modes of production. Yet her senses, as Marx would say, have become 
theoreticians in their immediate, suicidal praxis. And Fleur de Marie’s suicidal theoreticians 
have amplified her, setting in motion a seeking-after not only the confirmation of her “terrible 
situation,” as if she needs to be reminded, but a seeking-after an affirmation of their theory of the 
value of the most mundane, yet beautiful materiality, a theory of “the flowers and the sun”—an 
innocuously humane reflection of her being-in-the-world. And all Fleur de Marie can simply and 
humanely ask is, “Who can say?”  
* 
I like Fleur de Marie. And I think we all should like Fleur de Marie. She can teach us 
something. I think she can teach us that we can indeed feel valuable as producers and observers 
of value ought. What’s more, however, she can teach us that that value isn’t often made real or 
realized in an acknowledgement from within our world under capitalism, especially in the ways 
in which we ourselves indeed encounter value in it. Her oscillation between sensing “the good” 
in herself while avowing the absence of such acknowledgement from within her world, “Who 





or words that others understand, let alone hear. And, of course, as such, Fleur de Marie is 
suicidal.  
Suicidal activity is best shared. And for those in our suicidal lot, I think that Fleur de 
Marie can teach us that what our suicidal activity sometimes asks after is both a confirmation and 
an affirmation that demands answers. Fleur de Marie asks after a confirmation of the difficulties 
of our shared estrangement under capitalism and an affirmation of the possibility to imagine new 
forms of value-creation, not only reflected back to us from within our world, but an affirmation 
of our solicitude reinforced by affirmations from others. For she is asking us. I mean, she is not 
alone. 
Modern literature is replete with representations of suicidal moments that invite crucial 
questions, namely, can we approach suicidal activity in non-fatalistic terms? Can we engage in 
and encounter suicidal activity in ways that might slow down its momentum under capitalist 
modes of production? Or better yet, can we see that suicidal activity may amplify our being-in-
the-world, while asking after a sensuous affirmation of our collective potentiality such that we 
might remain in our worlds differently? Perhaps even change it? 
“Who can say,” she innocently asks?  
We can, Fleur de Marie!  
We can! 
The flowers and the sun are beautiful, and you are beautiful for pointing them out to us! 
And if you can spare them… 







“A Kind of Mimesis of Death” 
Modern Suicidality as Critical Mimesis 
 
Modernity must stand under the sign of suicide, an act which seals a heroic will that makes no 
concessions to a mentality inimical toward this will. Such a suicide is not resignation but heroic 
passion. It is the achievement of modernity in the realm of the passions. 
 
Walter Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” 1938 
 
 
In chapter one, I argued that modern suicidality may be approached as a rehearsal of the 
contradictions bound up in the capital relation. And although such suicidal scenes are best 
understood in close relation to processes of the production and circulation of capital, no one’s 
work invites us to consider modern suicidality as a rehearsal, as Hamacher and Wetters have it, 
of “this devastation of being in capitalism…in all of the structures, institutions, discourses, and 
nondiscursive experiences affected by it,” like that of Walter Benjamin.1   
By “invites,” I am thinking along the lines of Michael W. Jennings who writes that 
“Benjamin counts on the ‘expressive’ capacity of his images.”2 Throughout much of his work, in 
which every seventh sentence could stand as a thesis in itself, seldom is Benjamin so straight-
forward as he is, for instance, in his most famous essay. Calling for theses that define “the 
tendencies of the development of art under the present conditions of production,” “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” argues that the social function of modern art 
is “to rehearse” the interplay between “nature and humanity” in the service of revolutionary 
“innervations of the collective.”3  
For all of the critical contention that revolves around Benjamin’s art essay, this chapter is 
interested in exploring more specifically the place of suicidal imagery throughout his work as a 





questions. For instance, how is thinking about suicide, imagining it, or feeling an attraction to it, 
or analyzing it all ways of negotiating, practicing, or even rehearsing a different relation to 
twentieth-century capitalist modernity? How does suicidality open up not just new ways of 
feeling and thinking about modernity, but also different modes of being within, or possibly 
without, modern capitalist economic and social relations? Suffice it to say, Benjamin’s 
preoccupations about suicide are curious. 
And this motif of suicide is not so obvious, as with Benjamin’s other work, we are often 
left with his critical imagery. And it feels as if its expression is most inviting and compelling 
when we approach his lifework as if we were akin to Klee’s Angelus Novus, caught in 
homogenous, empty time. We almost have no choice. As Benjamin’s biographers write, it was 
typical for him to work “on several projects simultaneously,” and many of Benjamin’s key 
concepts bleed across his various works.4 By meditating on his oeuvre as if it were a single, 
synchronic montage, various moments in Benjamin tend to flash up as if by way of those 
explosions that blast, as he would say, “a specific era out of the homogenous course of [his] 
history,” “a specific life out of [his] era.”5 They are effective. I cannot imagine I am alone, for 
instance, when I confess that if not for reading his essays on history, I wouldn’t feel confident 
discussing mémoire involontaire; or that if I hadn’t read “The Task of the Critic” or “The Author 
as Producer,” I would be lost in Kafka’s The Castle, to say nothing of literary criticism. Yet most 
importantly, if not for his theory of the mimetic faculty, I wouldn’t feel so ambivalently-alive, or 
“homesick for the world distorted in the state of similarity.”6 What I am after here is what it feels 






Benjamin invites the most synchronic encounters—the capacity to perceive similarities—
not only in the diachronic movement through any single work, but in those synchronic moments 
of reflective connectivity we encounter when we read any single work in the context of the 
whole. When we approach Benjamin’s lifework as a montage, we enable ourselves to apprehend 
the syncopation of his theses as individual movements along a score whereby we encounter 
them, as he might have it, in their “the now of recognizability.”8 I think we encounter (and must 
encounter) Benjamin’s thesis in “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire”—that 
“modernity must stand under the sign of suicide”—in this way.9 As Michael Jennings argues, the 
essay is “one of the most demanding of its reader, requiring not merely inordinate contributions 
of imagination and analysis, but a thorough knowledge of Benjamin’s other work.”10  
To do so, this chapter highlights three key preoccupations that, I argue, punctuate 
Benjamin’s life and work. I begin by describing his lifelong encounters and engagements with 
suicidality, those of his friends, and those of his own. Next, I highlight Benjamin’s preoccupation 
with the ways in which we must understand, accommodate, and develop our capacities to 
perceive and produce similarities, what he calls the mimetic faculty. And lastly, I highlight the 
ways in which Benjamin explores Marx’s theory of the historical subsumption of labor under 
capital as a framework for understanding encounters with capitalist modernity in art upon which 
suicide marks its signature.  
This chapter argues that modern suicidality gets its power from imitating the deathly 
logic and lived experience of the capital relation whose rehearsal in modern art reveals the 
absurdity of the capitalist reification of human activity, on the one hand, while re-imagining the 
feeling of being-dead implicit in our reification under capitalism, on the other. As such, modern 





present, or rehearse the seemingly impenetrable totality of estranged life under capitalism 




SUICIDE AND BENJAMIN’S SUICIDAL ACTIVITY 
 
The destructive character lives from the feeling not that life is worth living, but that suicide is not 
worth the trouble. 
 
Walter Benjamin, “The Destructive Character,” 1931 
 
 
By late September 1940, not only had Walter Benjamin ended his life, but a life 
preoccupied with suicide and characterized by the curious literary productivity of suicidality had 
come to a close. This is not, however, so obvious. Nowhere, for instance, do we find an essay in 
Benjamin’s lifework focused on theorizing suicide alone.11 Rather, like that of Marx, suicidality 
appears throughout Benjamin’s work as a thought-image that helps illuminate a critical relation 
to something else. Most significantly, in “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” 
Benjamin’s appeal to the concept of suicide functions in the service of understanding something 
about modernity. For it is not that suicide must stand under the sign of modernity, as suicide is 
not an exclusively modern act. But rather “modernity must stand under the sign of suicide,” that 
there is something about modernity such that suicide marks its signature. In light of such critical 
relationships, Benjamin’s own encounters with the suicides of others and his own suicidal 
activity itself profoundly affected him and helped shape the production, the poignancy, and the 
critical nature of his later work. 
Benjamin had been exposed to the act of suicide at an early age. In 1914, in an act of 





double suicide. Benjamin was only twenty-two years old. Years later, as Eiland and Jennings 
suggest, the event found its way into One-Way Street and Berlin Childhood around 1900, albeit 
in “coded” form. Two years later, and just days before his twenty-fourth birthday, Benjamin’s 
beloved aunt, Friederike Joseephi, ended her life. Eiland and Jennings note that both suicide (on 
his father’s side) and Benjamin’s own “long bouts of immobilizing depression” describe a “trait 
relatives noted elsewhere in his family tree.”12 These bouts reached suicidal crises-points in the 
leadup to his exile in 1933. 
Throughout the middle months of 1931 and again in those of 1932, Benjamin’s diary and 
personal communications reveal that he had been planning to end his life. Although preceded in 
1929 by what his biographers describe as a “high point of productivity,” Benjamin’s affective 
life was complicated by his pending divorce from Dora initiated early in the year, the economic 
depression that followed the stock market crash of October, and the immanent rise of the 
National Socialists Party that would by 1933 ensure his exile.13  
In the intervening years, Benjamin described his flirtations with suicide – his suicidal 
activity – as moments influenced by this confluence of forces. While his diary entries titled 
“May-June 1931” open with reference to his material crisis—“I’m going to save my remaining 
sheets of paper for a diary.”—Benjamin’s preoccupations came together in a mixture of 
resignation and tranquility. By May 1931, Benjamin was immersed in an ambivalent suicidal 
activity, codified as “fatigue,” within which he found a curious power.  
I feel tired. Tired above all of the struggle, the struggle for money, of which I now have enough in 
reserve to enable me to stay here. But tired also of aspects of my personal life with which strictly 
speaking—apart from my economic situation—I have no reason to be dissatisfied. But the very 
sense of tranquility that has taken possession of me inwardly to a degree that has always been rare 
with me leads me to probe more deeply into the life I am now leading. And then this fatigue. It 
not only dredges up memories from the past; what is crucial is that of the events in my past which 
surface in my memory from time to time, it is the factors that make them moments of my life, 
make them mine, that have become clear, whereas previously I never gave them a thought. Last, 





dissatisfaction involves a growing aversion to, as well as a lack of confidence in, the methods I 
see chosen by people of my kind and my situation to assert control over the hopeless situation of 
cultural politics in Germany…And to the full measure of the ideas and impulses that preside over 
the writing of this diary, I need only hint at my growing willingness to take my own life. This 
willingness is not the product of a panic attack; but profound though its connection is with my 
exhaustion from my struggles on the economic front, it would not have been conceivable without 
my feeling of having lived a life whose dearest wishes had been granted, wishes that admittedly I 
have only now come to recognize as the original text on a page subsequently covered with the 
handwritten marks of my destiny.14 
 
This passage is striking on several accounts. Like so many people throughout history who 
entertain suicide, Benjamin’s economic life was unstable. By the early 1930s, the effects of the 
stock market crash of Fall 1929 were felt across Germany. As early as March 1930, Eiland and 
Jennings recount that “the number of unemployed in the country reached 3 million.” And 
although Benjamin found employment here and there throughout the early-to-middle 1930s, his 
already dire economic condition was compounded by the effect of his divorce from Dora who 
had been a consistent source of emotional, intellectual, and financial support. And while their 
divorce threatened to alienate him from that support, his biographers also note that the divorce 
also “threatened to deprive him of his entire inheritance.” It is at this time that Benjamin started 
to refer to his daily life, supported by paid work for various newspapers and radio broadcasts, in 
terms of his “makeshift existence.”15 Yet is it clear that in terms of those from whom he gathered 
emotional support, of those from whom he found consistent intellectual edification, and of those 
from whom he could rely on a stable source of income, Benjamin’s life was fragmented. 
What is most striking in the face of such fragmentation, however, is that despite his 
precarious survival, we can see that Benjamin’s “fatigue” in May 1931 mobilized for him two 
concurrent and related phenomena: a feeling of composure, on the one hand, that then offered 
him, on the other, clarity about seemingly forgotten events from his past. Whatever those events 
may have been, Benjamin describes a productive observation: “The very sense of tranquility that 





probe more deeply into the life I am now leading.” Benjamin’s ambivalent suicidality of May 
1931 functioned for him as a productive activity whereby moments from his lived history to 
which he otherwise “never gave…a thought” had “become clear.”  
 As Benjamin’s feelings about his makeshift existence intensified, so too had the way in 
which he talked about his suicidality. Where in May he wrote of his “growing willingness” to 
take his life, by August, his language reads more starkly. Noting another publication rejection, 
and with increasing pessimism about his professional options, Benjamin titled his diary, “Diary 
from August 7, 1931, to the Day of My Death.” This, the beginning of the first paragraph, sets 
the scene: 
This diary does not promise to be very long. Today came the negative response from Anton 
Kippenberg, and this gives my plan the relevance that only futility can guarantee. I need to 
discover “a method that is just as convenient but somewhat less definitive,” I said to [Inge] today. 
My hope of making any such discovery is fast disappearing. But if anything can strengthen still 
further the determination, indeed the peace of mind, with which I think of my intention, it must be 
the shrewd, dignified use to which I put my last days or weeks.16 
 
However solemnly his entry begins, Benjamin again highlights a sense of tranquility related to 
his suicidality. “Indeed,” he writes, “the peace of mind” that accompanied the planning of his 
suicide had also mobilized for him a desire to make use of what he describes as his last “days or 
weeks.” However foreboding, it is difficult to deny that Benjamin’s suicidal activity amplified 
his being-in-the-world, perhaps in a moment when it was most needed. And although his 
language reads less felicitously than it had in May, Benjamin further describes a sense of 
“reverie” upon thinking about suicide that found its way into, at least, the production of his 
journal. By November 1931, however, a brief meditation on suicide would come to punctuate, in 
the form of a cadence, the close of Benjamin’s short work, “The Destructive Character:” “The 
destructive character lives from the feeling not that life is worth living, but that suicide is not 





 Commenting on his later work, Eiland and Jennings suggest that Benjamin’s “imputation 
of ‘exhaustion’ to Baudelaire was as much projection as description.”18 In light of the way in 
which he framed the concept of suicide in his November essay, I think that something similar 
could be said about Benjamin’s thoughts on his own potential corporeal suicide. In other words, 
from August 1931 until late September 1940, it appears that Benjamin felt that corporeal suicide 
simply wasn’t worth the trouble.19  
What is more interesting are the ways in which Benjamin described to his lifelong friend 
Gerhard Scholem the productivity set in motion by his suicidal activity of the early 1930s. 
Scholem had been familiar with Benjamin’s situation.20 In his letter of July 26, 1932, Benjamin 
returned to the topic of his suicidal thoughts, coded again as “fatigue,” as it was the year prior. 
[A]t this very moment I am on my way to Speyer. There, in Poveromo, I will learn whether I 
must return to Germany in August or whether there is any way for me to extend my stay abroad. 
Even taking into account the circumstances you are familiar with, you still cannot begin to 
imagine just how averse I am to returning. To do so, you would need not only to have before you 
the letter in which the building-safety authorities demand I give up my apartment—because its 
condition fails to meet certain regulations—you would also need more than just a clear idea of 
how the reactionary movement you allude to has affected my work for radio. Above all, you 
would have to grasp the profound fatigue that has overcome me as a result of these very 
circumstances…Your remark that the chances of what you wish for me actually coming to pass 
are the smallest imaginable thus gains in significance. We would both be well advised to face up 
to these facts—in view of which the failure of your Palestine “intervention” was indeed fateful. 
And if I do so with a grimness verging on hopelessness, it is surely not for want of confidence in 
my resourcefulness in finding alternatives and subsidies. Rather, it is the developing of this 
resourcefulness, and the productivity that corresponds to it, that most seriously endangers every 
worthwhile project. The literary forms of expression that my thought has forged for itself over the 
last decade have been utterly conditioned by the preventive measures and antidotes with which I 
had to counter the disintegration constantly threatening my thought as a result of such 
contingencies.21 
 
Scholem was privy to Benjamin’s mood, especially the composure that accompanied his more 
intense moments of suicidal activity. For instance, Scholem reflected on a comment by Kitty 
Marx about Benjamin upon the day of their exile from Germany. In March 1933, Marx found 
Benjamin “remarkably self-possessed [and] free of the panic that was gripping so many.” Eiland 





his experience of near-suicide the year before.” And although Scholem also suggested that 
Benjamin’s composure “found stronger expression in the outward attitude he displayed to other 
people than in his letters,” what is significant about Benjamin’s suicidality in his letter to 
Scholem are the ways in which he describes a “resourcefulness” related to his “fatigue.”22 
Resulting from his dire socio-economic and cultural circumstances, this resourcefulness 
manifested in two ways. On the one hand, the thought of corporeal suicide functioned for 
Benjamin in part as a “preventative measure and antidote” to his otherwise miserable makeshift 
existence. Like Nietzsche, who wrote, “the thought of suicide is a powerful comfort: it helps one 
through many a dreadful night,” Benjamin had carried with him a potential “out” that tempered 
his nerves.23 Yet what is more, his suicidal activity had also functioned, on the other hand, as a 
mechanism for the perception and production of many “literary forms of expression.” 
For Benjamin was writing about his suicidal activity, which can be a lively, embodied, 
affective and cognitive activity—an activity that at once depends upon our liveliness while 
posing that very liveliness at something at risk. Yet all too often, we encounter the fact of a 
suicide or the concept of suicide as some crass thing that is only ever defeating, as if suicide is 
some foregone conclusion framed as an act of which morbidity is all that can be spoken, thought, 
or theorized. Psychoanalysts are good at this. Often the concept comes at the close of a sentence, 
as Freud has written of the melancholic, “what is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it 
were, a pure culture of the death instinct, and in fact it often enough succeeds in driving the ego 
into death, if the latter does not fend off its tyrant in time by the change round into mania;”24 or 
Donald Winnicott, who offers the concept its own sentence, with emphasis! “There is much that 
could be said about the management of care of boys and girls who have these various disorders. 





theorists are often more careful, once in a while we encounter similar sentences like this: “We 
genre flail so that we don’t fall through the cracks of heightened affective noise into despair, 
suicide, or psychosis.”26 Yet it may be best, here, to follow another of Berlant’s suggestions that 
privileges how we as critics must “slow down” in an effort to capture the ways in which, as she 
writes, “the body slows down what’s going down [and helps clarify] the relation of living on to 
ongoing crises and loss.”27 In other words, it might be best to mimic a characteristic of 
Benjamin’s own suicidal activity in an effort to understand its resourcefulness. 
When we suffer traumas, time tends to feel altered. Within this time, affects are 
heightened, amplified in such a way that makes us able to, as Marx suggests, theorize. In his 
August 1931 entry, Benjamin wrote of the ways in which his suicidality altered his experience of 
time. For him, it was as if he were slowing down: “Incapable of action, I just lay on the sofa and 
read. Frequently, I fell into so deep a reverie that I forgot to turn the page.”28 And as Berlant has 
shown, everyday trauma, or what she calls “crisis ordinariness,” “unfolds in stories about 
navigating what’s overwhelming.” Suffice it to say, the fragmented character of Benjamin’s 
everyday life marked an increasingly normalized encounter with crises. His suicidality, however, 
must have felt extraordinary. Yet, as Berlant continues, the “extraordinary always turns out to be 
an amplification of something in the works, a labile boundary at best, not a slammed-door 
departure. In the impasse induced by crisis, being treads water; mainly, it does not drown.”29 Of 
course it can. The suicidality that Benjamin confronted has confronted others differently. People 
kill themselves. Many, women historically, have drowned. But we are talking about suicidal 
activity, which is a lively activity. And Berlant’s metaphor for everyday trauma is apt. That 
treading-of-water itself describes a bodily movement whose immersion, literally, slows us down. 





Benjamin’s suicidality not only slowed him down, but functioned as what Berlant, 
following Raymond Williams, might characterize as a “process of emergence.”30 Berlant writes 
that during such a process, “one moves around with a sense that the world is at once present and 
enigmatic, such that the activity of living demands both a wandering absorptive awareness and a 
hypervigilance that collects material that might help to clarify things.”31 As we have already seen 
from his diary entries, Benjamin had written that his suicidal activity “dredge[d] up” memories 
from his past, the effect of which “combine[d] in a strange way” both the “causes of 
dissatisfaction” with his life and his “feeling of having lived a life whose dearest wishes had 
been granted.” Yet “what is crucial,” Benjamin argues, are the ways in which his suicidal activity 
re-presented his lived history. As if presented with and having read a series of dialectical images, 
Benjamin writes, “that of the events in my past which surface in my memory from time to time, 
it is the factors that make them moments of my life, make them mine, that have become clear.”  
Benjamin’s suicidality functioned for him as a re-enactment—a rehearsal—of his lived 
experience. Just as his life had become fragmented by the social forces that both surrounded him 
and with which he interacted, his suicidality also dredged up for him, in a fragmented fashion, 
historical events from his life. In this way, Benjamin’s suicidal activity functioned for him as a 
mode of productive self-alienation. As Eiland and Jennings might suggest, suicidal activity, for 
Benjamin, set in motion his ability “to see [his] own alienation, and so to glimpse the 
fragmented, oppressive character of [his] history.”32 His suicidality rehearsed for him events 
from his past with which he found ways to clarify his situatedness within his lived history. 
What’s more, I argue, Benjamin came to encounter his suicidal activity as an expression of his 










Modern man can be touched by a pale shadow…on southern moonlit nights in which he feels, 
alive within himself, mimetic forces that he had thought long since dead, while nature, which 
possesses them all, transforms itself to resemble the moon. 
 
Walter Benjamin, “On Astrology,” circa 1932 
 
 
In the wake of his most intense suicidal activity, Benjamin began to theorize about the 
mimetic faculty, the human capacity to both perceive and produce similarities. In many ways, 
Benjamin’s theory of the mimetic faculty may be understood as a development aligned with his 
work on allegory, on the one hand, and his theory of the dialectical image, on the other. As 
Miriam Hansen might argue, although non-synonymous, Benjamin’s idioms “hook into each 
other” in various ways that offer a more comprehensive understanding of his theories.33 
In The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin argues that allegorical modes of 
representation function whereby “any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely 
anything else.” “With this possibility,” he continues, “a destructive, yet just verdict is passed on 
the profane world: it is characterized as a world in which the detail is of no great importance.”34 
Yet by virtue of the configuration of its disparate objects, allegory flirts with its audience, 
inviting us to try to put the pieces back together. Any revelatory value, however, names a 
“redemption in downfall,” as Eiland and Jennings have it. Allegory frames its objects as 
shattered, disconnected, or disassociated from one another—conditions that expose the myth of 
some unified, coherent totality. In a word, Eiland and Jennings argue that “allegorical works hold 
within themselves [this] potential purgative force.”35 In Benjamin’s case, then, such a force 





representation invite a reading practice in the service of generating meaning, however expulsive 
that meaning may be. 
 The idea of the dialectical image shares with allegory this invitation-to-read, yet in more 
specific encounters. In addition to artwork, we may encounter dialectical images anywhere and 
at any time, and the meaningful correspondences between disparate phenomena are bound up in 
a single image such that—and through our reading practice in any chance moment—we may 
encounter some historical significance. As Eiland and Jennings succinctly suggest, the dialectical 
image “is an image read if not literally seen, a historical constellation emerging suddenly—
flashing up…though a correspondence of moments.” In these ways, the dialectical image in 
Benjamin’s theory is a bit more specific and also a bit more random, as our encounters with 
dialectical images are both historical and subject to chance. Again, following Eiland and 
Jennings, dialectical images function such that the “historical object reveals itself to a present 
day uniquely capable of recognizing it.”36 So, in short—you know—best of luck! But allegory 
and the dialectical image name only one part of the dialectic involved in the mimetic faculty. 
Where allegory and the dialectical image invite us to perceive similarities through reading, the 
mimetic faculty adds to it our capacity to produce them. 
For Benjamin, the mimetic faculty names a basic human capacity. Hansen explores 
Benjamin’s idiom and emphasizes its relational character. The “mimetic,” she argues, “is not a 
category of representation,” but rather a “relational practice.”37 In addition to its relationality, I 
would like to emphasize its active character. Or, I would like to emphasize that the mimetic 
faculty is an active function, as Marx may have had it, of our species-being.38 In this regard, the 
mimetic faculty concerns not only the relation between subject and object, but the lively 





By way of illustration, Benjamin offers us obvious examples; the child who plays 
“shopkeeper” or “teacher” mimics activity in a specific role. But children also mimic other 
activities, that of “a windmill and a train.”39 Benjamin situates such modes of mimicry in the 
“sensuous realm of similarity.”40 It is not difficult, for instance, to apprehend the children’s arms 
as wings, their gate as propulsion. When their cheeks billow, we can hear the engines. ‘Look at 
me!,’ exclaims the talking airplane. Our smiles, should we be smiling, may share in the child’s 
mimesis. In this way, our smiles are a product of our own mimetic faculty. For someone may 
ask, ‘What’s so funny?,’ and we may respond, ‘Look at that joyous airplane!’ But do our smiles 
also mimic the airplane, in the event that we are smiling? Perhaps the upturned sides of our lips 
resemble the wings of an airplane? It’s a bit difficult—a bit of a stretch. Which is to say, not only 
are mimetic objects difficult to pin down, but there are other modes of mimicry that are more 
difficult to perceive as such. 
This is the stuff of which Benjamin describes as nonsensuous similarity. His modifier 
itself is difficult, as our understanding of the mimetic faculty depends in part upon our perception 
of similarities. In other words, understanding what Benjamin means by nonsensuous depends on 
one’s perception of sensuousness. Following Marx’s description of our “human relations to the 
world,” I argue that our mimetic faculties depend on our “seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, 
feeling, thinking, contemplating, sensing, wanting, acting, loving,” and on and on, as mentioned 
in chapter one.41 Of course we encounter and produce similarities sensuously, as affect and 
cognition are linked. But our encounters and productions, as Hansen so clearly insists, are at 
times “not obvious” to us. In other words, nonsensuous similarities have ceased to be “coded in 
terms of conventional analogies.”42 Yes! Our smiles can be of the airplane, too; yet more likely, 





But perhaps we aren’t smiling. Perhaps our mimetic comportment takes shape otherwise. 
Perhaps we mime something else in our encounter with the talkative, child-airplane. Perhaps we 
aren’t smiling because, although we may adore children and want children, we think better of it. 
Perhaps, we merely can’t afford them. Perhaps we love the idea of children so much that we dare 
not bring them into our shitty world. Or, perhaps we aren’t smiling because of specific worldly 
shit—because we’ve suffered some trauma—a plane crash or a train wreck. As Benjamin argues, 
“not only are the objects of this mimetic force innumerable, but the same thing may be said of 
subjects, of the mimetic centers that may be numerous within every being.”43 In short, in the 
presence of the child-airplane, not only may we mimic an object differently, but we may mimic a 
different object, perhaps something of a scene of trauma. Many of us who witness such mimicry 
may sense something’s up. That much may be obvious. The mimetic object, however, might be 
more difficult to pin down. As such, we may ask, ‘What’s the matter?’ And we may often hear 
back something veiled and opaque, ‘Don’t mind me. I’m a wreck.’44 
Our mimetic faculty is a basic human capacity shaped by our histories. And while the 
shapes it takes may be obvious or otherwise, its historical character might be the most non-
obvious thing about it. As Benjamin writes, “we have to reckon with the possibility that manifest 
configurations, mimetic resemblances, may once have existed where today we are no longer in a 
position even to guess at them.”45 This was a problem for Benjamin (let alone problematic for us 
all!). Hansen frames well Benjamin’s concern: the mimetic faculty, she argues, “comes in to 
view only at the moment of its decay.”46  
I would like to be careful, however, not to exaggerate our understanding of decay. For 
Benjamin, the mimetic faculty had surely been under threat, as it is in our present moment. But it 





function of our species-being, and for it to disappear would simultaneously describe something 
akin to the collective death of one of our capacities as a species. Although possible, observations 
like these informed Benjamin in the midst of his most intense suicidal activity of the early 1930s, 
as he writes: “Modern man can be touched by a pale shadow of this on southern moonlit nights 
in which he feels, alive within himself, mimetic forces that he had thought long since dead, while 
nature, which possesses them all, transforms itself to resemble the moon.”47 And observations 
like these can be witnessed in Benjamin’s slightly-later work as he carefully formulated his 
research questions surrounding mimeses—questions that concerned active processes: “Are we 
dealing with a dying out of the mimetic faculty, or rather perhaps with a transformation that has 
taken place within it?”48  
For Benjamin, and for us, it is the latter, and with regard to our mimetic capacities, “the 
question,” Benjamin continues, “is whether this can be developed and accommodated to an 
improved understanding.”49 What was at stake for Benjamin and is at stake for everybody is not 
merely acknowledging that we mime any more than theorizing that which we mime. As 
Benjamin writes, “the beautiful is neither the veil nor the veiled object…” What is most at stake 
is identifying the dehumanizing processes that wither away an essential human capacity in the 
service of resuscitating the value that Benjamin suspected the mimetic faculty makes available 
for us, namely, the value of contending with “the object in its veil.”50 Which is to say, Benjamin 
was interested in reading, analyzing, exposing, and resuscitating the critical value of mimesis in 
the face of the detritus of our estranged lives under capitalism. It is within that detritus that his 
preoccupations regarding the mimetic faculty found their historical specificity as he began to 







BENJAMIN’S THEORY OF OUR EXPERIENCE OF CAPITALIST MODERNITY 
 
He lay on his bed racked with homesickness, homesick for the world distorted in the state of 
similarity, a world in which the true surrealist face of existence breaks through. 
 
Walter Benjamin, “On the Image of Proust,” circa 1929 or 1934 
 
 
Benjamin was really good at apprehending value through the detritus, spotlighting the 
there, there of humane activity in the face of the wreckage of our estranged life under capitalism. 
And in its greater context, Benjamin’s claim about Proust, above, reveals the most pervasive of 
his own critical concepts. For if “mimicry,” as Benjamin insists, is a “feature of [Proust’s] entire 
creativity,” then, I argue, Benjamin’s own mimetic practices permeate his own lifework.51 Yet 
the development of his theory about the mimetic faculty and its decay would be incomplete 
without a more historically nuanced theory of our experience of capitalist modernity itself. 
“We have become impoverished,” Benjamin states in his brief, 1933 essay, “Experience 
and Poverty.”52 Benjamin’s theory of modern experience, however, began to take stronger 
shapes as he engaged more intensely with Marx’s Capital around 1935, that, I argue, helped lay 
the groundwork upon which he developed his most significant and long-lasting theoretical 
claims.53 For not only had Marx’s critique of capitalism helped explain the structural forces of 
the decay of our humanity54 of which the mimetic faculty names one part. Marx’s critique also 
set in motion for Benjamin a nuanced focus on that which our mimetic faculties struggle to 
reveal. Capital had become indispensable for Benjamin’s exploration of the ways in which our 
mimetic faculties have become weakened while they simultaneously reveal the possibility to 
understand, accommodate, and develop an ability, as Benjamin has it, “to preserve one’s 





In much of his writing, however, Benjamin’s theoretical fidelities seem fickle. Rather 
than a “hard-line [Marxist] ideologue,” Eiland and Jennings describe Benjamin as more of a 
“visionary insurrectionist,” whose Marxism was “heuristic and experimental in nature.”56 
Hansen’s take is not dissimilar. In her conversation about the role of “play” in Benjamin’s 
thinking, she distinguishes Benjamin from others associated with the Frankfurt School.57 To 
illustrate, in reply to the written form of his 1935 exposé, “Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth 
Century,” Adorno questioned some of Benjamin’s intellectual fidelities. In what is now 
infamously known as the “Hornberg” letter of August 1935, Adorno critiques Benjamin’s appeal 
to the explanatory power of psycho-social theory on the grounds that the theory and Benjamin’s 
use of it in his draft article are both insufficiently dialectical. By way of response, Adorno offers 
a suggestion: “[O]nly a precise definition of the industrial form of the commodity as clearly 
distinct from the earlier form could fully yield the ‘primal history’ and ontology of the nineteenth 
century…The fetish concept of the commodity must be backed up, as you no doubt plan to do, 
by the relevant passages from its originator.”58 By 1939, in “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 
Benjamin had responded in kind, engaging most intensely with the historical development of the 
commodity form as framed in Capital, discussed more below. Yet if we approach several of his 
key writings between early 1936 through 1939 as a montage of intermediated preoccupations, 
then readers can see a sort of experimental menagerie in Benjamin’s conceptual and theoretical 
work with anti-capitalist thought that intersects with his ongoing theorizations and illustrations of 
the mimetic faculty.  
More specifically, Benjamin’s experimentation takes shape within his citation practice. 
As far back as 1929, Benjamin had written, “quotations in my work are like wayside robbers 





highlights Benjamin’s fondness for such citation practices that he found in the work of Karl 
Kraus. De la Durantaye writes, “Benjamin singles him out for his diabolical skill in citation, and 
for his ability to make citations at once ‘save and punish.’” And in many ways, Benjamin’s own 
citations function as thieves whose sights are set on the productivity of such theft. In other ways, 
Benjamin’s references are stealthier, as de la Durantaye examines what Benjamin called “the art 
of citing without quotation marks.”60 “There can be little doubt,” he argues, that for Benjamin, 
‘the art of citing without quotation marks’ was a provocative formula with provocative intent. 
There was an unquestionable measure of subversion in it, similar to that which Benjamin saw in 
surrealist montage.” This had little to do with plagiarism. As de la Durantaye concludes, 
“Benjamin well knew and often observed, citing authorities can just as often be used to end a 
debate as to begin one.”61 Which is to say, Benjamin was keen on critical citation as a form of 
critical experimentation, and it is his work starting from 1935 in which I would like to highlight 
what I understand as one of the main preoccupations that underscore the ongoing vitality of his 
arguments. Namely, I would like to highlight the ways in which Benjamin identifies in whose 
service human productivity has functioned under capitalism, and the ways in which anti-
capitalist thought grounds his exploration of the mimetic faculty to recast in whose service 
human productivity can and must then function. 
* 
In late 1935 and early 1936, Benjamin wrote the second version of “The Work of Art in 
the Age of Its Reproducibility” which laid the ground on which he continued to build his sense 
of experimental Marxism throughout several of his most key works. In the art essay, Benjamin 
theorizes two related aesthetic periods, idiomized in terms of first and second technology. In 





production depicts “ritual” relationships between “humans and their environment,” and whose 
“orientation and aims” functioned in the service of “cult value.” Benjamin seems to emphasize 
that the benefactors and beneficiaries of such rituals were clergy-like—elite groups of people for 
whom the mere presence of art supersedes its exhibition across classes more broadly. In short, 
during the period in which first technology presided, art was produced primarily by and for 
people, albeit circulating among the parochial classes of elites.62 On the other side, Benjamin 
examines aesthetics in terms of what he calls second technology whose processes of production 
had become influenced and organized under capitalist modes of production.63 Although second 
technology expands the cult value of the first into broader scenes of “exhibition value” for the 
masses, as might be expected, the deployment of modern technology in the production of art as a 
commodity under capitalism has diminished the role of people.64 As Benjamin argues, “whereas 
the former made the maximum possible use of human beings, the [second technology] reduces 
their use to the minimum.”65 We will see him pick this tragedy up in different ways in his later 
work. 
At best, Benjamin’s idioms are oblique. They identify and briefly describe two distinct 
periods of historical phenomena, but it is difficult to mobilize the concepts in productive ways on 
their own. Benjamin, too, may have been persuaded as such, influenced as he was, for better or 
worse, by Adorno. The concepts, for instance, are conspicuously absent in the third version of 
the essay. Yet in this second version, before moving onto his central argument Benjamin more 
carefully distinguishes second technology from the first in ways that line up with other, more 
established analytical categories. He writes, “the first technology really sought to master nature, 
whereas the second aims rather at the interplay between nature and humanity.” The relevant 





experimental, analytical expression of the dialects needed to understand our experience of 
modern capitalism, but it also identifies an experimental form of Benjamin’s preoccupation with 
critical citation.66 For despite its obliqueness, the concept of second technology aligns well with 
the anti-capitalist categories that frame both the second and third versions of Benjamin’s essay 
from the outset. Paraphrasing Marx without direct citation, each essay opens with a gesture 
toward the cultural effects of the historical subsumption of labor under capital: 
When Marx undertook his analysis of the capitalist mode of production, that mode was in 
its infancy. Marx adopted an approach which gave his investigations prognostic value. Going 
back to the basic conditions of capitalist production, he presented them in a way which showed 
what could be expected of capitalism in the future. What could be expected, it emerged, was not 
only an increasingly harsh exploitation of the proletariat but, ultimately, the creation of conditions 
which would make it possible for capitalism to abolish itself. 
Since the transformation of the superstructure proceeds far more slowly than that of the 
base, it has taken more than a half a century for the change in the conditions of production to be 
manifested in all areas of culture. How this process has affected culture can only now be assessed, 
and these assessments must meet certain prognostic requirements…They call for theses defining 
the tendencies of the development of art under the present conditions of production. The dialectic 
of these conditions of production is evident in the superstructure, no less than in the economy. 
Theses defining the developmental tendencies of art can therefore contribute to the political 
struggle in ways that it would be a mistake to underestimate.67 
 
For Benjamin, at the heart of such political struggle is the need for a reappropriation of 
technology (constant capital/means of production) that capitalism has set in motion in the service 
of its own agenda, namely, the production and accumulation of surplus-value set in motion again 
as such, all at the expense of those whose labor-power enchant it with value, let alone those who 
fall victim to what Marx described as “the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.”68 It 
is with regard to the method of reappropriation, however, where Benjamin’s theory of the 
mimetic faculty takes its strongest shape in his art essay. 
As mentioned from the outset, Benjamin’s central argument in the second version of his 
art essay is that, primarily, modern artists, by way of their mimetic perception, “rehearse [the] 
interplay” between nature and humanity in the service of producing art objects capable of 





social function of modern art involve not only our mimetic faculties, but also the intensification 
of the capitalist mode of production, idiomized as second technology, which invites its 
complement, namely, the ways in which capitalism, “deeply tied as [it is] to modern 
technology,” names “the destruction of the conditions necessary for an adequate human 
experience,” as Eiland and Jennings have it.70 In short, it is clear that Benjamin understood well 
our conditions of estrangement under capitalism discussed in chapter one. But, as mentioned 
above, Benjamin was also particularly sensitive at apprehending value from within the detritus, 
avowing not only the nefarious character of the relations between classes, but also the ways in 
which our mimetic faculties, bound up in artistic production, can function as efforts toward 
meaningful social change.  
And perhaps unsurprisingly, Benjamin’s argument about our experience of capitalist 
modernity and his vision for a path forward takes shape in dialogue between its main text and its 
footnotes. For the main body of text emphasizes the pedagogical nature of our mimetic 
engagement with technology: Our engagements with technology as deployed under capitalism 
“train human beings in the apperceptions and reactions needed to deal with a vast apparatus 
whose role in their lives is expanding almost daily.”71 Yet it is in the footnote where we learn 
more about the historical, pedagogical lesson of our mimetic engagements with technology itself, 
namely, their efforts toward innervations in the service of revolutionary social change: 
Revolutions are innervations of the collective—or, more precisely, efforts at innervation on the 
part of the new, historically unique collective which has its organs in the new technology. This 
second technology is a system in which the mastering of elementary social forces is a 
precondition for playing [das Spiel] with natural forces. Just as a child who has learned to grasp 
stretches out its hand for the moon as it would for a ball, so humanity, in its efforts at innervation, 
sets its sights as much on currently utopian goals as on goals within reach. For in revolutions, it is 
not only the second technology which asserts its claims vis-à-vis society. Because this technology 
aims at liberating human beings from drudgery, the individual suddenly sees his scope for play, 
his field of action [Spielraum], immeasurably expanded. He does not yet know his way around 
this space. But already he registers his demands on it. For the more the collective makes the 





they have received of what was due them under the dominion of the first technology. In other 
words, it is the individual liberated by the liquidation of the first technology who stakes his claim. 
No sooner has the second technology secured its initial revolutionary gains than vital questions 
affecting the individual—questions of love and death which had been buried by the first 
technology—once again press for solutions.72 
 
Benjamin was optimistic about our mimetic encounters with various objects, here identified as 
“technology.” And although he hadn’t cited it, the spirit of his footnote aligns well with an axiom 
in Capital: “[T]he properties of a thing do not arise from its relation to other things, they are, on 
the contrary, merely activated by such relations.”73 It is clear that Benjamin was after the 
activation of different social relations. And what I mean is, the character of our encounters with 
Benjamin’s things, codified as second technology, have been organized and activated by 
capitalist modes of production at various registers. For not only can the term technology refer to 
individual technological objects, i.e., for Benjamin, in this essay, the motion picture camera. But 
technology can also refer to the transformational effect of the activity of a technological object 
in-use within a “system.” At the systemic level, as Eiland and Jennings argue, the product of the 
motion picture camera can activate in the viewer “profound changes in the very structure of the 
human sensory apparatus.”74 Hansen’s take extends this observation even farther: “Because of 
the technological nature of the filmic medium, as well as its collective mode of reception, film 
offers a chance—a second chance, a last chance—to bring the apparatus to social consciousness, 
to make it public.”75 More than preserving one’s humanity in the face of the apparatus, Benjamin 
sights were set on the ways in which, through mimetic reappropriation, we may “make the vast 
technical apparatus of our time an object of human innervation.”76 
In an effort to illustrate our pedagogical encounters with technological objects at different 
registers—from within our personal use, from within scenes of the production process under 
capitalism, and from within greater cultural scenes of a product’s circulation on the capitalist 





written, in Kafka, “each gesture is an event—one might even say a drama—in itself,” and I read 
Benjamin’s footnote, here, and his citations throughout his most influential essays, in a similar 
light.77 They function as dramatic gestures that can make vivid the allegorical value of reading 
our mimetic faculties as laid out in the second version of his art essay.  
In our everyday lives, our enjoyment of the use-value of an object is quite different when 
we encounter that object by way of its use-as-capital. I’ve been coerced to work, for instance, at 
a desk nearly every day and for many years at various rates of exploitation calculated by and to 
suit the domination of capitalist modes of production. In the concreteness of such labor, my 
awkward body has suffered the aches and pains of various misfits. Fed up, I finally saw my 
“scope for play” and built an awkward desk out of other desks. Drawing on my mimetic 
capacities, I perceived my situation in my world-of-things and produced an awkward desk to suit 
my awkward body. Like me, my desk performs awkwardly, yet it performs beautifully when 
activated as such, in-the-moment. As Benjamin writes, “art is a perfecting mimesis.”78 Yet, 
unlike Benjamin, it would be inaccurate to suggest that I “mastered” nature—to suggest that the 
desk works for me. For I know it works with me, and my “field of action [has] immeasurably 
expanded.” By way of my mimetic production within my world-of-things, I have made my 
beautifully-awkward desk function as an extension of myself, as if my “organs” are “in” its 
“technology.” As such, I have come to adore my desk.  
Yet about once a month, when bills are due, I get scared and I begin to wonder about the 
ways in which the desk’s exchange-value on the market may help me. In those moments, the 
character of my encounter with the desk changes from one of enjoyment into one organized and 
characterized by the painful, systematic expression of the effect of a nefarious social relation. 





be torn away from my body in the service of satisfying some other need to reproduce myself. I 
become estranged from the enjoyment not of my desk, but of that desk. Even in more lucrative 
months, I cannot enjoy my desk, as I know that I cannot get too attached. For I also know that I 
fear that one month, any coming month, the painful event that I only thus far anticipate, might be 
realized. My mimetic product, activated as it is by the social relations in which I find myself as a 
working-class subject, has taught me something about my historicity. As a working-class subject, 
I can create value. But my enjoyment of it is always-already at risk, limited, and estranged. 
 But my illustration is incomplete, for I encounter the value of my desk both in-use and in 
anticipation of its exchange, as something I’m told is “mine.” As far as I understand, the stupid 
bourgeois political economist would insist that I “own” it, expressed in one way by my legal 
“freedom” to set it in motion as capital. But as we know, we don’t always “own” the technology 
we encounter, are coerced to use, and are forced to suffer in the service of its “owners,” namely 
capitalists. To illustrate that drama, I must draw from another scene of Benjamin’s works within 
his montage. 
Like his essay on Kafka, Benjamin’s 1939, “On Some Motifs on Baudelaire” explores 
what appear as a thousand historical-cultural preoccupations at once: the decline in reception of 
lyric poetry; changes in the structure of experience of its readers; motions to produce meaningful 
experience in the face of, or as a response to, shock as a normative phenomenon of urban space; 
a collective emancipation from isolation within the conspicuous presence of the crowd, and on 
and on. Yet each preoccupation finds a theoretical ground that Marx had made available for him, 
reinforced, perhaps, by Adorno. In the following passage, Benjamin links the question of the 
historical transformation of modern European society to Marx’s claims about the ways in which 





again interested in cultural expressions of the historical subsumption of labor under capital. Yet 
this time, answering Adorno’s call, he converses with Capital more directly as he discusses the 
effects of our engagement with technologies that we don’t “own”: 
Marx had good reason to stress the great fluidity of the connection between segments in 
manual labor. This connection appears to the factory worker on an assembly line in an 
independent, objectified form. The article being assembled comes within the worker’s range of 
action independently of his volition, and moves away from him just as arbitrarily. “It is a 
common characteristic of all capitalist production…,” wrote Marx, “that the worker does not 
make use of the working conditions. The working conditions make use of the worker; but it takes 
machinery to give this reversal a technologically concrete form.” In working with machines, 
workers learn to coordinate “their own movements with the uniformly constant movement of an 
automaton…All machine work,” says Marx…, “requires prior training of the workers.” This 
training must be differentiated from practice. Practice, which was the sole determinant in 
handcrafting, still had a function in manufacturing. With practice as the basis, “each particular 
area of production finds its appropriate technical form in experience and slowly perfects it.” To be 
sure, each area quickly crystallizes this form “as soon as a certain degree of maturity has been 
attained.” On the other hand, this same system of manufacture produces “in every handicraft it 
appropriates a class of so-called unskilled laborers which the handicraft system strictly excluded. 
In developing a greatly simplified specialty to the point of virtuosity…it starts turning the lack of 
any development into a specialty. In addition to rankings, we get the simple division of workers 
into the skilled and the unskilled.” The unskilled worker is the one most deeply degraded by 
machine training. His work has been sealed off from experience…79 
 
As we follow the passage, it is not difficult to imagine, for instance, another drama—a historical 
scene of the subsumption of labor under capital in which we are pulled from the handicraft shop 
to work at some assembly line—assembling, whatever. Desks? In this process, the ‘whatever’ 
doesn’t matter anymore than the abstractness of the labor of those who are coerced to set it in 
motion as capital. In our interactions with the machines, we mime the dead labor-power that has 
enchanted them with value and has set them in motion as constant capital for the capitalist. As 
each individual corpse-unit of another’s dead labor passes into our proximity, it asks after the 
sacrifice the death of our own life’s energy such that we then pass that new congealing corpse-
product on by to the next victim. It is clear that our “historically unique collective…has its 
organs in the new technology,” albeit in an estranged way. And it is also clear that the activity 





But we haven’t yet lost our sense of humor. We maintain that reserve on that other side, 
as we tend to joke that the machines have set it all in motion, as if the machines have an agenda. 
No doubt, machines play a significant, material role. But as mentioned above, we know our 
social relations are not the fault of the tools. ‘Someone put on “Radio Friendly Unit Shifter,” and 
let’s pile ‘em up. Teamwork makes the dream work!’ Our acerbic smirks avow a truth, yet a 
truth that reflects a sort of violence. The visceral rhetoric of Marx is exemplary here, as his own 
gesture toward the mimetic re-capitulation of the bodily-organ-turned-subject reveals. As 
mentioned in chapter one, “Living labour does not realize itself in objective labour which 
thereby becomes its objective organ, but instead objective labour maintains and fortifies itself by 
drawing off living labor.”80 Estranged from our humanity, we encounter the otherwise lively 
mimesis of our activity transformed into a mere semblance of an organ that functions in the 
service of the greater, synthetic organism—capitalism—all in the service only of its health at the 
expense of our mimetic, yet affective suicide. What’s at stake here are the ways in which human 
activity under capitalism has taken shape less as the mimetic extension and objectification of our 
organs for our greater social development, but rather as a transformational reversal of subject and 
object, ushering in another form of the fetishized subject-appearance of capital. As mentioned in 
chapter one, capitalism haunts us with the corpse of our collective death. That corpse names a 
product of our mimeses-turned-bourgeois, and although we might not yet “know” our “way 
around this space,” our affective lives “register” our “demands on it.” Yet, Benjamin was also 
keen to examine our mimetic immersion within processes of circulation. And it is with regard to 
circulation where we can witness the criticality of suicidal mimesis more vividly, as Benjamin 





In “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in two key passages, Benjamin 
examines the intoxication of the flâneur, circulating within a crowd altogether immersed within 
the circulation of commodities themselves. On the one hand, Benjamin begins to set up a 
juxtaposition that “punishes” us for our fetishes in the service of “saving” us from our reification, 
at least intellectually. Which is to say, Benjamin’s citation-thieves are productive. Intoxicated by 
our mimetic immersion within the circulation of commodities, Benjamin begins with the fetish, 
specifically the phantasmatic concept of the “commodity-soul:”  
If there were such a thing as a commodity-soul (a notion that Marx occasionally mentions in jest), 
it would be the most empathetic ever encountered in the realm of souls, for it would be bound to 
see every individual as a buyer in whose hand and house it wants to nestle.81 
 
Benjamin highlights, here, the innocuous value-character of the products of human creative 
activity. Any product insofar as it is a “good” appears simply as that. My desk, for instance, is 
good insofar as its function performs some use-value for me. Yet, historically, and of course, 
presently, we have also encountered products as commodities where use-value names merely one 
side of the dialectical character of the commodity form. We encounter their utility compounded 
by their exchangeability, such that commodities appear to bear traces of a ghostly, human 
activity imprinted on or activated within them. This is what Marx means when he argues that 
commodities “transcend sensuousness.”82 And by no fault of their own (I mean, it’s our fetish), 
commodities confront us with the most seductive of enchantments: ‘Oh hey, Consumer. Pardon 
me, I don’t know your name. But, as you can see, I’ve had you in mind. Tell me I’m pretty?’ 
they ask, coquettishly. And we may graciously respond: ‘Who, me? Whoa! Why thank you, 
Absorbant-Cotton-Dish-Towel-With-The-Loop-Sewn-On-Your-End-Which-Allows-Me-To-
Hang-You-Especially-On-That-Hook-Near-The-Sink! Pity me! Good thing you’re here, for all 
my stuff has gotten so wet!’—for instance. There can be an intimate empathy transmitted in the 





anticipatory and felicitous realization of some potential, empathetic interaction for us by 
imagining the function-in-use of some product. It can be really hot! All of which is to say, due to 
their use-values, there remains a there, there in the circulation and realization of the products of 
human activity set in motion by the value-producing power of human creativity, even in the face 
of the wreckage of capitalism.83 
On the other hand, as he continues his argument, Benjamin sobers us up. Unlike his 
preoccupation with the “commodity-soul,” which toys with the idea of the intoxicating nature of 
our fetishes, Benjamin’s preoccupations about circulation become more historically specific and 
also more properly anthropocentric. His archetype is the flâneur, the idle stroller. And his 
protagonist is Baudelaire, whose flânerie coincides with his occupation as a man of letters whose 
avenues toward publication had undergone a transformation from circulation in literary journals 
toward that of the feuilleton section of the daily newspaper around the middle nineteenth 
century. Which is to say, by the middle nineteenth century in Paris, modes of literary production 
had begun, however loosely, to be subsumed under capital.  
The feuilleton, as Benjamin has it, functioned as a cultural section of the newspaper 
featuring “short, abrupt news items,” “city gossip,” “theatrical intrigues,” “the serial novel,” and 
other “‘things worth knowing’”—all surrounded, of course, by advertisements and funded by 
their revenue. Marking more than an advent in the mediation of European pop culture, and in 
addition to their “cheap elegance,” Benjamin points out the ways in which the popularity of the 
feuilleton compelled literary producers into a mimetic “assimilation” within the scene-of-events 
offered in the feuilleton itself. As an immediate result, someone like Baudelaire, argues 





commodities, gossip, and nonsense, encountering it all as the stuff of the raw material necessary 
for literary production.84 
On the boulevard, he kept himself in readiness for the next incident, witticism, or rumor. There he 
unfolded the full drapery of his connections with the colleagues and the men-about-town, and he 
was as much dependent on their results as the cocottes were on their disguises…Building’s walls 
are the desk against which he presses his notebooks; newsstands are his libraries; and café 
terraces are the balconies from which he looks down on his household after his work is done.85 
 
Throughout the day, spread out amongst all the constant capital, Benjamin argues that his 
protagonist, Baudelaire “behaved as if he had learned from Marx that the value of a commodity 
is determined by the worktime needed from society to [re]produce it.”86 But Baudelaire also 
behaved in another way, as if he’d been trained by the capitalist to confront himself as the mere 
reified form of human-activity-turned-commodity. For Baudelaire, in effect, had become a 
laborer, mimicking the death of his life’s energy. 
As with the circulation of commodities, so too had gone Baudelaire, intoxicated within 
the marketplace. Miming the dead-labor, he’s there, “surging in a stream of customers,” and like 
the commodity, he’s there “to find a buyer.” But he’s still a little tipsy. As Benjamin argues, 
“empathy is the nature of the intoxication to which the flâneur abandons himself in the crowd.” 
Yet what’s more, Benjamin argues that “Baudelaire knew the true situation of the man of letters.” 
As a person, merely miming the circulation of dead-labor, Benjamin argues that Baudelaire 
“possessed” a “sensitivity” “that perceives charm even in damaged and decaying goods,” a 
sensitivity that invites both “pleasure and uneasiness” that has become necessary for our survival 
under capitalism.87 And as Benjamin approaches one of the most striking passages in his Paris 
essay, he draws from Baudelaire’s Oeuvres in the service of setting up a juxtaposition between 
Baudelaire’s “pleasure” in the face of its “uneasiness.” “The pleasure of being in a crowd is a 
mysterious expression of the enjoyment of the multiplication by number.”88 We can witness the 





…enjoyment” set in motion by miming the circulation-effect of capitalism’s “multiplication by 
number.” It’s illuminating. There’s a mysterious pleasure, here, as capitalists have mystified the 
world. Within the marketplace, at the point of transaction, our purchase of the commodity 
realizes one form of the multiplication by number set in motion by way of human-energy. At the 
marketplace, we enjoy the celebration of the multiplication by number of the potential use-values 
the merchant capitalist makes available by way of exchange. And sure, what joy. 
Yet such pleasure is not without its caveat. And as he continues his analysis, what is at 
play is Benjamin reading the allegorical value of Baudelaire’s suicidal mimesis within the 
marketplace in the service of exposing the absurdity informed by Marx. On the one hand, 
workers, by way of the activation of their value-producing labor-power, in fact, multiply the 
value of constant capital, x, while capitalists, on the other hand, have offered in return mere 
wages, the mere price of commodified labor-power, y, as if its function were one of mere 
addition, rather than one of multiplication. Workers work for their wages, while capitalists 
accumulate the remaining surplus-value, euphemized as profits, made real for them by way of 
exchange on the market, yet another effect of the mysterious pleasure of the multiplication by 
number. Although activating his mimetic faculty, which can itself be a value-producing activity, 
Baudelaire mimes less the value-producing power or effect of human creative energy. What 
Baudelaire’s mimesis emphasizes, rather, is the circulation of the effect of the commodification 
of reified human activity made possible by the subsumption of his human-energy under 
capitalism. In short, Baudelaire mimes the absurdity of the capital relation. And the image of 
Baudelaire that Benjamin makes vivid—his circulation within the crowd, hung-over, as if he too 





And as we encounter Benjamin’s passage, we witness again a form of his critical citation, 
namely, the art of citing without quotation marks. Without citation, the expressive effect of 
Benjamin’s imagery riffs on the synthetic death of our lives’-energy that makes “special” that 
historical irrationality of which Marx calls that “special commodity.”89 We feel the “chilly 
breath” of the effect of the commodification of reified human energy bound up in Baudelaire’s 
poetic statement. The full passage reads: 
“The pleasure of being in a crowd is a mysterious expression of the enjoyment of the 
multiplication by number.” But this statement becomes clear if one imagines it spoken not only 
from the viewpoint of a person but also from that of a commodity. To be sure, insofar as a person, 
as labor power is a commodity, there is no need for him to identify himself as such. The more 
conscious he becomes of his mode of existence, the mode imposed on him by the system of 
production, the more he proletarianizes himself, the more he will be gripped by the chilly breath 
of the commodity economy, and the less he will feel like empathizing with commodities.90 
 
If there were such thing as a commodity-soul, and if it were the most empathetic ever 
encountered in the realm of souls, and if it could speak to us, what we would hear through its 
chilly breath would be the humane whisper of the laborer who set it in motion as dead-labor, the 
commodity: “You beautiful mutherfucker, I am nothing more than the objectification of your 
dead labor-power. Now, let me dry your eyes, while you listen here. A person—you—simply, 
categorically, are not one of us. A person may be commodified in whole, as are the enslaved: A 
person’s life-energy may be commodified in part as labor-power, as are the working class. But 
I’ll be goddamned if I let you go away thinking it is nothing other than a fucking bourgeois 
travesty to think of, ontologically circumscribe, and coerce a person to be set in motion, in 
whole, or in part, as a fucking commodity. For I am dead-labor, and you are alive…Now, you go 
s i n g  t h a t !”  
Marx has argued, unlike the commodity, “labour as the value-forming element cannot 
itself possess any value.”91 And here, Benjamin spotlights the ways in which Baudelaire’s 





breath” the absurdity of the commodification of reified human activity that makes commodity 
production and circulation possible under capitalism. For Baudelaire engaged not only in suicidal 
mimesis, but in a critical suicidal mimesis. 
* 
 The critical value of the mimetic faculty as found in the art essay depends upon our use 
of technology—a tool, a machine, a motion picture camera, art, and on and on. By way of our 
use of them and our practice with them, they train us such that it appears as if our “organs [are] 
in the new technology,” as if they are extensions of ourselves.92 As Eiland and Jennings argue, 
through our training with technology, we can acquire “new apperceptions and reactions,” 
“profound changes in the very structure of the human sensory apparatus.”93 Through our active 
relationships with technologies, we expand, as Benjamin describes, our “scope for play,” and this 
sense of play is what Hansen emphasizes more precisely.94 By training us in the interplay 
between humanity and nature, Hansen argues that technology has “the potential to reverse, in the 
form of play, the catastrophic consequences of an already failed reception of technology.”95 
What she means, of course, is that technology, as deployed by industrial capitalists, has 
functioned only in the service of capitalism itself. In short, capitalism has failed the value-
producing power that makes it possible. Benjamin makes this clear in dialogue with Capital in 
“On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.” Yet with our organs in the new technology, and by 
contemplating our scope for play, we may come to imagine—by way of our mimetic 
performances with it—the function of technology in the service of something else, perhaps even 
ourselves, our “unique historical collective,” as Benjamin envisions.96 Yet what is striking about 
Benjamin’s treatment of the mimetic faculty in “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” 





has found its way, through circulation and distribution, into our greater cultural milieux, 
infecting our behavior and poisoning our thinking.  
 As mentioned in chapter one, by the middle 1860s, Marx had come to describe the 
capitalist mode of production and circulation as “the rule of things over man, of dead labour over 
the living.”97 By 1935, Benjamin began reading more thoroughly, Capital, as evinced throughout 
his own work between the middle-to-late 1930s. By the fall of 1938, Benjamin continued to 
theorize the mimetic faculty as a fundamental human capacity transformed by our experience of 
capitalist modernity, and he highlighted the literary work of Charles Baudelaire as an exemplar 
of mimetic experience under capitalism—the rule of dead labor over the living. And the extent to 
which Benjamin makes vivid the absurdities of the capital relation bound up in the criticality of 
Baudelaire’s mimetic perception and production, readers can come to understand why Benjamin 
began to describe the works of Baudelaire as “a kind of mimesis of death.”98 
 
 
ANOTHER KIND OF MIMESIS OF DEATH 
 
The demolition of the autonomous, self-identical individual entails an analogous transformation 
of the collective. 
 
Miriem Bratu Hansen, “Mistaking the Moon for the Ball,” 2012 
 
 
From the outset, I argued that no one invites the thought of modern suicidality as a 
rehearsal of the capital relation like that Walter Benjamin. And throughout this chapter, I have 
tried to show the ways in which Benjamin, influenced by his own suicidality, theorized the 
transformation of the mimetic faculty under our experience of capitalist modernity such that we 





absurdity of our interplay with capitalism—the ways in which we rehearse the contradictions 
bound up in the capital relation.  
For those in our suicidal lot, however, I am interested in scenes in which the stakes are 
more acute, yet no less significant. As Benjamin argues “the first material on which the mimetic 
faculty tested itself was the human body.”99 And even though, as he argues, “both the mimetic 
force and the mimetic mode of vision may have vanished from certain spheres, perhaps only to 
surface in others,” I am interested in the ways in which the body still functions as a site of 
mimetic production.100 Most specifically, I am interested in what happens to our bodies when we 
mime a loss of our humanity—when our mimetic faculties perceive and then reproduce that loss. 
What forms might that take? How severe might they be? And what happens if we are losing our 
capacity even to perceive that we are capable of miming such losses, reinforced, as we are, by 
our circulation within socio-economic and political structures fueled by the very human-energies 
and capacities that that structure simultaneously insists we disavow in favor of the twin, 
dehumanizing absurdities of reification and fetishization? In other words, what happens if the 
stuff of capitalist realism appears as if it has become our material reality? And, of course, worst 
of all, like Fleur de Marie, what happens when our mimetic centers contend with losses that 
mobilize a mimetic production that not only recapitulates those losses, but begs for an avowal, 
fallen on deaf ears? 
“Who can say?” 
For those in our suicidal lot, what is at stake is not only our lives, but especially the 
extant liveliness that our mimeses, bound up in suicidality, both consistently exhibit, yet also put 
at risk. I would like to argue that that which is allegorized by way of suicidal, critical mimesis 





circulation. At stake is not only our ability to avow the historical character and transformation of 
our experience under capitalism, but the meaning of that experience itself from within the 
detritus of our historically situated present without which, I argue, we’d understand little of our 
suicidal lives and the value after which their expressions seek. As Hansen has argued, “Benjamin 
seeks to reactivate the abilities of the body as a medium in the service of imagining new forms of 
experience.”101 And I would like to conclude by suggesting that modern suicidality can describe 
our attempt, at the level of mimetic perception and production, to re-present to us the seemingly 
impenetrable totality of our shared estrangement under modern capitalism in the service of 
imagining, affirming, and possibly creating new forms of social reproduction. 
* 
While in no single work had he theorized suicidality alone, by tending to Benjamin’s 
lifework as a montage, we encounter his thesis in “The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire” as such. He argues, “Modernity must stand under the sign of suicide,” and his 
statement strikes us as if it were a sort of flashpoint. It is as if Benjamin’s thesis, as he writes 
elsewhere, “blasts…a specific work out of [his] lifework.”102 The blast, however, is delayed, as 
two claims about Baudelaire flank Benjamin’s thesis while the imagery that follows detonates 
the explosion. 
In his conversation about the significance of the working-class hero as the subject of la 
modernité in relation to works of antiquity, Benjamin draws from Baudelaire’s “Salon de 1859,” 
highlighting the detritus of capitalism which was never far from his mind. He quotes, “When I 
hear how a Raphael or a Veronese is glorified with the veiled intention of denigrating what came 
after them…I ask myself whether an achievement which must be rated at least equal to 





place.” As if the 16th century weren’t hostile, Benjamin argues that the resistance afforded to the 
“natural productive élan” of the working-class hero under capitalism is “out of all proportion to 
his strength,” emphasizing the hostility through which the working-class subjects of modernity 
struggle to survive. With empathy to the working-class hero of modernity, Benjamin then 
delivers his thesis: 
It is understandable if a person becomes exhausted and takes refuge in death. Modernity must 
stand under the sign of suicide, an act which seals a heroic will that makes no concessions to a 
mentality inimical toward this will. Such a suicide is not resignation but heroic passion. It is the 
achievement of modernity in the realm of the passions.103 
 
To be sure, what is heroic about the working-class subjects of modernity is their passion, not 
their corporeal suicides. Benjamin knew that, as his thesis insists, “Such a suicide is not 
resignation but heroic passion,” the “achievement of modernity in the realm of the passions” (my 
emphasis). In other words, it is simply that in the face of capitalism, working-class suicidality is 
all-too-often the shape that that heroic passion takes. This emphasis on suicidality over corporeal 
suicide is further emphasized in the way in which Benjamin sort of clumsily asks after the source 
of the value of acknowledging working-class suicidality. “Do the dregs of society supply the 
heroes of the big city? Or is the hero the poet who fashions his work from such material?”104 
What’s at play, again, is Benjamin reading Baudelaire’s mimetic faculty—his ability to perceive 
and produce similarities. As Benjamin argues: “For the modern hero is no hero; he is the 
portrayer of heroes.”105 In grammatical obfuscation, it is precisely the mimetic faculty that 
informs Benjamin’s claim about who’s who. Is the modern hero the suicidal, working-class 
subject? Or is the modern hero the portrayer of such subjectivities? And it is in his answer where 
a flash of his mimesis shines through again, for “[t]he theory of the modern admits both.”106  
Benjamin perceived a similarity between Baudelaire’s poetic production and the coercive 





mediates that similarity at the site of suicide itself. That is, substantiating that to which 
Baudelaire merely gestured in “Salon de 1846,” Benjamin grounds the heroic élan of the modern 
working-class with specific reference to a spate of then contemporary suicides.107 Georges 
Minois makes this vivid: “The annual mean number of suicides for the whole of France rose 
from 1,827 for the years 1826-30 to 2,931 during 1841-45,” and as “the moralist took fright,” 
Minois continues, their “works on suicide proliferated during the July Monarchy.”108 Yet rather 
than moralize, Benjamin amplifies the significance of suicide, framing it as a collective 
preoccupation. He argues, “[a]round that time, the idea of suicide became familiar to the 
working masses…[and] [s]omeone like Baudelaire could very well have viewed suicide as the 
only heroic act still available to the multitudes maladives of the cities in reactionary times.” 
Returning to Baudelaire’s “Salon de 1846,” Benjamin further emphasizes a sense of collectivity 
surrounding the idea of suicide, reminding us that it is as if “[w]e are all attendants at some kind 
of funeral.”109  
Benjamin was fond of the expressive, revelatory value of physiognomy. And I would like 
to argue that in the few pages that follow his thesis in “The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire,” Benjamin’s expressive imagery takes its most effective form. From high atop the 
church of Sacré-Coeur, Benjamin references Léon Daudet’s observations of Paris. 
From above, one looks down on this agglomeration of palaces, monuments, houses, and barracks, 
and one gets the feeling that they are destined for catastrophe, or several catastrophes—natural or 
social…I have spent hours on Fourvières with a view of Lyons, on Notre-Dame de la Garde with 
a view of Marseilles, on Sacré-Coeur with a view of Paris…What becomes most apparent from 
these heights is a threat. The agglomerations of human beings are threatening…A man needs 
work—that is correct. But he has other needs, too…Among his other needs is suicide, something 
that is inherent in him and the society which forms him, and it is stronger than his drive for self-
preservation. Thus, when one stands on Sacré-Coeur, Fourvières, and Notre-Dame de la Garde 
and looks down, one is surprised that Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles are still there.110 
 
By imagining modernity’s suicidal physiognomy in the late 1930s in relation to Daudet’s 





passion moderne which Baudelaire recognized in suicide has received in this century.”111 If Fleur 
de Marie asks after both a confirmation of our estranged life under capitalism and an affirmation 
of the possibility to imagine new modes of social reproduction by posing a simple, yet painfully 
humane question, “Who can say?,” then the expression of surprise immanent in the physiognomy 
of Benjamin’s Face-of-Suicidal-Modernity wagers a statement on the assumption of a similar 
question that amplifies his thesis about Baudelaire, which is really Benjamin’s own. For not only 
must modernity stand under the sign of suicide, but in the face of our strangled forms of 
resistance to capitalism, it is surprising that we are even still here—that we even still exist. For 
the question posed from Benjamin’s physiognomic suicidal expression seems to read, Oughtn’t 
we be surprised that we all haven’t yet killed ourselves? 
* 
To live modernity is to survive a catastrophe. Yet in the face of our wreckage, there is a 
joy in the question of Benjamin’s Face-of-Suicidal-Modernity reminiscent of a common form of 
greeting in Chinese, “吃了吗 (Chī le ma)?” The meaning of 吃了吗 translates as, “Have you 
eaten?”112 One could imagine the poignancy of such a greeting when food has become scarce, for 
instance, during the Long March. Yet, it is a felicitous greeting. In its care is also reflected an 
acknowledgement of an otherwise quite normal need, for what is more normal than our need for 
food? 
 I have often imagined a similar greeting, but I’ve never felt comfortable enough to open a 
conversation with it. I mean, often when people ask me how I am doing, I respond with 
something like, “Well, I chose life today.” It’s never not been met with a smile, as if not only I 





well. It’s as if, when I respond this way, I’ve met a fellow traveler whose physiognomy confirms 
its implication, and I feel less alone. 
But how fucking joyous it would be for me—and maybe for those in our suicidal lot—
perhaps for you, too, were when we meet one another, we respond to the greeting, “Have you 
entertained your suicide lately?” with something equally felicitous, “I’m doing great! Thanks for 
asking.” 
By approaching suicidality as critical mimesis, we may better situate those in our suicidal 
lot within our lived histories under capitalist modernity, we may better understand the ways in 
which the critical value of suicidal activity invites us to imagine new forms of social 
reproduction, and we may help mitigate the frequency of suicide itself by redirecting our 
tendencies toward corporeal suicide in the service of critical art, as had Baudelaire, or criticism, 
as had Benjamin. 
 Until then, I’m afraid, the resonance emanating from Benjamin’s curiously-titled 
reflection, “Closed for Alterations” will appear as a mystery. 
In a dream, I took my life with a gun. When it went off, I did not wake up but saw myself lying 







The Affective Value of Suicidal Fantasy: Feeling the “Insane Truth” in Mrs. Dalloway 
 
[T]he moderns had never written anything  
one wanted to read about death, she thought;  
and turned. 
 
Virginia Woolf, “Mrs Dalloway in Bond Street,” 1923 
 
 
Where Walter Benjamin’s work with suicidality invites us out of the industrial factory 
and into scenes of our mimetic immersion amongst the circulation and distribution of 
commodities more broadly, the following two chapters analyze each character’s situatedness 
within capitalist modernity in different ways. The mimeses are as diverse as the characters’ lived 
historicities from within the world of each novel, and as such, the mimetic objects of their casts 
of characters are more difficult to pin down. In the present chapter, Septimus Smith’s suicidal 
mimeses re-present a loss on the site of his body epiphenomenal to the development of 
capitalism. Clarissa Dalloway’s suicidal mimeses are more externalized and take the shape of a 
re-staging of a specific historical scene of loss from within her bourgeois culture. Both mimeses, 
however, are situated within scenes made possible under capitalism, as each is characterized by 
our estrangement from one another and our greater humanity in general. 
* 
Virginia Woolf was fond of thinking about death. She often wrote about death in her 
diary, and in 1922, Woolf drafted an entry whose import would exceed its occasion, “I meant to 
write about death, only life came breaking in as usual.”1 Woolf suspected a value in death, a 
value for which she sought confirmation in others. “I like, I see, to question people about death,” 





of death in her 1923 story, “Mrs Dalloway in Bond Street,” a short story tracing Clarissa 
Dalloway’s morning errands throughout metropolitan London.  
Woolf framed the value of death as one that gives rise to potentiality, a cognitive 
suspicion about death accompanied by an affective empowerment. Woolf framed the value of 
thinking about death as a force or a particular kind of affective power that connects Clarissa to 
and situates her within the world around her. The full passage reads as follows: 
She mounted the little hill lightly. The air stirred with energy. Messages were passing 
from the Fleet to the Admiralty. Piccadilly and Arlington Street and the Mall seemed to chafe the 
very air in the Park and lift its leaves hotly, brilliantly, upon waves of that divine vitality which 
Clarissa loved. To ride; to dance; she had adored all that. Or going on long walks in the country, 
talking, about books, what to do with one’s life, for young people were amazingly priggish—oh, 
the things one had said! But one had conviction. Middle age is the devil. People like Jack’ll never 
know that, she thought; for he never once thought of death, never, they said, knew he was dying. 
And now can never mourn—how did it go?—a head grown grey…From the contagion of the 
world’s slow stain,…have drunk their cup a round or two before….From the contagion of the 
world’s slow stain! She held herself upright. 
 
The narrator sets the “divine vitality” by which Clarissa is empowered and connected to her 
world in obverse relation to that of Jack, a man who “never once thought of death.” Through 
Jack, yet in relation to Clarissa, Woolf suggests that thinking about death can set in motion an 
ability to mourn while alluding both to Percy Bysshe Shelley’s “An Elegy on the Death of John 
Keats”3 and to Omar Khayyam’s “The Rubaiyat,” two poems whose motifs engage issues of 
mourning the death of another, the value of which seems clear.  
The loss of another can give rise to a host of painful feelings, or even numbness 
characterized by a withdrawal from the world; as Freud suggested, experiences of loss can 
inaugurate a subsequent “loss of interest in the outside world,” an “inhibition of all activity.” 
Through mourning, we are brought back into association with the world around us.4 Yet Woolf’s 
short story extends her understanding of mourning, or rather, mimetically turns that sense of 





dying” (my emphasis). Here Woolf’s inward turn raises interesting questions. If Clarissa 
encounters an affective value while thinking about death in relation to a man who has not 
thought of his own, had she, then, been thinking about her own death? Is that which empowers 
Clarissa’s affective engagement with her world, a power to hold “herself upright,” an effect of 
miming her own death in the service of mourning? 
Quite characteristically, Woolf’s work raises these questions, yet resists offering any 
clear answers. Rather, the narrator reveals her thoughts and affect to us by way of continued 
allusions to poetry, albeit this time mixed with reference to William Shakespeare. “For all the 
great things one must go to the past, she thought. From the contagion of the world’s slow 
stain…Fear no more the heat o’ the sun….And now can never mourn, can never mourn, she 
repeated.” Clarissa’s thoughts about death and mourning repeatedly “ran in her head,” the 
narrator insists, as a “test of great poetry.” Like Benjamin’s preoccupation with play in his art 
essay, Woolf framed the aesthetic value of thinking about death as a question, a “test,” an open 
question to be repeatedly posed in the service of seeking affirmation. 
Throughout drafting the palimpsestic texts that would become Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf’s 
thematic preoccupations about the affective value of thinking about death began to take more 
focused shapes. As she continued to experiment, Woolf reported in her diary what was then to 
her only a premonition. On September 6, 1922, during her initial drafting stages she wrote, 
“Anyhow, nature obligingly supplies me with the illusion that I am about to write something 
good: something rich, & deep, & fluent & hard as nails, while bright as diamonds.”5 Woolf had 
just finished “Mrs Dalloway in Bond Street” on September 2nd and was to begin another 
connected story, “The Prime Minister,” to be completed by October 12th. Sometime between 





more concrete themes as she then announced, “Mrs Dalloway has branched into a book; & I 
adumbrate here a study of insanity & suicide: the world seen by the sane & the insane side by 
side—something like that. Septimus Smith?—is that a good name?”6 Knowing she wanted to 
develop further the themes of the affective value of thinking about death taken up in her short 
story, Woolf envisioned a mimetic double to Clarissa in Septimus, another figure for thinking 
and feeling something not only about death, but more specifically about his own through suicide. 
As Woolf’s thematic preoccupations about death began to extend into issues surrounding suicide, 
however, she continued to explore ways in which to frame her preoccupations in the form of an 
open question. 
Woolf imagined what was to become her fourth novel as a “study” of insanity and 
suicide, yet the appositional phrase that follows within her diary entry extends that study to one 
of “the world,” the world “seen by the sane & the insane side by side” (my emphasis). Woolf 
sought to stage her study of whom she came to refer to as her doubled protagonists not only as 
one whose focus highlights two characters who inhabit the same world. She also framed them 
such that their apprehension of the possibility of death and suicide connects them to their worlds. 
As her early manuscript notations of October 16, 1922 reveal, Woolf wanted to portray her 
doubled protagonists’ preoccupations about death, particularly one’s own, in a subtle, yet 
striking way that emphasizes that which they share. “Mrs. D. Seeing the truth. S.S. seeing the 
insane truth.”7 Woolf used this language in her manuscript notations. The closest, most 
analogous language we find in Mrs. Dalloway, however, comes by way of the novel’s narrator, 
describing, on the one hand, Clarissa as enraptured by “something central that permeated,” 
holding her “diamond, something infinitely precious” whose “radiance burnt through” like a 





or “secret signal,” “a young man who carries in him the greatest message in the world,” a 
“message hidden in the beauty of words”—the object in its veil.8  
And again, Woolf resisted disclosing any stable answers about Clarissa’s “truth” or 
Septimus’ “insane truth.” Rather, as we found in her short story, Mrs. Dalloway poses these 
themes as open questions, as the narrator asks, “what did it mean to her, this thing called life?,” 
and “what was his message?” “Why seek truths and deliver messages…?”9  
Woolf framed Mrs. Dalloway as a study, a term that calls to mind approaches suggestive 
of, for instance, exploration, investigation, examination, and inquiry, all subject to affirmation, 
and the texts that together make up Mrs. Dalloway pose a host of curious questions this chapter 
takes up, questions such as, what is the truth Clarissa sees? What of Septimus’ insane truth? Are 
the meanings of these truths different? In what ways does Woolf formally explore what it means 
to “see” these truths? Is Septimus’ vision different than Clarissa’s? Or more specifically, if, as I 
argue, “Mrs. Dalloway in Bond Street” celebrates the aesthetic value of Clarissa’s tendency to 
think about death, perhaps even her own, does Mrs. Dalloway then celebrate the affective value 
of thinking about one’s own death through suicide? What, if anything, could be the affective 
value of thinking about one’s own suicide? And lastly, as an extension from Woolf’s aesthetic 
concerns, if she imagined her fourth novel as an effort to “to criticise the social system, & to 
show it at work, at its most intense,” how can an affective value of thinking about one’s own 
suicide, an act that takes one’s active ability to engage with the world absolutely, function as a 
political critique?10  
By examining the palimpsestic texts that became Mrs. Dalloway, texts examined by a 
host of various scholars in a host of various different ways,11 this chapter takes up a series of 





understood her preoccupations about death and suicide, how those preoccupations found their 
form in her writing, and ultimately, what Woolf can teach us about her early twentieth-century 
experience and, perhaps, our own in the twenty-first. 
 
 
THE TRUTH, THE INSANE TRUTH 
 
A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured in her 
own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he had preserved. Death was 
defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the impossibility of reaching the 
centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded, one was alone. 
There was an embrace in death. 
 
Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway, 1925 
 
 
 Since June 1922, Woolf had been anxious in anticipation of the publication and reception 
of her third novel, Jacob’s Room. She had been contending with critiques that described her 
fiction as “impossible,” critiques routinely received at the time from mostly male friends, 
reviewers, and literary critics who suggested that she struggled to narrate reality.12 Throughout 
her diary, Woolf often anticipated criticism of her work as an engagement in mere “graceful 
fantasy” written “without much bearing upon real life.”13 At times she even seemed to have 
internalized such criticism, asking, “Have I the power of conveying the true reality?” In the face 
of her doubts, however, Woolf resisted declaring firm claims about reality, acknowledging, “I 
insubstantiate, willfully to some extent, distrusting reality—its cheapness. But to get further.”14 
She wanted “to think out Mrs Dalloway,” “to foresee this book better than the others, & get the 
utmost out of it.”15 In the process she worried about exploring “almost too many ideas.” She 
knew she wanted to “give life & death, sanity & insanity,” figured in her doubled, yet different 





hand, and Septimus Warren Smith, a working-class veteran, clerk, husband, and self-educated 
poet on the other.16  
Yet despite their obvious differences, Woolf also linked Clarissa and Septimus in 
significant ways. Both Clarissa and Septimus, for instance, struggle to come to terms with their 
shared same-sex desire.17 Where Clarissa contends with “this question of love…this falling in 
love with women,” specifically her life-long friend Sally Seton, Septimus struggles to come to 
terms with his feelings for his officer, Evans, killed in the Great War.18  
In her manuscript notations, however, Woolf’s formal contentions about staging reality 
began to overlap with her thematic preoccupations about death and suicide explored in her short 
story. She became more curious about the effect of what she came to pose as this “strange” 
reality, the curiously oblique focal point of Clarissa’s “truth” and Septimus’ “insane truth”—the 
effect of which I develop as the affective value of entertaining the possibility of death, 
specifically one’s own through suicide.19 
In August 1923, Woolf came closest to pinning down her fourth novel’s most significant 
motif, a motif that binds her doubled protagonists in the most fundamental ways.  
Staged in the form of a sort of strangled hypothesis, Woolf reflected, almost in verse: 
There must be a reality which is  
not in human beings at all. What about  
death for instance? But what is death?  
Strange if that were the reality.20 
 
Her hypothesis, “There must be a reality…,” proposes an extant condition. Yet this condition, 
she wrote, “…is not in human beings at all.” Woolf suggested, here, an absence internal to 
human subjectivity, and I argue, this absence describes in part what Woolf meant by the “truth” 
she wanted Clarissa to see. As the epigraph to this section suggests, Woolf positioned that “thing 





them,” giving rise to sensations of “the impossibility of reaching the centre.” Although Woolf 
portrayed that “thing” central to subjectivity as an absence, her notation then frames a sort of 
research question that gives shape and character to that absence, or perhaps, proposes a medium 
that betrays that absence, Clarissa’s “truth.” “What about death for instance?,” Woolf asks. Here 
Woolf expands Clarissa’s “truth,” the absence central to subjectivity, as revealed by death, a 
phenomenon that presupposes life, a presupposition that suggests a relationship between death 
and subjectivity. To sum up her hypothesis, I understand Woolf to have been curious about what 
it means to suggest that death reveals the absence central to subjectivity, her “strange” curiosity, 
the “truth” she wanted Clarissa to see. 
 In Woolf’s manuscript notations, it is tempting to misread her language—“I want to give 
life & death…;” “Mrs. D. seeing the truth…;” “There must be a reality…” (my emphasis). Such 
notations suggest a desire for her novel to disclose a metaphysical truth or set of truths, 
something cognitive. While at times Woolf too seemed tempted in this way, as some of the 
strikeouts in her manuscript notations suggest, “Really the truth is that,” her novel is less 
interested in cognitive phenomena or metaphysical truths, as such.21 In Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf 
became less interested in theorizing what death is than she had in exploring how death functions, 
death’s productive, affective materialization. Taken in turn, Jacques Derrida’s concerns about 
both textuality and death may be instructive here, and also shed some light the ways in which 
Mrs. Dalloway frames its motif in the service of an open question, her study about death and 
suicide.  
As mentioned above, Mrs. Dalloway describes its most significant motif as a “message 
hidden in the beauty of words.” Similarly, in Of Grammatology, Derrida examines issues of 





are always-already unstable and undetermined by way of a signifying deferral, the a priori 
operation of textuality itself. Derrida describes this textual operation as differance, an operation 
prior to and simultaneously inaugurating a desire for presence. Referring to the sign as the 
supplement, Derrida argues, 
The concept of the supplement and the theory of writing designate textuality itself…in an 
indefinitely multiplied structure—en abyme [in an abyss]—to employ the current phrase. And we 
shall see that this abyss is not a happy or unhappy accident…[T]he indefinite process of 
supplementarity has always already infiltrated presence…Representation in the abyss of presence 
is not an accident of presence; the desire of presence is, on the contrary, born from the abyss (the 
indefinite multiplication) of representation, from the representation of representation, etc.22 
 
Born from an abyss, Derrida argues that the desire to signify a presence also “carries in itself the 
destiny of its non-satisfaction,” similar to Benjamin’s work with allegory. The operation of 
textuality, he insists, “tricks with a gesture of effacement” marked by the supplement itself – a 
substitute. In other words, in language, we are never in the presence of the signified itself. In 
language, we encounter only symbols that efface presence. It is in this way that we can 
understand Derrida’s claim that “differance produces what it forbids, makes possible the very 
thing that it makes impossible.”23 
By acknowledging the play of differance, we can better understand the ways in which 
Woolf’s gestures toward truths are not themselves metaphysical truths, nor metaphysical 
theorizations. Nor can they disclose presence; Woolf understood this. Rather, Mrs. Dalloway 
stages an engagement with the play of desire by way of the deferral of signification. Mrs. 
Dalloway’s narrator asks, for instance, not after truth of the message of the aeroplane– “the 
symbol of something which has soared beyond seeking and questing and knocking of words 
together and has become all spirit, disembodied, ghostly—” – but asks rather “why not enter 





operation of textuality that conditions and fuels our sensory suspicions about the question of the 
strange function of death.  
But what of death? Why death? What is death’s strange function? And how can death 
function in the service of our lives? 
Derrida was also concerned about the function of death—what death makes possible. His 
concern had been amplified in the wake of the death of his long-time friend, Paul de Man that led 
to a series of three lectures transcribed and published as, Memoires for Paul de Man. Derrida 
wrote that “Paul de Man was a thinker of affirmation,” specifically a doubled affirmation made 
possible by an apperception upon encountering the possibility of the death of another, on the one 
hand, that, on the other, initiates the possibility of what Derrida referred to as a vow, a recursive, 
performative practice made upon acknowledging death’s social function.25 De Man’s 
“affirmation and vow,” what Derrida describes as a “yes, yes,” can help us better understand the 
cognitive dimensions of Woolf’s “strange” hypothesis. Death reveals the absence central to 
subjectivity, while simultaneously illuminating the doubleness of Clarissa and Septimus, their 
truth and insane truth, “seen,” as Woolf put it, “side by side.”  
What I would like to develop below, however, are the ways in which Woolf’s novel 
doubly extend de Man’s cognitive affirmations about death. For where Derrida describes de Man 
as a “thinker” of affirmation, I argue Mrs. Dalloway invites readers into a world of affective 
experiences conditioned not only by a cognitive suspicion about death, but affective experiences 
conditioned by and preoccupied with suicide in particular. In other words, where de Man’s 
affirmations cognitively reveal the social function of death, Mrs. Dalloway privileges suicide’s 
psychic and affective components that connect us, I argue, to the world around us, inaugurating a 





What I would like to develop are the ways in which Septimus’ mimetic fantasies about 
the Great War reveal and extend the mechanics of de Man’s first affirmation about the effects of 
the death of another into the psychic and affective world of suicide. It is within his specifically 
suicidal affective experiences, I argue, where we begin to understand what Woolf approached as 
Septimus’ “insane truth.” Namely, Septimus’ suicidal thoughts, feelings, and fantasies function 
in the service of a solicitude with, toward, and for the objects and people that surround him. I 
argue that Septimus’ suicidal mimeses enable him to come to terms with the death of his friend 
and lover, Evans, in ways that implicate Septimus himself. Yet where Woolf framed Septimus’ 
struggle partially in terms of cognition—for Septimus, who had “lately” been “taken from life to 
death,” “knew the truth! He knew everything! That man, his friend who was killed, Evans, had 
come”—Woolf besets Septimus’ suicidal struggle of coming-to-knowledge against an intense 
backdrop of affective engagement.26 Although prior to his heightened suicidal fantasies we learn 
that “he could not feel,” after embracing his suicidal fantasies we learn that, “He would turn 
round, he would tell them in a few moments, only a few moments more, of this relief, of this 
joy…”27 By focusing on the ways in which Septimus’ suicidal fantasies give rise both to his 
ability to feel and to his desire to communicate those feelings, we can come to see the ways in 
which the effect of Clarissa’s ability to have “felt herself everywhere,” namely, her psychic, 
affective attachment to the world around her, “not ‘here, here, here’…but everywhere” registers 
as a post hoc experience of having already encountered the affective value of thinking about 
death.28 Yet during the novel’s climactic moment when Clarissa learns of and responds to the 
news of Septimus’ suicide by way of her own suicidal fantasy in particular, we witness Clarissa’s 
empowered return to her party reveal a fidelity to de Man’s second affirmation, his vow—a 





affective materialization of what suicidal thinking and feeling make possible. By acknowledging 
the relationships between thinking about suicide and feeling that which suicide makes possible, 
we can better understand the ways in which Mrs. Dalloway asks after an affirmation of Septimus 
and Clarissa’s doubled truths, specifically, what I would like to develop below as the 
phantasmatic question of feeling “the insane truth”—the affective value of suicidal fantasy. 
* 
The unprecedented death of the Great War prefigures the affective world of Mrs. 
Dalloway, set in “This,” the “late age of the world’s experience,” experiences that the novel’s 
narrator reveals, “had bred in them all, all men and women, a well of tears.”29 Yet death 
prefigures Septimus’ experience in more particular ways. For although Septimus “had gone 
through the whole show, friendship, European War, death”—“He was right there”—the “last 
shells” that had “missed him” had not, however, missed his officer, friend, and lover, Evans.30 
Septimus’ encounter with Evans’ death becomes one with which he struggles to come to terms. 
For “something failed him; he could not feel.”31 “So he was deserted…[H]e was quite alone,” 
“condemned,” as the novel suggests, to solitude.32 
Derrida examines what he calls that “terrible solitude which is mine or ours at the death 
of the other,” and argues, however, that that solitude “is what constitutes that relationship to self 
which we call ‘me,’ ‘us,’ ‘between us,’ ‘subjectivity,’ ‘intersubjectivity,’ ‘memory.’” There can 
be no “I” in the absence of the possibility of death; “the possibility of death ‘happens,’ so to 
speak, ‘before’ these different instances, and makes them possible.” What’s more, implicated in 
the possible death of another, Derrida argues, is our own; “Or, more precisely, the possibility of 
the death of the other as mine or ours in-forms any relation to the other.”33 It is in such ways that 





encounters with the possibility of death, that “strange” reality woven throughout Woolf’s fourth 
novel. And it is in such ways that death constitutes precisely whom we call Septimus, as Woolf 
framed his preoccupation with death, specifically his own by way of suicide, in terms of 
subjectivity; “[T]hey were ‘people’ now,” Woolf wrote, “because Septimus had said, ‘I will kill 
myself.’”34 Septimus’ suicidal mimeses mobilize thoughts and feelings that characterize his 
strangled path toward acknowledging both Evans’ death and coming to terms with his own 
subjectivity, de Man’s first affirmation—the ability to acknowledge the other in the social 
relation figured as “I.”  
But how? How does death function in the service of subjectivity? And how does 
subjectivity invite the possibility of suicide? Psychoanalytic theorizations about subject 
formation can help us better hear the ways in which Septimus resonates as a figure for the 
relationship between death, subjectivity, and suicide throughout the novel. That resonance, 
however, begins to sound more dissonant as we approach de Man’s vow, what I argue 
characterizes the ways in which Clarissa comes to her own affirmation, as we shall learn. 
Similarly to that of de Man and Derrida, issues of loss and death are imbricated within 
scenes of what Freud initially understood as melancholic subject formation. Yet Freud’s 
theorizations about melancholic psychic topography also shares an interest with Mrs. Dalloway’s 
focus on suicide.  
In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud examines affective responses to loss, and argues 
that the prolongation of painful mourning affects associated with melancholia mark the effects of 
unavowable loss. In other words, where the process of mourning acknowledges an object-
cathexis and its loss, its death, so to speak, melancholia cannot. Through that which Woolf 





dreams, Septimus’ most significant lost object is positioned just out of sight.35 “White things 
were assembling behind the railings opposite. But he dared not look. Evans was behind the 
railings!;” “Evans answered from behind the tree.” For as we come to learn within his fantasies, 
“[Septimus] could not look upon the dead.”36 
Yet it is not so much that Septimus had not known that Evans had been killed in the war. 
As mentioned above, “[h]e was right there.” He “watched” the shells that killed Evans “explode” 
(MD 86). It is more that Septimus struggles to come to terms with what he had lost, as Freud 
insisted, even though the melancholic may be able to name “whom” he or she has lost, he or she 
may not know “what” he or she has lost “in” the lost object.37 It is in these ways that 
melancholia, in Freud’s view, may name an unavowable loss of a cathected object, a loss of an 
unavowably cathected object, or both.  
Woolf characterizes what Septimus lost in relation to Evans as “some very profound 
interest that unites them” (TH 109), “the affection of his officer,” the sensation that “[t]hey had 
to be together, share with each other, fight with each other, quarrel with each other.”38 Freud 
observes, as well, that one of the symptoms associated with such unavowability may take shape 
as a denial of any loss whatsoever. The repeated disclosure that Septimus “could not feel” 
throughout most of the novel reveals a form of such denial in relation to his lost object-cathexis. 
It is not that Septimus could not feel anything at all. In fact, Woolf makes clear in her manuscript 
notations that “Septimus should pass through all extremes of feeling & happiness & 
unhappiness—intensity.”39 Septimus’ inability to feel, rather, suggests that he struggles to feel 
that which he lost in Evans in particular. For at the moment of Evans’ death, we learn that 
Septimus, “far from showing any emotion or recognizing that here was the end of a friendship, 





process his feelings of loss in the aftermath of Evans’ death forestalls access to mourning his 
trauma. Septimus thus instead felt, as we have learned, “condemned,” feelings associated with 
melancholia that interested Freud and play a strong part in his theory of the formation of the 
psychic topography itself.  
Freud theorizes that in the event of melancholic loss, the libido cannot redirect its 
cathexis to another object but rather sets up what he describes as an internal world whereby the 
ego takes the place of the unavowable lost object, or object-cathexis, by way of identification. 
Simultaneously, that identification is beset by the formation of a critical agency that takes the 
ego, idealized as the unavowable lost object, as its object of condemnation. In this earlier work, 
Freud examines melancholic subject formation, or melancholia, as a mood disorder and 
presupposed the existence of the ego prior to any unavowable loss. It is in this way that Freud 
describes through metaphor, “the shadow of the object fell upon the ego.”41 The ego preexisted 
the shadow’s cast.  
By 1923, however, Freud begins to open ways in which to understand loss as constitutive 
of the ego. Rather than the shadow of the lost object falling upon a preexisting ego, in “The Ego 
and the Super-Ego (Ego Ideal),” Freud makes the case for the ego as a precipitate, that it is 
“possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes 
and that it contains the history of those object-choices.”42 What is of special interest presently, 
however, are the similarities between the ways in which de Man’s first affirmation and Freudian 
subject formation name an archive of lost objects, an archive of the social function of death 
figured in the formation of an “I.” But what does this subject formation, this psychic topography 
brought on by loss and death have to do with the possibility of suicide? How is suicide 





In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud also theorizes the ways in which scenes of 
violence become incorporated into a psychic topography, initiating what he thought was the 
possibility of suicide. He argues that within scenes of unavowable loss, the object-cathexis “has 
thus undergone a double vicissitude.” On the one side, part of the object-cathexis “has regressed 
to identification,” idealized in the ego, mentioned above. The other side, the critical agency, 
however, becomes violent, as Freud described, “has been carried back to the stage of sadism.”43 
The violence of the critical agency, Freud argues, explains a tendency toward “a lowering of the 
self-regarding feelings,” “self-reproaches and self-revilings,” and “expectations of 
punishment”—in short, a “disturbance of self-regard” otherwise “absent in mourning.”44 
Freud’s theorizations about subject formation, specifically the violence associated with a 
critical agency, led him to suspect that he had “solved the riddle of the tendency to suicide.” The 
riddle, for Freud, suggests that “we cannot conceive how [the] ego can consent to its own 
destruction[,]…[that] we have never been able to explain what interplay of forces can carry such 
a purpose through to execution.” It is this riddle, Freud wrote, that “makes melancholia so 
interesting—and so dangerous.” He continues, 
The analysis of melancholia now shows that the ego can kill itself only if, owing to the return of 
the object-cathexis, it can treat itself as an object—if it is able to direct against itself the hostility 
which relates to an object…Thus in regression from narcissistic object-choice [in other words, in 
suicide] the object has, it is true, been got rid of, but it has nevertheless proved more powerful 
than the ego itself.45 
 
In sum, what Freud’s observations and theorizations suggest, here, is that the violence of suicide 
is a violence set in motion upon encountering scenes of unavowable loss such that, and for a host 
of possible reasons, through an inability to avow the loss of an object of cathexis, that object or 
object-cathexis becomes internalized and idealized as the ego upon which a critical agency 
repeatedly rehearses the violence constitutive of the object’s initial death. The repeated rehearsal 





names a violence whose aim takes as its target the unavowable lost object of cathexis, yet gets 
displaced, however, onto an idealized substitute figured by the ego itself that if not recognized as 
such, may become displaced yet again onto one’s own body in the unfortunate event of some 
forms of corporeal suicide.  
Following Freud, the double vicissitude of the incorporation at the heart of subject 
formation makes possible a subject/object dialectic such that that which acts and is acted upon 
appear identical, a dialectic that suicidal fantasy can help demystify, as we shall see. At first 
glance, this appearance makes clear the lucidity of, for instance, Septimus’ simple sentence, “I 
will kill myself” – subject, copula, self-same object.46 Yet by understanding this dialectic, we 
may also understand various critical remarks about suicide posed from those historically 
associated with psychoanalytic thought, for instance, remarks by André Breton, “Suicide is a 
poorly made word: what kills is not identical to what is killed.”47 Or, for instance Blanchot, 
“when I kill myself, perhaps it is ‘I” who does the killing, but it is not done to me.”48 Such 
observations indicate a fidelity to the absence internal to subjectivity, an absence dominated by 
the masquerade of the “I” within a psychic topography under capitalism.  
But what of Woolf? How did Woolf contend with Septimus’ subjectivity fraught by a 
subject/object dialectic? If in Septimus’ suicidal fantasies his critical agency rehearses the 
conditions of the death of his lost object on and figured by his ego, then what shapes do those 
fantasies take? Or more specifically, if Woolf’s novel extends the psychic topography of 
subjectivity into its materialization in affect, where does that motion toward affect leave 
Septimus? 
 During the drafting processes of what Woolf describes as “the mad scene at Regent’s 





morning,” she struggled.49 What follows are two juxtaposed passages, one from Woolf’s 
manuscript notations, the next from the American publication of Mrs. Dalloway. In this scene, 
Septimus engages with what readers encounter as his most vivid suicidal fantasy in which the 
narrator describes the event of his phantasmatic suicide as a transition between waking, sleeping, 
and re-awakening, saturated with rich reference to materiality. What is particularly interesting 
about the manuscript notations are the ways in which Woolf’s strikeouts both continually 
privilege affect over cognition (“thinks feels,” “sees feels”). What’s more, they simultaneously 
illustrate a sketch that negotiates positioning Septimus as the speaker in the first-person “I” 
versus framing him by way of the third-person “he.” In other words, Woolf contends with the 
subject/object dialectic by framing Septimus in terms of his affective experience mediated by the 
narrative voice. At moments, Woolf even relies on the infinitive, avoiding the subject altogether 
(“To trust, to yield, to fight no more”). In her manuscript draft below, Woolf begins in the third-
person, moves into a struggle with the first, only to return to the third, placing emphasis on 
Septimus from the perspective of an observer. These third-/first-/third-person shifts, momentarily 
interrupted by infinitives, nonetheless gesture toward Woolf’s struggle to negotiate the 
subject/object dialectic fraught within subjectivity, a struggle characteristic of and heightened 
during strikingly affective suicidal moments. 
…he withdraws; he vanishes into the snow; the roses 
hang about him; the roses  (I have roses on my bedroom wall  
paper) they cluster, thick & those the thick musk roses, the 
his & if I sleep now, let you go now, said Septimus, I shall 
I am absolutely safe now. This music; I can have you  
again. I 
 To trust, to yield, to fight no more, no more bothering 
even to remember; {now, couched there on the back of nature, 
upheld in her arms, by her, let me} that’s is my next stage… 
Now I will wake, he said. Now I have passed through death. 
he said. I am dead have passed through death, he said. 
But I still hear the old man playing by the public house. 
So I am the first to conquer cross. 





He lay, like a drowned sailor, tossed on to the shore; & for the 
 first 
time in the whole world, the dead were alive; He could 
hear the shepard boy piping. through the mist. 
He could I have passed through death, he said. I am the first to 
cross. And I can He could hear the shepherd boy piping 
through in Regents Park; as before waking. The birds, the 
milk carts, sound through a veil, sound frail. plaintive. 
joyful, let joined in a melody which in the can 
& then, still in asleep, the sleeper thinks feels himself 
drawing towards the life, hearing more & more truly, 
recognizing, & yet still everything still sounds 
louder, a little stronger, a little more richer, & a 
queer excitement begins as if it concealed something. 
than usual, as if each cry & chirp were the prelude 
the opening. & draws nearer & nearer to the shore, 
& sees feels stir in him the extraordinary excitement of 
landing, & is yet half afraid, so now, Septimus 
drew towards life, & felt himself about to awaken in 
open his eyes.  
 He had only to open his eyes…50 
 
In this, her draft of one of Septimus’ suicidal fantasies, Woolf accompanies her formal struggle 
characterized by such shifts in voice and verb form with a heightened, intensely aesthetic 
portrayal of materiality. The “snow;” the “cluster” of “roses” that give texture and shape to the 
wall paper, Septimus’ immediate yet phantasmatic surroundings; the feeling of being “upheld” in 
nature’s “arms;” his heightened sense of hearing the “shepherd boy piping,” of hearing the 
“birds, the milk carts;” hearing these “still sounds,” sounds that register “a little stronger, a little 
richer,” a little richer “than usual,” all mark the heightened, intensified materiality, the “queer 
excitement,” “the extraordinary excitement” of his suicidal moment.  
As mentioned in the introduction, Blanchot wrote, “Hence the attention to minutiae often 
symptomatic in those who are about to die—the love for details, the patient, maniacal concern 
for the most mediocre realities.”51 Woolf privileges these for Septimus, as she so respectfully 
insists, “That everything should sing to Septimus.”52 It is clear Woolf understood something 





Before moving onto her finalized draft, it is important to note that as Woolf continued 
drafting her manuscript, she had been preoccupied with her formal presentation. She was 
concerned to develop a formal practice, a literary style capable of representing psychic realities, 
insisting, the “psychology should be done very realistically.”53 At the same time, however, 
Woolf criticizes literary methods that tended to psychologize characters, what she referred to as 
“this new method of giving the psychology.”54 Woolf was less interested in self-consciously 
presenting character psyches as types, pathological or otherwise. Much like Foucault, who 
criticized, albeit in another context, what he called the “frozen countenance of the perversions,”55 
namely the psychologizing game of institutionalized psychology, Woolf was suspicious of such 
pathology. She wanted Septimus, for instance, to “see” a “hypocricy, & insincerity.”56  
Nor was she interested in staging characters, especially protagonists, who project from 
within some interior space monologues or soliloquies that, in effect, reify and valorize 
psychoanalytic structures. As Molly Hite observes, Woolf “tends to forgo strategies that would 
validate an attitude or opinion.”57 In Mrs. Dalloway, the narrator describes each protagonist in 
ways that resist stable identification. “She would not say of herself, I am this, I am that;”58 where 
“he was on the whole, a border case, neither one thing nor the other.”59 Rather than stage 
character experience in such vulgar ways, Woolf was interested in something different. “One 
wants the effect,” she argues, “of real life.”60  
In her diary, Woolf criticizes characterization by way of psychologizing techniques, 
contending, “it doesn’t work. It doesn’t tell us as much as some casual glance from the outside 
often tells.”61 Woolf wanted to develop and stage “casual glances,” the presentation of which 
underscores her desire for her “characters…to be merely views.”62 Woolf remarks, “My idea is 





critique about ‘giving the psychology.’ Instead, Woolf began to explore affective presentation. 
She began to insist that “feelings should be treated…as poetry, not psychology,” perhaps 
offering the “impression of a play: only in narrative,” something more opaque and subject to 
interpretation.64 In her manuscript notations, she frames her preoccupation about 
characterization, again, in the form of a question that intensifies the play-like quality of the 
novel: “The Question is whether the inside of the mind is both Mrs. D. & S.S. can be made 
luminous—that is to say the stuff of the book—lights on it coming from external sources.”65 
Much like the action of players on a stage, Woolf’s preoccupation with psychological and 
affective exploration and experimentation became a matter of stylized perspective. At times in 
her drafting, Woolf envisioned portraying her “casual glances” from the perspective other 
characters. Woolf imagined, for instance, that Septimus “must be seen by someone. His 
wife?...He is only real insofar as she sees him.”66 Likewise with his double, “Mrs D. must be 
seen by other people.”67 At others times during novel’s development Woolf imagined a more 
obscure observer framed in ways related to the play-like design she desired. She asks, “Why not 
have an observer in the street at each critical point who acts the part of chorus—some nameless 
person?”68 In Mrs. Dalloway, the narrator is alluded to as “one of those spectral presences,” a 
“solitary traveller” who mediates between both Woolf’s characters and her readers as the 
narrative develops.69 It became the role of the narrator to mediate these “critical points,” Woolf’s 
intervals, interludes, the casual glances throughout the novel. All of which is to say, by framing 
her scenes in such ways, Woolf privileges not only subject, nor only object, but rather the 
interplay between subject and object.  
And we can see in the passage below the ways in which Woolf’s shift from the sketch in 





stage, lit, as she desired, from “external sources.” And perhaps more specifically, Woolf’s more 
concise deployment of free-indirect narration, here, sharply emphasizes Septimus’ suicidal action 
within his fantasy, only to return to the third-person, reminding readers that this is an account 
mediated by another, an account always subject to the open question of interpretation: “I leant 
over the edge of the boat and fell down, he thought…” “I have been dead and yet am now 
alive…he begged…” The full, finalized passage reads as follows: 
…Now he withdraws up into the snows, and roses hang about him—the thick red roses which 
grow on my bedroom wall, he reminded himself. The music stopped. He had his penny, he 
reasoned it out, and has gone on to the next public-house. 
 But he himself remained high on his rock, like a drowned sailor on a rock. I leant over the 
edge of the boat and fell down, he thought. I went under the sea. I have been dead and yet am 
now alive, but let me rest still; he begged (he was talking to himself again—it was awful, awful!); 
and as, before waking, the voices of birds and the sound of wheels chime and chatter in a queer 
harmony, grow louder and louder and the sleeper feels himself drawing to the shores of life, so he 
felt himself drawing towards life, the sun growing hotter, cries sounding louder, something 
tremendous about to happen. 
 He had only to open his eyes…70 
 
As Woolf’s formal narrative technique sharpened, so too had her focus on the ability of suicide 
to heighten Septimus’ affective, sensory perception of material reality, a heightened emphasis of 
which Woolf spread throughout the novel. Yet here, specifically, the “sounds” speaking to 
Septimus in their “chatter” that grow “louder and louder,” the “sun growing hotter,” all gesture 
toward “something tremendous about to happen.” That as if voiced in some “queer harmony,” 
some immanent disclosure would reveal itself if Septimus were “only to open his eyes.” 
As if that were so easy.  
Throughout Septimus’ fantasies, the narrator repeatedly suggests that he only had “to 
open his eyes,” reinforcing both the fact of the problem of Septimus’ unavowability and the 
necessity for acknowledging Evans’ death, an acknowledgement that would demystify the 
subject/object dialectic figured at the center of his subjectivity. As Freud argues, therapeutic 





consciousness such that the subject can properly grieve the loss through the work of mourning. 
Freud theorizes that that problematic attachment is released into mourning when “the libido’s 
attachment to the lost object is met by the verdict of reality that the [lost] object no longer exists; 
and the ego, confronted as it were with the question whether it shall share this fate, is persuaded 
by the sum of the narcissistic satisfactions it derives from being alive to sever its attachment to 
the object that has been abolished” (“MM” 255). Where the unavowable loss of the initial object 
of cathexis marked its first death, then severing the attachment to that unavowable lost object-
cathexis marks the necessity for its second, freeing the otherwise blockage of cathectic energy.71  
Freud’s theory, however, invites concerns. What, for instance, are the stakes of that 
second death? In other words, if the event of the first unavowable death sets in motion the 
creation of a death that becomes internalized and idealized in the figure of the ego itself, then 
doesn’t severing the attachment to that unavowable dead object at the outset of mourning 
violently implicate its double figured by the ego? Or posed in another way, if the ego itself is 
constituted by and functions as a figure for the unavowable death of lost objects of cathexes—
their substitutes that always-already efface the presence of those objects of cathexes—then 
doesn’t the practice of bringing to consciousness and avowing the death of lost objects of 
cathexes name a practice that effaces the ego itself?  
While we will revisit these issues later with regard to de Man’s second affirmation, what 
is important here with regard to Septimus concerns the subject/object dialectic figured at the 
center of subjectivity. As mentioned above, it is the “double vicissitude” at the heart of subject 
formation that precipitates Septimus’ ability to take himself as an object of condemnation. But it 
is here, at the outset of the work of mourning that we also witness a process that names a doubly 





himself. This process is mimetic. Septimus has been misapprehending the absence central to 
himself for its dialectical substitutes figured in his psychic topography.  
It is in such ways that mourning the death of another feels as if we are mourning the 
death of ourselves. Or perhaps in another way, we can understand better the ways in which 
mourning may itself feel like a suicidal practice. And it is in such ways that we can better 
understand how difficult it must be to “only” have to open one’s eyes. Woolf makes clear that 
the stakes of mourning feel quite high. Yet at the same time, as we see above, Septimus begins to 
feel and speak, albeit in the third-person, free-indirect form, as if such a process is at play. Here, 
Woolf’s otherwise common-place grammatical form, however, takes on a new meaning as she 
makes explicit the subject “I” at the outset of the sentence, only to conspicuously erase that 
subject in its closing clause. “I have been dead, and yet am now alive.” Liveliness, for Woolf, 
effaces the subject, a process both painful, yet freeing. 
Septimus’ violent, suicidal fantasies also function in the service of acknowledging the 
loss of his object of attachment, Evans, for it is through Septimus’ suicidal fantasies that Evans 
appears to him. Woolf frames her passage as an “ode to Time” while simultaneously calling on 
the specificity of Thessaly as a location of a sort of hallowed ground of lost objects. In so doing, 
Woolf privileges another observation vivid in Freud, namely that “in mourning time is needed 
for the command of reality-testing to be carried out in detail.”72 What’s more, we can see the 
ways in which Woolf extends and intensifies Clarissa’s affective experiences explored in “Mrs. 
Dalloway in Bond Street” in Septimus’ suicidal fantasy. In her short story, Woolf accompanies 
Clarissa’s affective empowerment upon thinking about death with changes in her physical 
comportment; Clarissa’s tendency to hold “herself upright,” to sit “very upright,” indexes various 





“turned,” to have found ways to re-engage with the world around her. With Septimus, we see a 
similar “turn around,” an affective re-empowerment coupled with changes in his bodily 
comportment, his liveliness. For Septimus’ re-empowered ability to feel, his “relief,” his “joy,” is 
precisely what gives rise, quite literally, to his physical re-animation. As the narrator informs us, 
“Septimus cried, raising his hand…raising his hand like some colossal figure…;” “Septimus half 
rose from his chair.” The full passage reads as follows: 
 The word “time” split its husk; poured its riches over him; and from his lips fell like 
shells, like shavings from a plane, without his making them, hard, white, imperishable words, and 
flew to attach themselves to their places in an ode to Time; an immortal ode to Time. He sang. 
Evans answered from behind the tree. The dead were in Thessaly, Evans sang, among the orchids. 
They were waited till the War was over, and now the dead, now Evans himself— 
 “For God’s sake don’t come!” Septimus cried out. For he could not look upon the dead. 
 But the branches parted. A man in grey was actually walking towards them. It was 
Evans! But no mud was on him; no wounds; he was not changed. I must tell the whole world, 
Septimus cried, raising his hands (as the dead man in the grey suit came nearer), raising his hand 
like some colossal figure who has lamented the fate of man for ages in the desert alone with his 
hands pressed to his forehead, furrows of despair on his cheeks, and now sees the light on the 
desert’s edge which broadens and strikes the iron-black figure (and Septimus half rose from his 
chair), and with legions of men prostrate behind him he, the giant mourner, receives for one 
moment on his face the whole—… 
The millions lamented; for ages they had sorrowed. He would turn round, he would tell 
them in a few moments, only a few moments more, of this relief, of this joy, of this astonishing 
revelation—73 
 
It is tempting to understand the up shot of Septimus’ therapeutic moment of suicidal fantasy, 
here, in terms that speak only to Septimus’ ability to avow the loss of Evans in the service of his, 
Septimus’, own relief. In other words, it is tempting to understand that he has only been 
preoccupied with that of which he otherwise could not avow, Evans’ place in the formation of 
his, Septimus’, subjectivity. And this is no doubt crucial. Septimus’ “relief,” his “joy” at having 
begun to come to terms with that which was haunting him (“It was Evans!”) marks a significant 
payoff, as the narrator insists, “Fear no more, says the heart in the body; fear no more. He was 
not afraid.”74 It is precisely Septimus’ vividly suicidal fantasy that inaugurates his ability to 





his ability to begin to mourn the loss of Evans, a process after which we find “him smiling.” “He 
was happy then.” He feels that “he knew the truth. He knew everything! That man, his friend 
who was killed, Evans, had come, he said.”75 Yet Septimus’ suicidal fantasy also sets in motion 
an affective empowerment that spreads beyond its occasion.  
Septimus’ suicidal fantasy revitalizes his ability to encounter the totality of the stuff that 
surrounds him. As Heidegger may have suggested, what was once merely present-at-hand to 
Septimus has transformed into the stuff of readiness-to-hand.76 Where once “the gradual drawing 
together of everything to one centre before his eyes” presented itself “as if some horror had come 
almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames,” after Septimus’ suicidal fantasy, the 
narrator reveals, “Every power poured its treasures on his head…”77 As Septimus begins to re-
awaken to the world of the novel from within the world of his fantasy, the narrator discloses, 
 He began, very cautiously, to open his eyes, to see whether a gramophone was really 
there. But real things—real things were too exciting. He must be cautious. He would not go mad. 
First he looked at the fashion papers on the lower shelf, then, gradually at the gramophone with 
the green trumpet. Nothing could be more exact. And so, gathering courage, he looked at the 
sideboard; the plate of bananas; the engraving of Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort; at the 
mantelpiece, with the jar of roses. None of these things moved. All were still; all were real.78 
 
Woolf celebrates, here, the intensified affective engagement with materiality that Septimus’ 
suicidal fantasy makes available for him in his waking life. It empowers Septimus, I argue, to 
feel the reality of the world around him. And in many ways, Woolf’s portrayal of the role of 
fantasy, especially Septimus’ affective re-empowered engagement in the wake of his suicidal 
fantasy, presciently anticipated further, mid-century theoretical observations within 
psychoanalysis.  
Donald Winnicott was interested in aggression often found in illusions, fantasies, and 
even play to the extent that they connect one to the world. Winnicott argues, “Fantasy is more 





experience of illusion.”79 What’s more, rather than focus on the ways in which fantasy makes 
clear some metaphysical reality of the real, a distaste we also have explored in Woolf, Winnicott, 
like Woolf, was concerned more with the ways in which aggressive fantasies function in the 
service of feeling the reality of the world around us. If the material of the fantasy outlasts the 
aggression by and through which it suffers, that material begins to feel real to whom the fantasy 
belongs. It is in such ways that, for Winnicott, fantasies, particularly aggressive fantasies, 
function in the service of a sort of affective reality-testing. In many ways such fantasies must 
precede feeling anything as real at all.  
His writings are replete with such emphases on feeling, as Adam Phillips observes, “It 
was, for Winnicott, not a question of what was real about human beings—which would 
presuppose a known essence—but of what, for each person, ‘gives the feeling of real.’ This 
could only be found by each person for himself.”80 For Septimus, what sets in motion not only 
his heightened sense of materiality, but also a heightened sense of that which feels materially 
real, is precisely his violent, suicidal fantasies.  
And thus describes part of Septimus’ “insane truth.” Suicidal fantasies can function in the 
service of our affective re-engagement in the wake of death. Yet understanding Septimus’ 
affective re-empowered engagement would be incomplete, however, without returning to the 
ways in which Woolf privileges the social function of his suicidal fantasies.  
In the immediate aftermath of Septimus’ affective re-awakening to the world of the 
novel, detailed in part above, we are taken into a shared moment between Septimus and his wife, 
Lucrezia, a moment as strikingly intimate as it is brief, a moment conspicuously underexamined 
in the scholarship on Mrs. Dalloway. As Septimus begins to re-engage with the objects in the 





she fashions a hat for Mrs. Peters, their neighbor’s daughter with whom Rezia had recently been 
at odds. The hat was to be a gift, a token of amends. As Septimus begins to ask after some 
minute details concerning Mrs. Peters, he begins to focus his attention on his wife. Just as 
cautiously as he re-engages with the objects in his immediate environment, he re-engages with 
Rezia, another “other” constitutive of his totality of involvements. After asking after what Mr. 
Peters (Mrs. Peters’ husband) does for a living, Woolf writes, 
“Ah,” said Rezia, trying to remember. She thought Mrs. Filmer had said that he travelled 
for some company. “Just now he is in Hull,” she said. 
“Just now!” She said that with her Italian accent. She said that herself. He shaded his eyes 
so that he might see only a little of her face at a time, first the chin, then the nose, then the 
forehead, in case it were deformed, or had some terrible mark on it. But no, there she was, 
perfectly natural, sewing, with the pursed lips that women have, the set, the melancholy 
expression, when sewing. But there was nothing terrible about it, he assured himself, looking a 
second time, a third time at her face, her hands, for what was frightening or disgusting in her as 
she sat there in broad daylight, sewing? Mrs. Peters had a spiteful tongue. Mr. Peters was in Hull. 
Why fly scourged and outcast? Why be made to tremble and sob by the clouds? Why seek truths 
and deliver messages when Rezia sat sticking pins into the front of her dress, and Mr. Peters was 
in Hull? Miracles, revelations, agonies, loneliness, falling through the sea, down, down into the 
flames, all were burnt out, for he had a sense, as he watched Rezia trimming the straw hat for 
Mrs. Peters, of a coverlet of flowers.81 
 
The brevity of this fleeting intimate moment between Septimus and Rezia registers Septimus’ 
cautious re-entry into feeling the reality, not only of Evans’ death and the materiality of objects 
within his immediate surroundings, but feeling the reality of others, of the people around him, 
Mrs. Peters, Mr. Peters, his wife, Rezia. And however cautiously Septimus’ affective re-
engagement takes shape, this brief moment of exchange between him and his wife begins to give 
rise to a change in his mood. For as the above passage discloses, Septimus “had a sense;” a 
sense, I argue, that marks the affective value of his suicidal fantasies.  
As the brief, momentary scene develops and Rezia prepares the hat for Mrs. Peters, 
Septimus observes and takes note, “‘It’s too small for Mrs. Peters.’” The minute, banal, mundane 
event of crafting a hat, possibly the most insignificant and dryly-reported event of a novel 





fantasy reveals for Rezia an entire world of significance. As the narrator discloses, “For the first 
time for days he was speaking as he used to do!” Septimus, finding the occasion ripe for a few 
playful slights suggests that the hat resembles “an organ grinder’s monkey’s hat,” or, after Rezia 
makes an adjustment, that “Now the poor woman” might look like “a pig at a fair.” 
Septimus’ playful jokes affect Rezia, Septimus’ only real confidant, in ways that amplify 
the significance of their shared moment. “How it rejoiced her that! Not for weeks had they 
laughed like this together, poking fun privately like married people.” And it is in this scene that 
the narrator, discussed more below, begins to feel most present to us. In a rare moment of 
address, the narrator explains to the audience the moment’s meaning. “What she meant was that 
if Mrs. Filmer had come in, or Mrs. Peters or anybody they would not have understood what she 
and Septimus were laughing at…Never had she felt so happy! Never in her life!”82 
For Septimus, the significance of the moment registers not only as moment of shared 
intimacy between him and his wife, but in the materiality of the hat itself, one of the novel’s 
most particularly modernist gestures, as well as one of its most painful. “It is wonderful,” 
Septimus insists. “Never had he done anything which made him feel so proud. It was so real, it 
was so substantial, Mrs. Peters’ hat.” And for Rezia, “it would always make her happy to see that 
hat. He had become himself then, he had laughed then. They had been alone together. Always 
she would like that hat.”83 Woolf’s verbal motion, from the modal auxiliary, “would always,” to 
the past perfect “had become,” “had laughed,” “had been alone,” and again back to the modal 
auxiliary, “would like,” both privileges and valorizes the intense, affective complexity within the 
historicity of the moment while suspending and expanding the significance of the memory of that 
moment within the materiality of a hat monumentalized by the immanent materialization of 





  Derrida observes, “our ‘own’ mortality is not dissociated from, but rather also 
conditions [the] rhetoric of faithful memory,” a mortality in the service of memory that can 
function to “recall us to an affirmation of the other.”84 Septimus’ “insane truth” teaches us of a 
potentiality and possibility, that through suicidal fantasy we may come to recognize and feel not 
simply the reality of unavowable losses, nor the reality of mere objects. What Septimus also 
teaches us is that suicidal fantasy can return us to the inevitability of our difference from 
ourselves, the absence internal to subjectivity set in motion by the possibility of the death of 
another and the possibility of our own—the social relation figured in the possibility of an “I.” 
Yet most importantly, suicidal fantasy can help us privilege that which is most important to us, 
namely, a solicitude with, toward, and for other people. And it is this privileging of other people 
that brings us to our figure for de Man’s second affirmation, his vow, Clarissa. 
* 
As I’ve mentioned, the death of Paul de Man marked the occasion for Derrida’s 
Memoires for Paul de Man, the three transcribed lectures performed in the service of the memory 
of his friend. Yet to do justice to de Man’s memory also asked that Derrida develop the ways in 
which de Man’s thinking functions as a rejoinder to Freud’s. De Man’s rejoinder responds to a 
problem that Derrida criticized as Freud’s “obsessive triumph.”85 Freud argued that, “carried out 
bit by bit” and “at great expense of time and cathectic energy,” the work of mourning withdraws 
the libido’s attachments to lost objects in the service of reattachment to others.86 While the work 
of mourning, here, was ancillary to his more significant focus on the mechanics the psychic 
topography, Freud nonetheless claims that the work of mourning “overcomes” the loss of the 
object.87 Or if not put strongly enough, Freud writes, “The fact is, however, that when the work 





“obsessive triumph,” a practice of mourning interpreted by Derrida as a practice that appeals to 
“closure,” “resolution,” “totalization,” and the possibility of “coming into being” as oneself. As 
if through the work of mourning, one could become present to oneself.89 
Derrida criticizes this “‘normal’ ‘work of mourning,’” on the grounds that Freud’s 
theorizations belie differance, the operation of figurality.90 Although he doesn’t explicitly pose it, 
Derrida’s critique responds to an implied question of the status of the Freudian subject after an 
avowal of lost object-cathexes. Namely, that through the work of mourning, what then becomes 
of the ego, a question posed above? In other words, what transformation, if any, takes place after 
such an evacuation, as if such an evacuation were possible?  
While de Man and Derrida acknowledges that the possibility of death inaugurates 
subjectivity—de Man’s first affirmation—Derrida reminds us that the possibility to imagine an 
“I” is an effect of the function of figurality always-already formed in relation that “precludes,” as 
he insists, “any anamnesic totalization of self.”91 Rather, he continues, “we are never ourselves, 
and between us, identical to us, a ‘self’ is never in itself or identical to itself. This specular 
reflection never closes in on itself.”92 In this way, we can understand the problem with Rezia’s 
otherwise innocent claim that Septimus “had become himself” rather than acknowledge the 
absence internal to his subjectivity figured by an identification with the other.  
Nonetheless, Derrida argues, here, that the work of mourning cannot, as Freud argues, set 
in motion a “free” and “uninhibited” subject by virtue of the fact that subjectivity itself always-
already presupposes the play of differance, the function of figurality. Similarly, Woolf’s 
strikeouts again resonate here, as her manuscript notations highlight her contention with 





us, “‘at the very moment we claim…escape,’” we belie the “fatal necessity of ‘reentering a 
system of tropes.’”94 And such marks Derrida’s critique of Freud’s “obsessive triumph.”  
In response, Derrida offers a rejoinder. He framed de Man’s second affirmation in terms 
of a recursive, performative function related to the acknowledgement of de Man’s first, that 
death names the absence internal to subjectivity. In response to Freud’s impossible appeal to 
resolution, Derrida argued, “as soon as the gathering of Being and totalizing memory” are 
acknowledged as “impossible, we recognize the fatality of this tropological dislocation... And 
this fatality is the law, or let us say instead, the law of the law: the moment when the authority of 
the law comes to take turns with, as if it were its own supplement, the impossible gathering of 
Being.”95 
Thus, what de Man’s second affirmation discloses to us is not just a simple, single 
reminder of the function of figurality manifested in the “I.” It invites us to make a vow that 
reminds us of the necessity of acknowledging the recursive function of the relatedness to one 
another within the figurality of subjectivity itself. De Man’s doubled affirmation emphasizes the 
possibility of a recursive, performative, re-acknowledgement of the other in social formation, a 
fidelity to the function of differance in the service of what Derrida describes as an “alliance”—a 
fidelity to, and an alliance made and performatively re-made in the service of the memory of the 
other.  
As mentioned above, Derrida describes de Man as a “thinker of affirmation,” but what’s 
more, Derrida insists that de Man “existed himself in memory of an affirmation and a vow,” de 
Man’s “yes, yes.”96 De Man’s doubled affirmation marks, as Alison Bechdel might suggest, a 





spirit of de Man’s memory. I quote at length to emphasize and illustrate Derrida’s fidelity to and 
alliance with the memory of his friend: 
 After the death of Paul de Man on December 21, a necessity became clear to me: I would 
never manage to prepare these lectures, I would have neither the strength nor the desire to do so, 
unless they left or gave the last word to my friend. Or at least, since that had become literally 
impossible, to friendship, to the unique and incomparable friendship that ours was for me, thanks 
to him. I could only speak in memory of him. 
 In memory of him: these words cloud sight and thought. What is said, what is done, what 
is desired through these words: in memory of…? 
 I will speak of the future, of what is bequeathed and promised to us by the work of Paul 
de Man. And, as you shall see, this future is not foreign to his memory; it keeps to what he said, 
thought, and affirmed on the subject of memory. Yes: affirmed. And I see this affirmation of 
memory, without which the friendship of which I am speaking would never have taken place, in 
the form of a ring or an alliance. This alliance is much more ancient, resistant, and secret than all 
those strategic or familial manifestations of alliance that it must actually make possible and to 
which it is never reduced…And we would understand nothing about what comes to pass and 
takes place if we did not account for this affirmation which comes to seal an alliance. An alliance 
which is not secret because it would be protected behind some clandestine, occult “cause” in want 
of power, but because the “yes,” which is a non-active act, which states or describes nothing, 
which in itself neither manifests nor defines any content, this yes only commits, before and 
beyond everything else. And to do so, it must repeat itself to itself: yes, yes. It must preserve 
memory; it must commit itself to keeping its own memory; it must promise itself to itself; it must 
bind itself to memory for memory, if anything is ever to come from the future. This is the law, 
and this is what the performative category, in its current state, can merely approach, at the 
moment when “yes” is said, and “yes” to that “yes.”98 
 
De Man’s second affirmation, his vow, names a performative repetition of his first. The 
performative vow thus “repeats itself to itself” in the service of “preserv[ing] memory,” and 
“promise[s] itself to itself” in the form of the “seal of an alliance.”99 And perhaps most 
poignantly for our purposes, Derrida describes de Man’s doubled affirmation much in the way 
Woolf describes her novel’s most significant motif, its “insane truth.” 
Framed as the product of what Derrida describes as a “mad lucidity,” de Man’s doubled 
affirmation marks a gesture toward what appears as impossible, that the “I” is constituted by an 
absence taken up upon an acknowledgement of death that death prefigures subjectivity.100 And 





imperative, that the “impossible here is the other, such as [s/]he comes to us: as a mortal, to us 
mortals. And whom we love as such, affirming this to be good.”101 
 What I would like to develop below are the ways in which, as I have been arguing, Mrs. 
Dalloway extends de Man’s doubled, cognitive affirmations about death into its psychic and 
affective world, a world in which suicide figures so predominantly. Where Derrida argues that de 
Man’s “mad lucidity” “gives or promises the thinking of the path, provokes the thinking of the 
very possibility of what still remains unthinkable or unthought, indeed impossible,”102 I argue 
that Mrs. Dalloway proposes its own psychic and affective “path” toward a suspicion about a 
“transcendental theory” that suggests that what accompanies the “horror of death” comes to be 
felt as “that unseen part of us, which spreads wide,” an unseen part of us that can “survive” and 
“be recovered somehow attached to this person or that…perhaps.”103 This, the novel’s most 
significantly modernist question about the affective value of thinking about death and suicide, is 
then revealed as the motive for the mimetic re-staging of Clarissa Dalloway’s June parties. In 
other words, what I would like to develop are the ways in which Clarissa’s June parties mark a 
repeated mimetic performance, a recursive staging of circumstances in the service of both asking 
after and affirming a psychic suspicion about the social function of death reinforced and 
amplified by an affective empowerment. In short, the question of Mrs. Dalloway’s 
transcendental theory materializes in, by, and through the mimetic re-staging of Clarissa’s parties 
in ways that simultaneously disclose her desire to affirm a vow and seal an alliance with the 
affective value of thinking about death, specifically suicide, that all functions in the service of 






Where the ways in which death and suicide vividly prefigure Septimus’ affective world, 
the ways in which death and suicide prefigure Clarissa’s affect within the world of Mrs. 
Dalloway take more subtle forms. Where Septimus lost his friend, officer, and lover, Evans 
during the close of Europe’s Great War, Clarissa suffers no such loss precisely in the ways 
Septimus has. Or, at least, readers do not witness so vividly the ways in which death so 
fundamentally marks her subjectivity. We do learn that Clarissa has, in fact, lost someone close 
to her, namely, her sister, Sylvia, “killed,” as Knox-Shaw observes, “before [Clarissa’s] eyes by 
a falling tree.”104 And we also learn that Clarissa loses the object of her same-sex desire, Sally 
Seton, to the pressures of compulsory heterosexuality, discussed more below. Sally, however, 
does not die. Yet there are other ways in which we come to learn of Clarissa’s experiences with 
and attitude toward death whose subtlety marks its powerfully compelling manifestation in her 
affective life.  
As argued from the outset, Woolf entertains the affective value of thinking about death in 
“Mrs. Dalloway in Bond Street.” As Clarissa runs her morning errands, she repeatedly rehearses 
poetic verses about death and mourning whose effect provides her with a particular kind of 
affective power through which she feels connected with her outside world. What I would like to 
juxtapose are two related passages from Woolf’s novel that expand, develop, and intensify the 
themes of the affective value of thinking about death explored in her short story. What is so 
striking about these passages, however, are the ways in which they each position affective 
intensities alongside, almost prior to, the cognitive suspicion they amplify, on the one hand, 
while on the other, each bookend what Woolf refers to as “the gradual increase of S’s insanity” 
within the novels diegetic development.105 Which is to say, Mrs. Dalloway formally links 





Clarissa’s affective engagement with and cognitive suspicions about the social function of death 
that preoccupy her throughout the novel. And finally, the positioning of the following two 
passages around and alongside Septimus’ suicidal struggle prime readers to encounter the ways 
in which the affective value of suicidal fantasy again materializes at the novel’s close. 
In the passage below, again tracing Clarissa’s morning errands, we can see the ways in 
which from the outset of Mrs. Dalloway Clarissa has already been affectively empowered by 
experiences with death, experiences undisclosed to readers. What we encounter, rather, are their 
mimetic effect. Rather than making claims about “this” or “that” in terms of her “knowledge,” 
Woolf places emphasis on Clarissa’s “perpetual sense,” her “feeling,” what for Clarissa felt 
“absolutely absorbing.” Clarissa’s affective empowerment sets in motion a series of 
remembrances, as she “remembered…hosts of people,” their “dancing,” the “wagons plodding,” 
and her drive “home across the Park.” Yet these remembrances of her solicitude with others and 
the materiality of her environment then give rise to a powerfully significant question that 
heightens and amplifies that feeling of solicitude. Clarissa’s affect precedes and amplifies her 
cognitive suspicion, as the narrator asks on her behalf, “Did it matter then, she asked herself, 
walking toward Bond Street, did it matter that she must inevitable cease completely…?”  
Here, from the outset of the novel, we witness the ways in which Clarissa already feels an 
affective solicitude toward her world, the explanation for which she suspects has to do with a 
“strange” reality, the reality of the social function of death. The passage reads in full:  
She had reached the Park gates. She stood for a moment, looking at the omnibuses in 
Piccadilly. 
She would not say of any one in the world now that they were this or were that. She felt 
very young; at the same time unspeakably aged. She sliced like a knife through everything; at the 
same time was outside, looking on. She had a perpetual sense, as she watched the taxi cabs, of 
being out, out, far out to sea and alone; she always had the feeling that it was very, very 
dangerous to live even one day. Not that she thought herself clever, or much out of the ordinary. 
How she had got through life on the few twigs of knowledge Fräulein Daniels gave them she 





memoirs in bed; and yet to her it was absolutely absorbing; all this; the cabs passing; and she 
would not say of Peter, she would not say of herself, I am this, I am that. 
 Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct, she thought, walking on. If you put 
her in a room with some one, up went her back like a cat’s; or she purred. Devonshire House, 
Bath House, the house with the china cockatoo, she had seen them all lit up once; and 
remembered Sylvia, Fred, Sally Seton—such hosts of people; and dancing all night; and the 
wagons plodding past to market; and driving home across the Park. She remembered once 
throwing a shilling into the Serpentine. But every one remembered; what she loved was this, here, 
now, in front of her; the fat lady in the cab. Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking toward 
Bond Street, did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without 
her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely? but 
that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, 
Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of the 
house there, ugly, rambling all to bits and pieces as it was; part of people she had never met; 
being laid out like a mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as 
she had seen the trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself.106 
 
Derrida argues, “if death comes to the other, and comes to us through the other, then the friend 
no longer exists except in us, between us. [S/h]e lives only in us.”107 Similarly, here, we witness 
Clarissa’s suspicions about the social function of death amplified by her affect that empowers her 
to acknowledge and feel “that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, 
here, there, she survived, Peter survived,” a memory of the other that “lived in each other.” Not 
only does Clarissa suspect something curious about her experiences with death sometime in a 
past not disclosed to us, but Mrs. Dalloway also reveals that that suspicion is accompanied by an 
affective empowerment, something “consoling” about her belief “in death”—a cognitive 
suspicion about the social function of death accompanied and amplified by affective consolation, 
the dual components of Clarissa’s “truth.” 
 Clarissa’s affective consolation, however, not only accompanies her thoughts about 
death, but her affective consolation also accompanies her thoughts about her own death in 
particular, “that she must inevitably cease completely” (my emphasis). As the narrator continues 
we learn of Clarissa’s suicidal preoccupations more specifically: “Oh if she could have had her 
life over again! she thought, stepping on to the pavement…;”108 or her allusions to Othello, “‘if it 





thoughts take shape regarding her own death, on the one hand, for readers, on the other, our 
attention to Clarissa’s preoccupations with her own death only become heightened in relation to 
Septimus’ more explicitly vivid suicidal fantasies mediated by way of what Woolf describes as 
the “pace” of the novel “all throughout the day”—the “gradually increasing…tension” of 
Septimus’ struggle alongside the “approach” of Clarissa’s “party.”110 
For what follows the passage examined above are precisely the various scenes that trace 
the development of Septimus’ suicidal fantasies this chapter has examined. By developing the 
diegetic flow of Septimus’ mimetic struggle to come to terms with the world around him, 
Woolf’s portrayal of Septimus’ suicidal fantasies both link us to and inform readers about 
Clarissa’s preoccupations with the relationship between solicitude and death, not excluding her 
own. By the time readers approach the novel’s most theoretically suggestive suspicion, examined 
below, we have already become conditioned by the affective value of Septimus’ suicidal 
fantasies in ways that prime us to apprehend its import for Clarissa.  
Framed as a sort of remembrance of solicitude itself, a flashback to the earlier passage, 
Woolf expands Clarissa’s suspicions about the social function of death into what she refers to, 
here, as a “transcendental theory,” one set in motion and amplified by a particularly curious 
affective relationship toward death. It is also within this passage where we most explicitly 
encounter Woolf’s theory of the relationship between death and subjectivity. By contrasting “our 
apparitions, the part of us which appears” with “that unseen part of us, which spreads wide,” 
Clarissa’s theory registers a fidelity to the absence internal to a subjectivity set in motion by the 
possibility of death. And finally, we also encounter the novel’s most focused theoretical 





death, a theory diegetically prefigured and informed by Septimus’ suicidal fantasies, can function 
in the service of an affective solicitude with, toward, and for the world around her. 
Clarissa once, going on top of an omnibus with him somewhere, Clarissa superficially at 
least, so easily moved, now in despair, now in the best of spirits, all aquiver in those days and 
such good company, spotting queer little scenes, names, people from the top of a bus, for they 
used to explore London and bring back bags full of treasures from the Caledonian market—
Clarissa had a theory in those days—they had heaps of theories, always theories, as young people 
have. It was to explain the feeling they had of dissatisfaction; not knowing people; not being 
known. For how could they know each other? You met every day; then not for six months, or 
years. It was unsatisfactory, they agreed, how little one knew people. But she said, sitting on the 
bus going up Shaftesbury Avenue, she felt herself everywhere; not “here, here, here”; and she 
tapped the back of the seat; but everywhere. She waved her hand, going up Shaftesbury Avenue. 
She was all that. So that to know her, or any one, one must seek out the people who complete 
them; even the places. Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to, some woman 
in the street, some man behind the counter—even trees, or barns. It ended in a transcendental 
theory which, with her horror of death, allowed her to believe, or say that she believed (for all her 
skepticism), that since our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so momentary compared 
with the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads wide, the unseen must survive, be recovered 
somehow attached to this person or that, or even haunting certain places after death…perhaps—
perhaps.111 
 
Similarly to the ways in which death sets in motion the intense, affective historicity of Septimus 
and Rezia’s shared moment monumentalized within the materiality of a hat, here we encounter 
Woolf’s more totalizing modernist gesture. Clarissa contends with her feeling of dissatisfaction 
in the face of London’s expanded, intensified, and urbanized project of modernization wherein 
she feels increasingly unnoticed, unrecognized, and unknown. In so doing, Clarissa theorizes that 
death names the function, the binding force by which she has become empowered to have “felt 
herself everywhere; not ‘here, here, here’;…but everywhere,” toward “people,” “places,” “even 
trees, or barns.”112 Death functions in the service of an affective solicitude with, toward, and for 
the world around her. And, of course, Woolf ended this, the most significant, modernist, 
theoretical suggestion of the novel, in the form of a question. The “perhaps—perhaps” both 
suspends a cognitive disclosure that fuels readers’ sensory suspicions as we are invited into 





Mrs. Dalloway, “All must bear finally upon the party at the end; which expresses life, in every 
variety & full of conviction: while S. dies.”113 
 While Septimus’ suicidal fantasies prime readers’ to comprehend the import of the 
question (“perhaps—perhaps”) of Clarissa’s “transcendental theory,” Peter Walsh has also been 
piquing our curiosities about another question within the novel, namely the motive for Clarissa’s 
June parties. As Peter, Clarissa’s most intimate confidant, repeatedly asks, “Oh these parties, he 
thought; Clarissa’s parties. Why does she give these parties, he thought.”114 And as we come to 
learn, the novel’s narrator feels less reticent to disclose possible answers. “What she liked was 
simply life. ‘That’s what I do it for,’ she said, speaking aloud, to life.”115 
The narrator then expands Clarissa’s explanation in response to an imagined question 
again posed by Peter: “But suppose Peter said to her, ‘Yes, yes, but your parties—what’s the 
sense of your parties?’”116 Here Peter’s imagined question asks after something different, not just 
an explanation, but an explanation that calls into play the relationship between affect—some 
“sense”—and “this thing she called life.”117 Framed as a sort of review of Clarissa’s day, the 
narrator poses Clarissa’s explanation for the “sense” of her parties as her “gift,” as her 
“offering”—a gesture made toward and only completed by another’s acceptance—“to combine, 
to create” in social formation. In other words, Clarissa’s parties, her gestures, suggest a staging 
of her desire for a kind of affirmation of her offering acknowledged by and sealed upon its 
reception. “[B]ut to whom?” the narrator wonders. To whom does her offering serve? And the 
narrator replies, “An offering for the sake of offering, perhaps.” By again deploying the adverb 
“perhaps,” Woolf continues to defer the question of the motive for and the recipient of the gift of 
Clarissa’s parties in ways that reinforce and re-fuel our sensory suspicions about the open 





sort of performative mechanism, a mimetic re-staging of circumstances rehearsed in the service 
of an affirmation.  
And what is so striking, here, are the ways in which the open question of the relationship 
between her gift and life, on the one hand, indexes the relationship between death and solicitude 
characteristic of her transcendental theory, on the other, as the novel calls the meaning of death 
back into play: 
…Oh it was very queer. Here was So-and-so in South Kensington; some one up in Bayswater; 
and somebody else, say, in Mayfair. And she felt quite continuously a sense of their existence; 
and she felt what a waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt if only they could be brought 
together; so she did it. And it was an offering; to combine, to create; but to whom? 
 An offering for the sake of offering, perhaps. Anyhow, it was her gift. Nothing else had 
she of the slightest importance; could not think, write, even play the piano. She muddled 
Armenians and Turks; loved success; hated discomfort; must be liked; talked oceans of non-
sense; and to this day, ask her what the Equator was, and she did not know. 
 All the same, that one day should follow another; Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, 
Saturday; that one should wake up in the morning; see the sky; walk in the park; meet Hugh 
Whitbread; then suddenly in came Peter; then these roses; it was enough. After that, how 
unbelievable death was!—that it must end; and no one in the whole world would know how she 
had loved it all; how every instant…118 
 
The passage approaches what the narrator means by suggesting that Clarissa’s party is to 
“expresses life, in every variety & full of conviction,” as we learn that her “gift” is prefigured by 
a sharp focus on the social function of death—“How unbelievable death was!—that it must end; 
and no on in the whole world would know how she had loved it all.” Clarissa’s parties name a 
recursive mechanism, a repeated form, a mimetic stage rehearsal in the service of affirming the 
affective value of thinking about the social function of death. By priming readers’ curiosities 
about the affective value of thinking about the social function of death throughout the novel, first 
by way of Clarissa’s sensory suspicions, next by way of Septimus’ suicidal fantasies, and lastly 
by way of the relationship between the novel’s transcendental theory and the performative 





apparition, and Clarissa, life’s possessor, to cross paths upon which Clarissa might seal an 
alliance between death and life in the service of solicitude. 
In the novel’s most climactic scene, offered below, Clarissa learns of the news of 
Septimus’ suicide and is then drawn into the “little room” adjacent to the action of her party 
where she can be alone with her feelings, as Derrida might have suggested, where she can allow 
herself the privacy to feel that “terrible solitude…at the death of the other.” By re-inaugurating 
an occasion to entertain death, the news of Septimus’ suicide sets in motion, again, Clarissa’s 
engagement with her curiosity about the affective value of thinking about death that we have 
encountered throughout the novel. Only here, her feelings manifest in a different form. Clarissa 
begins to imagine and envision the events of Septimus’ suicide in ways that recall Septimus’ 
suicidal fantasies themselves. In other words, readers witness Clarissa, like Septimus, engage in 
her own fantasy informed by our familiarity with Septimus’. Much like the heightened 
encounters with materiality characteristic of Septimus’ suicidal mimeses, discussed above, so too 
Clarissa envisions the ways in which “he had thrown himself from a window,” how “the ground” 
had “flashed” up, how the ground in which had been set “the rusty spikes” pierced his falling 
body. Her vision continues to intensify materiality, like Septimus’, emphasizing sound, the 
“thud, thud, thud in his brain” as Clarissa imagines Septimus’ encounter with death, the 
“suffocation of blackness.” Clarissa fantasized. “So she saw it.” Clarissa’s imaginary vision of 
Septimus’s suicide, a young man with whom she never had the occasion to meet in person, then 
expands further into something more phantasmatic.  
Similar to the ways in which Septimus fantasizes himself suffering the violence by which 
his lost object of cathexis had suffered, “falling through the sea, down, down into the flames,” 





somehow connected in some way to her own, that their experiences with entertaining death bind 
one another in some significant way.119 By way of a repeated reference to an event in her own 
life, cited above, Clarissa remembers how she “once threw a shilling into the Serpentine.” Yet, 
here, in relation to Septimus, her reference takes on a new meaning; a new meaning that conjures 
images of the gendered history of suicide, as Georges Minois has observed, drowning has been 
one of the most predominant methods by which women have historically ended their lives.120  
As readers have been primed by Septimus’ suicidal fantasies, the narrator guides us 
through Clarissa’s brief, suicidal phantasmatic vision through which she feels that “[s]omehow it 
was her disaster—her disgrace. It was her punishment to see sink and disappear…”121 Through 
imagining and fantasizing about the connections between Septimus’ suicidal act and events in 
her own life, we witness Clarissa beginning to feel “somehow very like him—the young man 
who had killed himself.” And rather than on previous occasions upon which Clarissa had thought 
about death in ways that have given rise to her suspicions about its social function, it is here, 
through Clarissa’s own phantasmatic vision that she begins to formulate, not mere suspicions, 
but more substantial claims, the affirmation of the social function of death for which this chapter 
has been arguing. Where Septimus’ suicidal fantasies set in motion his ability to acknowledge 
his lost object of cathexis, to feel the reality of objects in his world, and most importantly, to re-
engage with the people that surround him, we encounter Clarissa’s affirmation as Woolf’s 
critical scene begins its decent, and closes with the passage, the epigraph, that frames this 
section. The passage, with few omissions, reads: 
Sinking her voice, drawing Mrs. Dalloway into the shelter of a common femininity, a 
common pride in the illustrious qualities of husbands and their sad tendency to overwork, Lady 
Bradshaw (poor goose—one didn’t dislike her) murmured how, “just as we were starting, my 
husband was called up on the telephone, a very sad case. A young man (that is what Sir William 
is telling Mr. Dalloway) had killed himself. He had been in the army.” Oh! thought Clarissa, in 





 She went on, into the little room where the Prime Minister had gone with Lady Bruton. 
Perhaps there was somebody there. But there was nobody…There was nobody. The party’s 
splendour fell to the floor, so strange it was to come in alone in her finery. 
 What business had the Bradshaws to talk of death at her party? A young man killed 
himself. And they talked of it at her party—the Bradshaws, talked of death. He had killed 
himself—but how? Always her body went through it first, when she was told, suddenly, of an 
accident; her dress flamed, her body burnt. He had thrown himself from a window. Up had 
flashed the ground; through him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a 
thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it. But why had he 
done it? And the Bradshaws talked of it at her party! 
 She had once thrown a shilling into the Serpentine, never anything more. But he had 
flung it all away. They went on living (she would have to go back; the rooms were still crowded; 
people kept on coming). They (all day she had been thinking of Bourton, of Peter, of Sally), they 
would grow old. A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, 
obscured in her own life, let drop every day in corruptions, lies, chatter. This he had preserved. 
Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the impossibility of 
reaching the centre which, mystically evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded, one was 
alone. There was an embrace in death.122 
 
As suggested above, Derrida argues, “the possibility of the death of the other as mine or ours in-
forms any relation to the other,” namely the social relation figured in the possibility of an “I.” 
And as Derrida desired for his lectures to give “the last word” to his “friend,” Paul de Man, or 
even more so “to friendship” in the service of preserving memory itself in the form of a “seal of 
alliance,” so too we witness an affirmation of Clarissa’s seal of alliance with the memory of a 
friend she’d never met. Yet where Derrida describes de Man’s “mad lucidity” as a cognitive 
“thinking of the path,” Woolf enables us to see the ways in which Clarissa is led by a specifically 
affective encounter with Septimus, her affective encounter whereby “as always” “her body” 
passed “through it first.” Clarissa’s suicidal fantasy sets in motion an affective amplification by 
and through which, then, the “words came to her.” Giving the last word, the last respectful, non-
pathological word to her friend, Clarissa acknowledges that through his memory—a memory of a 
suicide that set in motion her own engagement with his “insane truth”—Septimus has 
empowered her to “feel the beauty,” to “feel the fun…”—the surprisingly life-affirming, 





As we come to the close of the passage, we encounter the words that seal her alliance 
with the affective value of suicidal fantasy, as Clarissa insists, “There was an embrace in death.” 
It is precisely through Clarissa’s suicidal fantasy that her affirmation of death’s embrace 
empowers her to feel and acknowledge a solicitude with, towards, and for the other. As Derrida 
might have suggested, Clarissa’s suicidal fantasy “commits” her, as the narrator insists, to “have 
to go back,” as just as surely as Septimus died, “They went on living,” as Clarissa performs her 
vow, 
She must go back to them…The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air…she 
must go back. She must assemble. She must find Sally and Peter.124 
 
“And she came in from the little room,” reentering and assembling within the fatal “system of 
tropes,” Clarissa performs her solicitude made possible by her encounter with suicidal fantasy at 
her party, her social function.125 Mrs. Dalloway’s climactic moment reveals a fidelity to de 
Man’s second affirmation, his vow—Clarissa’s performative alliance made with the memory of 
Septimus in the service of Woolf’s strange reality, in the service of the psychic and affective 
materialization of what suicidal thinking and feeling make possible. Where we witness 
Septimus’ psychic and affective suicidal re-engagement within the world of the novel alongside 
the diegetic flow of its present, we witness Clarissa’s already in process, only then to be 
performatively re-affirmed on the occasion of her encounter with the insane truth of suicidal 
fantasy set in motion by and affirmed in the memory of Septimus’ suicide at her party. It is not 
that Clarissa feels the affective value of thinking about death for the first time upon hearing 
about Septimus’ suicide. It is rather that through her encounter with the insane truth of suicidal 
fantasy, Clarissa re-experiences, re-affirms, and continues to perform what she already suspects, 







STAGING FANTASY AND THE BIOPOLITICAL CRISIS OF GRIEVING  
 
I am committed to a veritable cultural combat to remind people that there is no more beautiful 
form of conduct which, as a result, merits reflection with such great attention, than suicide. It 
would be a case of working on one’s suicide for all of one’s life. 
 
Michel Foucault, “Conversation avec Werner Schroeter,” 1994126 
 
 
Thus far, I have been risking reference to fantasy, in a sort of common-place way, as a 
form of mimesis. I have not defined the term, nor situated it within a theoretical trajectory. In 
other words, fantasy has taken shape as a sort of casual signifier for the daydreams or visions by 
and through which Septimus and Clarissa rehearse their shared preoccupations about death that 
amplify their affective relationship toward other people. It now becomes important, however, to 
better understand the ways in which the logic of fantasy functions within Mrs. Dalloway, a 
novel, I argue, that itself functions in phantasmatic ways for its readers. As Woolf insists, “There 
should be some fun—.”127 
In The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Laplanche and Pontalis define fantasy as an 
“imaginary scene in which the subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfillment of a wish (in 
the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that is distorted to a greater or lesser extent 
by defensive processes.”128 What I would like to develop below are connections between the 
ways in which psychoanalytic theorizations frame fantasy as a staging of desire and the ways in 
which Mrs. Dalloway invites a desire in readers to entertain and witness the question of the 
insane truth about the affective value of suicidal fantasy, its potentiality for solicitude. I would 
also like to examine the ways in which the logic of fantasy’s specifically defensive processes, its 
tendency to distort and forestall the fulfillment of desire, may also allow us to think about what 
Woolf described as her novel’s effort “to criticize the social system.” By understanding the ways 





people alongside that which interrupts, forestalls, or even precludes access to fulfilling their 
desires, I argue that Mrs. Dalloway helps us to re-encounter, re-imagine, and re-engage with the 
world around us in the service of social change. 
Laplanche and Pontalis’ “Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality” expands their focus on 
wish fulfillment and emphasizes the ways in which fantasies more broadly stage desire itself. 
Rather than marking the object and fulfillment of desire, as the brief definition above suggests, 
Laplanche and Pontalis argue that fantasy names a “setting,” a sequence of events in which a 
subject appears “caught up.”129 Which is to say, they emphasize the ways in which the subject is 
“invariably present” within the sequence of a fantasy’s scene-script, a script in which the subject 
“does in fact have a part to play,” however frustrated by defensive processes, discussed later.130 
As examined thus far, we have witnessed the various ways in which Mrs. Dalloway 
stages desire for its various characters in terms of fantasy. Septimus suicidal fantasies register his 
unconscious desire to avow the loss of Evans that then sets in motion his amplified affective 
engagement in and with the world around him. Clarissa’s repeated rehearsal of her June parties 
sets the stage for the occasion of her encounter with suicidal fantasy, revealing her unconscious 
desire to affirm and seal an alliance with her sensory suspicions about the social function of 
death. In their individual, yet connected fantasies, the “part” each “play” can be characterized as 
the fantasy’s subject-protagonist – Septimus and Clarissa, the novel’s doubled protagonists 
themselves.131  
Yet what is so striking about the novel’s form are the ways in which the desires it stages 
relate, connect, and overlap in ways that direct our own curiosities about various plot 
developments and potential resolutions in multiple directions. Woolf guides readers through 





others the paragraph level. We are taken from one character to another both within the 
narrative’s present and through individual character histories by way of what Woolf describes as 
her “tunneling process,” a method by which readers learn of the connectedness between 
characters and their shared pasts by “instalments” as needed.132 As examined above, Woolf 
wanted to execute what she describes as “the effect of real life,” the effect of an “incessant,” 
“unbroken” texture connected by the “casual glances” from another’s perspective in ways that 
provide the impression of a coherent, cohesive whole.133 Yet the effect of Woolf’s experimental 
narrative form begs a significant question: To whom do these impressions belong? From whose 
perspective do readers encounter the novel’s “casual glances”? Are these causal glances 
themselves individual, phantasmatic scene-scripts that together make up a subject’s more 
elaborate cohesive fantasy? And most importantly, if Mrs. Dalloway itself functions as staging of 
some subject’s desire for readers to entertain the question of the affective value of suicidal 
fantasy, in what ways does the novel invite us to encounter this fantasy as our own? 
While Laplanche and Pontalis argue that the subject might take the shape of a protagonist 
within a phantasmatic scene, they also argue that fantasies can frame a subject in positions of 
alterity across a “permutation of roles.” The permutation of roles a subject can occupy, they 
argue, must take shape in the form of a “participant,” as fantasies are undoubtedly subjective 
phenomena. But more interestingly for Woolf’s formal purposes, Laplanche and Pontalis argued 
that a subject might assume a role within the action of a fantasy’s script “as an observer.”134 And 
as we have learned, Woolf was curious about developing the effect of observation as a formal 
characteristic of narration, namely, that which in her manuscript notations she identifies as “an 





Yet more than a mere observer, Woolf’s narrator becomes who the novel alludes to as 
“one of those spectral presences” who at times appears to speak from within the subjectivity of 
individual characters. As Judith Butler has observed, fantasy names not an “activity of an already 
formed subject, but of the staging and dispersion of the subject across a variety of identificatory 
positions.”135 And although the identity of the novel’s narrator escapes us, reinforcing the 
absence internal to subjectivity figured by the social function of death throughout the novel, we 
do, however, encounter the narrator’s spectral presence in the form of an address. The novel’s 
“spectral presence,” I argue, takes the shape of a participant-observer within the novel-fantasy 
mediated to readers by way of its diegesis in ways that direct our attention elsewhere, not to the 
narrator, but to others, not excluding ourselves.  
In other words, Woolf’s phantasmatic participant-observer very intricately functions not 
only as a medium who speaks both about and on behalf of the various characters within their 
phantasmatic world, but the novel-fantasy’s participant-observer also speaks to readers both on 
the behalf of characters through free indirect discourse and also to readers directly. Readers are 
addressed at various moments within the fantasy as “you,” in ways that heighten our always-
already observer-position as engagers of diegeses. Readers are first addressed directly as second-
person addressees in a scene already examined above. From the outset of the novel wherein 
Clarissa runs her morning errands and asks herself “did it not become consoling to believe that 
death ended absolutely?,” we encounter our first invitation into the fantasy’s script as a 
heightened observer. The narrator begins with free indirect discourse revealing Clarissa’s 
impression of herself, “Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct, she thought.” The 
narrative then shifts to address readers directly, “If you put her in a room with some one, up went 





imagine alongside the narrator, and perhaps alongside Clarissa herself, the ways in which 
Clarissa’s “instinct” to know people has materialized in her past.  
As we proceed through the novel, we encounter a variety of both free-indirect, and direct 
modes of address that continue to heighten our observer-participation and our desires for 
potential revelations within the novel-fantasy. Within particularly bold moments of second-
person address, readers’ curiosities are compounded, amplifying our desires for revelations. Set 
off parenthetically, our fantasy’s narrator insists of Clarissa but directs toward us, “(You could 
always get her to own up if you took the trouble; she was honest.),”136 to which readers might 
respond: “Wha—?! Own up to what? If we took what trouble? Have I missed something? Should 
I re-read? Just a moment, I’ll go back…” Or take, for instance, another striking example of 
second-person address, here in its free-indirect form, found in the scene in which Septimus 
fantasizes a chorus commanding him to act, an oddly explicit moment indexing the relationship 
between suicidal fantasy and solicitude: “The whole world was clamouring: Kill yourself, kill 
yourself, for our sakes.” By addressing readers with the second-person “you” either on behalf of 
a character or on behalf of the narrator, readers are themselves invited into the phantasmatic 
scene-scripts whose participation we play as phantasmatic observer-participants, enhancing our 
otherwise ordinary observer status as mere readers of diegeses. 
Yet there is another lingering question about our own observer role within a novel in 
which suicidal fantasy figures so predominantly. And that is, if Mrs. Dalloway valorizes the 
question of the affective value of suicidal fantasy, and if we are invited alongside its 
phantasmatic scene-script to participate as observers within its diegetic development, are we also 
then invited to fantasize about our own suicide? In other words, does Mrs. Dalloway invite us to 





I am not certain I am in a position to wager an answer to this question, nor would I want 
to. To wager an answer to such a question would belie the subjective nature of fantasy itself. 
Rather, I am inclined to direct the question’s focus toward the question of the function of suicidal 
fantasy itself, as Woolf had, to that which Woolf theorized suicidal fantasy makes possible. 
Rather than ask readers directly the extent to which the novel’s suicidal fantasies articulate our 
own, the novel’s suicidal fantasies ask that we direct our attention toward those who engage in 
them and toward those whom they serve. In other words, Woolf places emphasis on those for 
whom engaging in the insane truth of suicidal fantasy matters most, their subjects and their 
others. 
Before moving onto the ways in which Mrs. Dalloway stages its fantasy’s defensive 
mechanisms in the service of social critique, it is important to point out one last observation 
about Mrs. Dalloway’s phantasmatic form in relation to modernism more broadly. Butler 
examines the part of the subject-participant within scenes of fantasy in relation to loss, or as she 
describes it, a “separation” from an object of attachment. She emphasizes that fantasy originates 
from an initial separation from an object of attachment whereby fantasies function, then, “both to 
cover and to contain the separation” from the lost object, a “dissimulation.”137 In various ways, 
we have come to learn how Mrs. Dalloway stages its fantasies in relation to its characters, its 
narrator, and in relation to its readers. But in terms of its position in relation to the world in 
which in was published, Mrs. Dalloway’s phantasmatic form invites us to explore the ways in 
which solicitude itself had become an “object” of separation, an “object” of loss, a dead “object” 
desperately in need of resuscitation. Or perhaps more specifically, Mrs. Dalloway’s phantasmatic 





another that its emphasis on solicitude seeks to repair. In other words, such fantasy names a 
product of our condition of estrangement exacerbated under capitalism. 
In the face of the fragmentation and alienation historically associated with projects of 
modernization itself, a solicitude with, toward, and for the other re-enters Mrs. Dalloway’s 
phantasmatic world as a lost object of cathexis for which it seeks avowal. In these ways, 
solicitude names a lost object-cathexis par excellence of modernity’s social, aesthetic and 
political project for which Woolf’s aesthetic contribution to literary modernism contends. And 
while it may be pithy to suggest that Mrs. Dalloway is a novel best re-read, and then best re-re-
read, ad infinitum, its very form, a form that piques and re-piques our sensory suspicions about 
our lost cathexis toward solicitude and its possibility for recovery itself indexes its performative 
function. Mrs. Dalloway valorizes the question of the affective value of suicidal fantasy in the 
face of social loss that functions in the service of solicitude – a solicitude that becomes suicidal 
to neglect, and a function that “commits” us, as Derrida suggestes on the one hand, and Foucault 
alludes on the other, to a “veritable cultural combat” whose shape can manifest in our modern 
world as what Foucault describes as a “case of working on one’s suicide for all of one’s life.” 
* 
We have been discussing the ways in which we encounter within our fantasies traces of 
the lived experience of the social losses that prefigure our subjectivities. Within fantasy we 
encounter an imaginary return of lost objects of cathexes, yet we also encounter mechanisms 
whose function within fantasy interrupt and forestall our access to those objects fueling our 
desire for them. As mentioned above, Laplanche and Pontalis argue that within a phantasmatic 





of what they describe as “defensive processes,” the presence of mechanisms that distort or 
disrupt our access to fulfilling our desire within a fantasy’s scene-script.  
In Septimus’ fantasies, we have witnessed, for example, the ways in which his 
unconscious desire for encountering his lover, Evans, had been repeatedly interrupted. The 
presence of the “railings” and “trees” behind which Evans was situated within Septimus’ 
fantasies function as expressions of defensive processes that reemphasize his condition of 
unavowability, the ways in which Septimus “could not look upon the dead.”  
Psychoanalytic theories describe such distortions, somewhat ironically, as “defensive” in 
large part because such distortions function to protect the ego—an idealized figure for the 
unavowable lost object of cathexis itself—from re-experiencing the occasion for its loss that the 
fantasy may be rehearsing. The irony, of course, is that avowing the lost object of cathexis sets in 
motion our ability to come to terms with the pain associated with it, to identify the ways in which 
those lived experiences of separation, loss, and death have come to figure within our psychic 
topographies as the ego or the critical agency that takes the ego as its object of condemnation.  
And this is one of the things so special about suicidal fantasy in particular. Where fantasy 
stages a rehearsal of one’s desire for an unavowable lost object of cathexis, suicidal fantasy 
stages a more vivid rehearsal upon which one may more readily avow the lost object in its 
alterity, demystifying the subject/object dialectic at the heart of subjectivity. For in suicidal 
fantasy, as we have witnessed with Septimus, the violence constitutive of the death of the lost 
object is rehearsed on us, a violence whose proximity heightens, I argue, the possibility of 
recognizing the displacement of that violence from the initial lost object to its figure, our ego—
perhaps the most stubborn expression of defensive processes. Suicidal fantasy can disclose that 





bodies marked, as Jameson might say, by a “history” that “hurts.”138 Nonetheless, within a 
fantasy’s scene-script, psychoanalytic theorizations suggest that our access to fulfilling the 
various desires they stage are beset by various barriers whose function prolongs our disavowal 
and simultaneously fuels the return of our desire for a lost object of cathexis accompanied by the 
pain of that loss.  
What I would like to develop however, are the ways in which Mrs. Dalloway privileges 
its phantasmatic exposure in relation to its situatedness within the novel’s world in such a way 
that fantasy itself becomes one of the mechanisms by which Woolf’s readers can come to 
identify various social powers within the novel, and hopefully within our present, that function in 
the service of social control in ways that simultaneously prolong and exacerbate our suffering. In 
other words, I argue that if fantasies are beset by defensive processes that perpetuate our 
disavowal, and if suicidal fantasies more readily enable us to encounter, avow, and demystify the 
dialectic figured in our psychic topographies, Mrs. Dalloway’s dramatization of Septimus’ 
suicidal fantasies also function to implicate harmful biopolitical behavioral prescriptions by and 
through which Septimus suffers in his waking life – prescriptions against which he resists by 
way of his corporeal suicide. 
 In the wake of announcing “I will kill myself,” Septimus has been subjected to medical 
treatment and placed under the surveillance of his general practitioner, Dr. Holmes.139 As Butler 
observes, “forms of social power emerge that regulate what losses will and will not be 
grieved”140 Septimus’ medical treatment reveals, however, the ways in which forms of social 
power emerge and regulate how our losses may or may not be grieved. As a result, Septimus 
undergoes a host of behavioral prescriptions, executed with the otherwise innocent help of his 





Septimus and Rezia, we are taken to Regent’s Park, a place Rezia feels “she must take” Septimus 
in an effort to honor Dr. Holmes’ prescription for Septimus to “take an interest in things outside 
himself.”141 While readers come to understand that Septimus is unconsciously preoccupied with 
other “things outside himself,” namely, his painful experience in the war, those “things” escape 
the focus of his medical treatment. Rather than confront that by which he feels “condemned,” or 
even ask after it, Dr. Holmes encourages Septimus and Rezia to engage in a host of distracting 
activities that might “make him notice real things.” Dr. Holmes encourages Septimus and Rezia 
to “go to a music hall, play cricket—that was the very game, Dr. Holmes said, a nice out-of-door 
game, the very game for her husband.”142 While in Regent’s Park, Woolf frames Septimus’ 
treatment with no uncertain tone. “‘Oh look,’ [Rezia] implored him. But what was there to look 
at? A few sheep. That was all.”143 
The treatment is not working.  
As mentioned in the introduction, Septimus is subject to a power that Foucault describes 
as biopower, the regulatory forms “working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize and 
organize the forces under it.”144 But what is new, and simultaneously irritating, about 
mechanisms of biopower, Foucault adds, is that such forms of power are “bent on generating 
forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than…impeding them, making them 
submit, or destroying them.” In other words, biopower’s task is to monitor and administer life, to 
manage life often through behavioral prescriptions about which we are encouraged to feel some 
positive attachment. And although he doesn’t say it, Foucault implies that biopower is an 
affective power. Dr. Holmes looks to valorize in Septimus’ affect the biopolitical spirit with 
astoundingly patronizing condescension, “‘So you’re in a funk,’ he said agreeably, sitting down 





way in the world. ‘Talking nonsense to frighten your wife?’”146 Cricket! “[T]hat was the very 
game, Dr. Holmes said, a nice out-of-door game, the very game for her husband.” One can 
imagine Septimus’ thousand-yard stare begin to focus on an object. 
To make matters worse, Septimus then comes under the care of Sir William Bradshaw, 
Woolf’s figure for neuroscience. Rezia’s innocent optimism primes readers’ doubts. “She 
thought his name sounded nice; he would cure Septimus at once.”147 As readers approach the 
occasion of Septimus’ appointment with Sir William Bradshaw, however, we are taken by way 
of Woolf’s “tunneling process” through a brief, casual glance into another expression of the 
operation of biopower found outside medical practice. We are simultaneously set up to encounter 
the juxtaposition between Septimus’ repeated claim that “he could not feel,” and the ways he is 
encouraged to feel about his position as an honored veteran. At the office where Septimus sells 
his commodified labor-power as a clerk, his boss, Mr. Brewer reflects on Septimus’ service 
during the war. “They were proud of him; he had won crosses. ‘You have done your duty…’”148 
This, only after being more thoroughly brought back to Septimus’ experience in the war wherein 
we learn, “he developed manliness; he was promoted; he drew the attention, indeed the affection 
of his officer, Evans by name.”149 By situating what we have already come to know about 
Septimus’ preoccupations alongside the predominant impression of who Septimus appears to his 
public to be, the narrator playfully observes, “The War had taught him.”150 Which is to say, by 
presenting readers with casual glances into both Septimus’ own psychic reality and the psychic 
realities of those that surround him, Woolf enables us to encounter the conflicting forces at play 






While “Dr. Holmes said there was nothing the matter with him,” yet still finds the 
occasion to prescribe, and charge for, Septimus’ medical treatment, Sir William Bradshaw 
diagnoses Septimus with something more serious.151 Compounding Mr. Brewer’s comments, Sir 
William Bradshaw, the “priest of science,” venerates Septimus’ social position, “You served 
with great distinction in the War?”152 And like a good scientist, Sir William Bradshaw records 
Septimus’ reply, 
“The War?” the patient asked. The European War—that little shindy of schoolboys with 
gunpowder? Had he served with distinction? He really forgot. In the War itself he had failed.153 
 
Sir William Bradshaw pathologizes Septimus’ response, “A serious symptom, to be noted on the 
card.” And after securing from Rezia that she and Septimus “have nothing to worry you, no 
financial anxiety, nothing,” Sir William Bradshaw then confirms that Septimus “was very 
seriously ill.” Septimus would be prescribed “rest, rest, rest; a long rest in bed” in a “delightful 
home down in the country where her husband would be perfectly looked after.” To which Rezia 
responds, “Away from her? she asked.”154 Septimus was to be alone, alienated, by biopolitical 
design. 
Woolf makes clear the irritating futility of these biopolitical mechanisms while poking 
fun at them in the process. Repeatedly Woolf calls into question the domineering scientific 
justification that functions to legitimate such biopolitical discourse throughout the novel: “(for 
one must be scientific, above all scientific);” “(for one must be scientific above all things);” and 
perhaps most critically toward Sir William Bradshaw himself, “To his patients he gave three-
quarters of an hour and if in this exacting science which has to do with what, after all, we know 
nothing about—the nervous system, the human brain—a doctor loses his sense of proportion, as 
a doctor he fails.”155 And as we know, Sir William Bradshaw’s “three-quarters of an hour” 





his patient’s, mustn’t fall out of proportion.156 For it is Septimus who suffers from, as Sir 
William would have it, “not having a sense of proportion,” and it is Sir William Bradshaw who 
benefits.157 By framing medical science in such an amusingly contemptuous way in the face of 
her otherwise intricate portrayal of what fundamentally concerns Septimus, Woolf’s readers can 
begin to identify the ways in which Septimus’ psychic and affective life of power has been 
historically controlled by the workplace, the military, and in the novel’s present, by the 
biopolitics of medical science. And very much like the ways in which, in fantasy, a subject 
experiences the forestalling effects of defensive processes, Woolf makes clear the ways in which 
the biopolitical medical prescriptions Septimus suffers function both to prolong and exacerbate 
his suffering. 
Septimus’ subjection to such treatment is no mere fictive construction.. Both the occasion 
for Lady Bruton’s lunch party and the conspicuous talk of the “Bill” regarding the “deferred 
effects of shell shock” spoken between Sir William Bradshaw and Richard at Clarissa’s party 
function as figures for otherwise real-life legislation entertained by Parliament during the 
drafting processes of Mrs. Dalloway. Knox-Shaw’s meticulous research examines what he 
describes as the “fierce controversy over the plight of afflicted ex-servicemen” in the wake of 
World War I. He continues, arguing, 
A storm had broken in Parliament only a fortnight before [Woolf envisaged Septimus as a 
character] over the announcement that, as from October 1, six hundred or so ex-servicemen in 
asylums were to forego their right to a pension under a now expired Royal Warrant and to be 
supported wholly under the provision of the Poor Law—on the grounds that their mental 
treatment was judged to have been due to causes other than the war. In two hard-hitting leaders 
(Sept. 27 and 29, 1922), The Times accused the government of transforming ‘service patients’ 
into ‘pauper lunatics’ and demanded an explanation of how the men concerned were ever 
accepted for service in the first place; and the point was further driven home when a former 
member of a recruiting board wrote in to declare that he had never heard of a certified lunatic 
being passed fit. What began as an attempt to a limited retrenchment on the part of the Ministry 
of Pensions gave the Labour opposition an opportunity to reopen the whole matter of state 






Knox-Shaw’s research demonstrates the ways in which Parliament sought to mitigate state 
responsibility for the painful legacy of the war materialized in, among other things, veterans’ 
mental health. Claiming that symptoms expressed by soldiers after the close of the war were 
symptoms with which these soldiers entered the war, we find what today we might call an 
argument about “pre-existing conditions.” By virtue of such pre-existing conditions the 
government sought to skirt responsibility for veterans, leaving them to seek whatever help they 
could secure as paupers. Hence, Woolf’s intent focus on Sir William Bradshaw’s curiosities 
about the Smiths’ financial stability.  
 Woolf’s dramatizes the ways in which Septimus’ very experience in the war functioned 
as a mechanism for his unavowabiltiy. While he has “won crosses” for his bravery, encouraging 
a stoic masculinity throughout his otherwise painful experiences encountering shelling, that very 
shelling took the life of his officer and lover in such a way that prevented its avowal. To be 
brave, to win the approval of his country, Septimus unconsciously comports himself with a 
reticence that would come to haunt him until the occasion of his suicidal fantasies. By virtue of 
Woolf’s intricate narration, we can see the power relations play out between Septimus’ own 
therapeutic trajectory versus the prescribed trajectory reigned down upon and functioning 
through him in his relationship with institutions of governmentality. 
Septimus’s corporeal suicide marks Woolf’s critique of the very social system that 
produced him. And in its dramatization, absent is the heightened aestheticized materiality 
characteristic of his suicidal fantasies. Rather, Septimus encounters his heightened totality as a 
mere totality-of-equipment, as Heidegger might have had it. “Mrs. Filmer’s nice clean bread 
knife,” the “gas fire,” the “razors,” won’t do. “There remained only the window,” the threshold 





While Septimus’ corporeal suicide marks the most significant form of Woolf’s critique, 
he is not alone, as we know Septimus has a double. 
Woolf was sensitive about class and gender. Where the Smiths “had to buy” their 
“roses…from a poor man in the street,” as we know “Mrs. Dalloway…would buy the flowers 
herself” from a fashionable shop, rather than send her servant, Lucy.160 Clarissa is aristocratic, 
married to a politician. She entertains aristocracy, even the prime minister, at least every year 
upon the repeated occasion of her June parties. Yet like Septimus, Clarissa too has been subject 
to the “medical gaze,” a gaze we know, and Woolf knew, is a gendered one. Yet where 
throughout the novel we learn that Clarissa too must avoid “excitement” for fear that “it was bad 
for her heart,” she fears no prescription of countryside quarantine.161 Knox-Shaw comments on 
the relationship between Clarissa’s class privilege and Woolf’s own with regard to avoiding the 
threat of countryside quarantine. In September 1913, Woolf had tried to “kill herself” by way of 
what Knox-Shaw learned was a “nearly fatal overdose of veronal.”162 As “suicidal intension was 
sufficient grounds for certifying a patient,” Knox-Shaw writes, Woolf was slated for the 
countryside. It was only by way of what Knox-Shaw describes as “special circumstances,” 
namely, Woolf’s class status and social connections, whereby she was released into the custody 
of her husband Leonard who subsequently agreed to take his wife “into the countryside” 
accompanied by himself and their hired “nurses.”163 Rather than be subject to state surveillance, 
Woolf was entrusted to its paternal substitute, her husband. Yet by situating Clarissa—wealthy, 
aristocratic, delicate—alongside Septimus—poor, working class, rigid—Woolf’s dramatization 
critiques the social system by way of class and gender, inviting readers to contemplate the ways 





And finally, Clarissa and Septimus both share same-sex desires. Sally plays double to 
Septimus’ Evans, compounding the doubleness of Clarissa and Septimus, rehearsed throughout 
the novel. And in each their own way, both Clarissa and Septimus are compelled by way of 
predominant biopolitical social prescriptions to suppress their same-sex desire and fall in line 
with the pressures of compulsory heterosexuality. Where Septimus regrets “how he had married 
his wife without loving her,” Clarissa longs for a “quality which could only exist between 
women,” feeling a “presentiment of something bound to part them.” When she and her 
girlfriends spoke of marriage in their youth. “They spoke of marriage always as a 
catastrophe.”164 In each their own way, both Clarissa and Septimus entertain the ways in which 
the novel suggests, “every one gives something up when they marry.”165 And of course, both are 
haunted by the implications of their socially influenced, compulsory heterosexual marriages. 
Where Septimus longs for the “affection” his officer and lover lost in a peculiarly 
hypermasculine scene of power, Clarissa longs for her “match burning in a crocus” upon 
“yielding to the charm of a woman.”166 In each their own way, and also in significantly shared 
ways, both Clarissa’s and Septimus’s lives function within the confines of biopolitical social 
prescriptions that preclude, forestall, and simultaneously intensify their feelings of misery in 
their present and a desire for something otherwise on some horizon. 
Capitalism and biopower, I argue, name two modern forms of productive power, what 
Marx broadly described as effects of, the “real subsumption of labour under capital.” In 1867, 
roughly sixty years prior to the publication of Mrs. Dalloway, Marx commented on the 
relationships between capitalist modes of production, circulation, and distribution, on the one 
hand, and the function of institutions of science, on the other. He wrote: 
The social productive forces of labour, or the productive forces of directly social, 
socialized (i.e. collective) labour come into being through co-operation, division of labour within 





conscious use of the sciences, of mechanics, chemistry, etc. for specific ends, technology, etc. and 
similarly, through the enormous increase of the scale corresponding to such developments (for it 
is only socialized labour that is capable of applying the general products of human development, 
such as mathematics, to the immediate process of production; and, conversely, progress in these 
sciences presupposes a certain level of material production). This entire development of the 
productive forces of socialized labour (in contrast to the more or less isolated labour of 
individuals), and together with it the use of science (the general product of social development), 
in the immediate process of production, takes the form of the productive power of capital.167 
 
It is by way of these “productive powers of capital” that we encounter biopower and its 
biopolitical interest in our lives. As Foucault observes, biopower is “without question an 
indispensable element in the development of capitalism.”168 Much of biopolitics is culturally 
constructed nonsense, often backed, underwritten, justified, and naturalized by way of 
institutions that construct the very objects of analysis claimed to be under examination—
bourgeois objectifications of people, who are then told what to do and how to feel about it. And 
matters can be otherwise.  
Mrs. Dalloway exposes the dominance of and some of the mechanisms by which 
biopower functions alongside mechanisms of resistance. One of those mechanisms of resistance 
is suicidal fantasy. Heidegger argues, “The ‘end’ of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which 
belongs to the potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, to existence—limits and determines in 
every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein.”169 The question of Clarissa’s transcendental 
theory asks after some disclosure of some totality for a potentiality-for-Being, an anticipation of 
some such disclosure revealed by death in its suicidal form. As mentioned in the introduction, 
Heidegger also emphasizes anticipation when he observes, with his own emphasis, 
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the 
possibility of being itself…in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has 
been released from the Illusions of the “they”, and which is factical, certain of itself, and 
anxious.170 
 
That anxiety, Heidegger argues, “reveals itself as care,” a care that can take the form of 





their world, Woolf illustrates ways in which we can encounter within our fantasies traces of both 
the lived experience of our social losses and the social forces that inaugurate and perpetuate our 
subjectivities, phantasmatic encounters by which we can come to avow the function of each, and 
through which we can come to re-imagine our world in the service of solicitude for social 
change, change that may include mitigating the frequency of corporeal suicide through suicidal 
fantasy itself. The question of affirming the affective value of the insane truth of suicidal fantasy 
marks Woolf’s gesture toward Dasein, to being-there-in-the-world. Woolf sensed this in October 
1924, as she raced to her manuscript to recall and recite the “astounding fact” that had nearly 
escaped her as she “was interrupted” for some unknown reason. She didn’t want to forget to note 








Suicidal Fugitivity: Another Country and its “Powers of Darkness” 
 
When people no longer knew that a mystery could only be approached through form, people 
became—what the people of this time and place had become…They perished within their 
despised clay tenements, in isolation, passively, or actively together, in mobs, thirsting and 
seeking for, and eventually reeking of blood. Of rending and tearing there can never be any end, 
and God save the people for whom passion becomes impersonal! 
 
James Baldwin, Another Country, 1962 
 
 
James Baldwin’s 1962 novel, Another Country joins a long tradition in fiction of framing 
suicide both as a critique of the world as it is and as a way to imagine how we can begin to repair 
our broken relation to this world. What interests me most about Baldwin’s approach to Rufus 
Scott’s suicide, however, are the ways in which he frames Rufus’ suicidal activity, namely, his 
capacity for and the activity of imagining his own death by way of suicide.  
Apart from, for instance, Dostoevsky’s Alexei Kirillov or Woolf’s Septimus Warren 
Smith, whose suicidal ideation is made explicit from the outset of and materializes throughout 
Demons and Mrs. Dalloway respectively, Baldwin invites readers into the activity of Rufus’ 
suicidal ideation in subtler, almost reticent ways. Readers may not be certain that Rufus has been 
entertaining his own death.  
Although the narrator repeatedly alludes to the site of Rufus’ suicide in terms of the 
“distant bridge” and the “faint murmur[s]” and “whistles on the river” in ways that “seemed to be 
calling [Rufus],” Baldwin frames Rufus’ suicidal activity in ways less obvious to the genre of the 
suicide novel itself.1 In so doing, Baldwin’s narrative plays with what Berlant would describe as 
the stuff of an unforeclosed genre. In other words, Baldwin plays with readers’ “affective 
expectation(s) of the experience of watching something unfold.”2 Readers may sense that 





wandering, but it is difficult to anticipate that he may end up atop the George Washington 
Bridge.  
By framing the activity of Rufus’ present in such ways, Baldwin directs our attention to 
the character of Rufus’ wandering throughout the streets of New York. And like we saw in 
Benjamin’s diary entries and correspondence, we witness Rufus repeatedly encounter his 
surroundings in ways that set in motion fantastical remembrances. Yet Baldwin offers us more, 
namely, vignettes that inform us about Rufus’ lived experience from within his short past. We 
learn of the ways in which Rufus’ usual modes of survival—for instance, his jazz performance 
and his non-normative relationships—have historically kept him attached to his world. Yet we 
also learn that, despite his best efforts, his usual modes of survival have worn out. 
By way of Rufus’ remembrances, readers begin to understand his embeddedness in a 
world defined by hetero-masculinity and the color line—a world that has framed his queerness 
and blackness as both a spectacle and a problem. And as these conditions become more vivid, the 
world of the novel begins to feel more violent. Which is to say, throughout the intensification of 
Rufus’ wandering and the remembrances it sets in motion, Baldwin makes visible the 
vicissitudes of Rufus’ mimetic immersion within scenes of American violence. 
Readers come across descriptions of Rufus’ non-normative sexual encounters, for 
instance, in terms of “the violence of the deep,” or in terms of an “unforeseen violence which 
frightened him a little.” Readers find other routine behaviors suggestive of violence as well: the 
way in which Rufus “growled in his sleep and bared the white teeth in his dark face” in the dark 
movie theater; or the way he “turned, pulling up the collar” of his jacket as “the policeman 
passed him.” Others begin to notice such violence as well, as Vivaldo later reflects on Rufus, 





Rufus played the drums.” Each instance exemplifies the ways in which Another Country is shot 
through with moments in which Baldwin’s rhetoric illuminates affective experiences of 
normative violence that, as a result, found Rufus “in hiding, really, for nearly a month.”3 
Such scenes exhibit what Fred Moten, borrowing from Nathaniel Mackey, would 
describe as Rufus’ “fugitivity.” Yet more than simply being on-the-run, constantly trying to 
escape the violence that surrounds him, Rufus’ fugitivity takes place as a series of moments-in-
action. As Jack Halberstam describes Moten’s idiom, “fugitivity is not only escape,…[i]t is a 
being in motion that has learned that…there are spaces and modalities that exist separate from 
the logical, logistical, the housed and the positioned.”4 Which is to say, Rufus’ fugitivity names a 
mode of survival that I would like to develop more specifically as suicidal fugitivity,  embodying 
another of Moten’s concepts about radical black performance, namely, the role of improvisation. 
Moten writes, 
This movement cuts and augments the primal. If we return again and again to a certain passion, a 
passionate response to passionate utterance, horn-voice-horn over percussion, a protest, an 
objection, it is because it is more than another violent scene of subjection too terrible to pass on; 
it is the ongoing performance, the prefigurative scene of a (re)appropriation—the deconstruction 
and reconstruction, the improvisational recording and revaluation—of value, of the theory of 
value, of the theories of value.5 
 
However estranged from his usual modes of survival, Rufus is not wholly disconnected from nor 
disinterested in productive potentialities. As Rufus wanders the streets of New York, we learn 
that he had been “thinking of going downtown and waking up Vivaldo,” and that he “thought of 
walking up to Harlem” to visit his sister, Ida. In fits and starts, Rufus gestures towards re-
engaging with his friends, with his fellow musicians, and with his sister, all of whom had played 
a significant part in keeping him connected to his world. And along the way, we begin to suspect 
that Rufus is improvising. Which is to say, in addition to Rufus’ status-as-fugitive, we also learn 





that function not only in the service of his survival, but also in the service of something greater. 
As Baldwin writes, the “most impenetrable of mysteries moved in this darkness for less than a 
second, hinting of reconciliation.”6 
And most importantly, as argued in chapter one, suicidality is best when it’s shared. Yet 
as Baldwin’s narrative makes vivid Rufus’ lived history and productive potentiality, no other 
character throughout the novel is keyed in to the substance of Rufus’ mode of fugitivity in terms 
of suicidality. Within the world of the novel, the event of Rufus’ suicidal fugitivity and corporeal 
suicide fall on deaf ears. Yet Baldwin’s narrative mode of address, as Benjamin would argue, 
“embeds the event” of Rufus’ suicide in the “life of the storyteller in order to pass it on as 
experience” to Baldwin’s reader.7 Baldwin’s take on the suicide novel functions, then, not only 
as one of many modes of recognition for readers, but also, as Virginia Jackson argues, as one of 
many “modes of cultural creation” that can serve as “a shaping force in lived experience” for 
other people.8 In other words, by understanding the ways in which suicidal fugitivity can 
function as a mode of social activity, intensifying our affectivity and situating us within our lived 
histories, we may be able to re-appropriate its value in the service of social change, forestalling 
our tendency toward corporeal suicide itself. 
After exploring Baldwin’s mid-century preoccupations with genres of black social life 
and his critical commentary on literary aesthetics in the early 1960s, this chapter examines 
several scenes throughout Another Country’s long first chapter that illuminate the ways in which 
the activity of the last night of Rufus’ life highlights the social value of suicidal fugitivity, what 
suicidal fugitivity makes visible, and the ways in which we all may become more sensitive to its 
secret potentialities in the face of what too often transforms into the fatal risk of suicide itself. 





mentioned above, as something that is best shared. As Baldwin has written, “Perhaps such 
secrets, the secrets of everyone, were only expressed when the person laboriously dragged them 




ALL OF THE POWERS OF DARKNESS 
 
And who has not dreamed of violence? 
 
James Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” 1960 
 
  
Rufus’ suicidality names a product of Baldwin’s aesthetic preoccupations with mid-
century genres of black social life in the face of the color-line and white power. More 
specifically, I argue, the potentialities surrounding Rufus’ suicidal fugitivity illustrate one 
aesthetic expression of Baldwin’s idiom, “the powers of darkness,” drawn out below, that 
amplify the stakes of our own contemporary thinking about genres, as Berlant and Jackson 
would have it, as modes of both recognition and cultural creation. 
Throughout the middle twentieth century, James Baldwin was preoccupied with genre 
perhaps best illustrated in his contentious essays on the subject, especially when they referenced 
Richard Wright. Although Baldwin admired Wright, he had been at odds with Wright’s work for 
much of his adult life. Baldwin’s “quarrel” with Wright began with the publication of his 1949 
essay, “Everybody’s Protest Novel.” In his essay, Baldwin criticizes what he calls “novels of 
oppression written by Negroes” on the grounds that they tended merely to “add a raging, near-
paranoiac postscript” to the sentimental and glib likes of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.10 Of Wright’s 





Below the surface of this novel there lies, as it seems to me, a continuation, a complement of that 
monstrous legend it was written to destroy. Bigger is Uncle Tom’s descendant, flesh of his flesh, 
so exactly opposite a portrait that, when the books are placed together, it seems that the 
contemporary Negro novelist and the dead New England woman are locked together in a deadly, 
timeless battle; the one uttering merciless exhortations, the other shouting curses. And, indeed, 
within this web of lust and fury, black and white can only thrust and counter-thrust, long for each 
other’s slow, exquisite death; death by torture, acid, knives and burning; the thrust, the counter-
thrust, the longing making the heavier that cloud which blinds and suffocates them both, so that 
they go down into the pit together. Thus has the cage betrayed us all, this moment, our life, turned 
to nothing through our terrible attempts to insure it. For Bigger’s tragedy is not that he is cold or 
black or hungry, not even that he is American, black; but that he has accepted a theology that 
denies him life, that he admits the possibility of being sub-human and feels constrained, therefore, 
to battle for his humanity according to those brutal criteria bequeathed him at his birth. But our 
humanity is our burden, our life; we need not battle for it; we need only to do what is infinitely 
more difficult—that is, accept it. The failure of the protest novel lies in its rejection of life, the 
human being, the denial of his beauty, dread, power, in its insistence that it is his categorization 
alone which is real and which cannot be transcended.11 
 
Baldwin argues that Native Son, like Uncle Tom’s Cabin is replete with reification. 
Simultaneously, however, Baldwin’s essay announces an urgency to explore new literary genres 
that “make a further journey…to discover and reveal something a little closer to the truth.” By 
“truth,” Baldwin is thinking of aesthetic genres more capable of “devotion” to what he describes 
as the “indefinable, unpredictable” activity of “human being[s].”12 Baldwin’s emphasis on 
indefinability and unpredictability, here, are reminiscent of Marx. Where Marx famously asked, 
“for what is life but activity?,” Baldwin seems preoccupied with amplifying aesthetic genres, 
making them capable of representing that surplus of human activity and creativity that powers 
us.13 As José Esteban Muñoz has said, channeling Bloch, “surplus becomes that thing in the 
aesthetic that exceeds the functionalism of capitalist flows.”14 Baldwin is after a 
“(re)appropriation…of value, of the theory of value, of the theories of value,” as Moten has it. In 
short, Baldwin is interested in more. 
Twelve years later, and shortly after the death of Richard Wright, Baldwin published 





it.15 Like in his earlier essay, Baldwin again explores the inadequacy of then contemporary 
literature to confront and contend with issues of the color-line and white supremacy.  
Here, however, he tries to be more generous. Baldwin’s main theme, that any “real writer 
is always shifting and changing and searching,” announces a potentiality for literature that spans 
the essay’s three sections while building a sort of vociferous crescendo that highlights that which 
inspired in Baldwin the important place of Wright’s work for him from his youth. On the one 
hand, he writes that as a young man, he admired in Wright’s work its ability to have 
“expressed…the sorrow, the rage, and the murderous bitterness which,” as Baldwin confesses, 
“was eating up my life and the lives of those around me.” Wright expressed a pain that inspired 
Baldwin by way of dramatizations of racial violence. Wright’s work functioned as “an immense 
liberation and revelation” for Baldwin, and he describes Wright as his “ally,” “witness, and 
alas!,” his “father.”16 
Yet on the other hand, Baldwin’s comments throughout the essay become more and more 
punctuated by a syncopated and aggressive sense of contempt in the service of fashioning “one 
of the severest criticisms that can be leveled against [Wright].” Baldwin emphasizes Wright’s 
limitations, namely, his literary inadequacy to comment on violence, to wield it, and to inspire 
through his writing any productive potentialities that violence may set in motion. Baldwin argues 
that in Wright’s work, the “violence…is gratuitous and compulsive.”17 As Benjamin might have 
it, in Wright, mimetic immersion reveals the object of mimesis, yet falls short on revealing any 
potential value from within the mimetic production itself.  
Baldwin extends his critique, insisting that Wright never seemed to examine the historical 
conditions of possibility for racial violence in his work. Rather, he merely reported on them. 





Baldwin concludes, “Richard did not really know much about the present dimensions and 
complexity of the Negro problem [in the U.S.], and,” what’s worse, he “did not want to know.”18 
Although Baldwin had admired “how accurately” and “deeply” black social life had been 
“conveyed” throughout Wright’s work, his essay clamors after that excess, that power—the 
value in mimetic production that can be disclosed and produced if marshaled in the service of 
historical change. In the face of their personal “quarrel,” and within their broader, shared milieux 
both in the U.S. and in Paris, Baldwin maintains that Wright “paid a price,” a “hidden, terrible 
price.” Baldwin argues that Wright sought various forms of “exile” in his “ways of thought,” in 
his “work,” and more generally in his “ways of life” so much so that “Richard was able, at last, 
to live in Paris exactly as he would have lived, had he been a white man, here in America.”19 
Baldwin’s comments aside, surely no one can blame Wright. Who wouldn’t be tempted to seek 
exile in the face of the American color-line enforced by white power? 
As the essay comes to its fever pitch, Baldwin seeks after an avowal of the violent affects 
and fantasies borne of encounters with white power all in the service of mining these violent 
affects and fantasies for their potential to help imagine, create, and motor new conditions of 
possibility for humanity writ large. Moving from a question, to a series of statements, and 
ultimately to what I read as a form of aesthetic and political manifesto, Baldwin’s polemic begins 
to exceed vitriol. It begins to flirt with virulence. In short, Baldwin’s comments mime violence:  
For who has not hated his black brother? Simply because he is black, because he is 
brother. And who has not dreamed of violence? That fantastical violence which will drown in 
blood, wash away in blood, not only generation upon generation of horror, but which will also 
release one from the individual horror, carried everywhere in the heart. Which of us has 
overcome his past? And the past of a Negro is blood dripping down through the leaves, gouged-
out eyeballs, the sex torn from its socket and severed with a knife. But this past is not special to 
the Negro. This horror is also the past, and the everlasting potential, or temptation, of the human 
race. If we do not know this, it seems to me, we know nothing about ourselves, nothing about 
each other; to have accepted this is also to have found a source of strength—source of all our 






And it only intensifies from there, as Baldwin then draws out the stakes of his argument – the 
stakes of “ignoring,” or worse yet, the stakes of “turning away from” the potentialities of this 
“fantastical violence.” Baldwin continues, “I am suggesting that one of the prices an American 
Negro pays—or can pay—for what is called his ‘acceptance’ [under white power] is a profound, 
almost ineradicable self-hatred” that “corrupts every aspect of his living.”21 He is saying this 
about his friend. “Alas, Poor Richard” is an uncomfortable read. Yet although occasioned by 
Wright’s literary legacy, Baldwin’s argument is larger than his personal quarrel with Wright. For 
it is about the potential to imagine and create aesthetic genres capable of contending with white 
power.  
Baldwin had long been preoccupied with what he called “novels of oppression,” the 
“protest novel” or the “racial manifesto,” all various genres of black social life. He had also been 
long preoccupied with the power of literature as well, arguing that it is the “power of revelation 
which is the business of the novelist.” And although Baldwin had before described such 
revelatory powers in terms of “darkness,” here in 1961, he argues after an aesthetic genre 
capable of exposing the conditions of possibility for racial violence through powerful mimetic 
reappropriations of fantastical violence itself.22 Baldwin describes the aesthetic potential he 
refers to here as the “paradox” of the “everlasting potential” of the “fantastical violence” of “all 
of the powers of darkness,” and I read Baldwin’s idiom as a motion toward creating aesthetic 
genres of black social life capable of revealing a fantastically violent mode of lived experience, 
putting it on display, and making recognizable both its conditions of possibility and its 
productive potentiality for social change. Baldwin was interested in critical mimesis. 
What is at play here are the ways in which affect signals both a power to be affected, and 





by…external sources, is not a weakness but a strength, a power.” The “power to be affected,” 
Hardt continues, can function as a gauge of one’s “capacity to be really in the world, to register 
and feel its diverse powers,” for better or for worse.23 The powers of darkness name a power to 
be affected as a starting point—as a “source” of our strength. They name a will-to-avow all kinds 
of violence that invariably come “first.” They precede formal creation. By vigilantly 
acknowledging our experience of and capacity for violence, we can avow our lived histories as 
in fact violent.  
They also name a power to affect. By way of aesthetically reappropriating our 
experiences of violence, not only in response to white power, but also in response to the 
interconnected forces of political economy, misogyny, and homophobia, we can begin affecting 
and conceptualizing modes of survival in the service of creating avenues for social change 
amidst the ordinary, everyday, normative powers of capitalism.  
Yet perhaps most importantly, Baldwin argues that we must approach the paradox of all 
of the powers of darkness “with joy.” I read Baldwin’s appeal to joy, here, in the Spinozan sense. 
By making visible and avowing our experience of and capacity for violence, we expand and 
intensify our power to affect and be affected, lest we “never” be “at peace again,” and remain 
“out of touch” with ourselves “forever.”24 For Baldwin, the stakes are high. 
By tracing the ways in which Baldwin frames Rufus’s suicidal ideation as one expression 
of the “everlasting potential” of “the fantastical violence” of “all of the powers of darkness,” and 
its stakes, the remainder of this chapter addresses a series of questions about Another Country 
that privilege the value of Rufus’ suicidal ideation in their development and name that which 
readers witness Rufus take with him to the Hudson. Namely, how does Baldwin dramatize the 





product of those powers? And, how can we understand Rufus’ suicidal fugitivity as a 
performance of the value of the lived experience of black life only then lost in his lonely 
corporeal suicide?  
In this regard, I follow Berlant’s call to “slow down” and track the “resonances” of 
Rufus’ powers of darkness “across many scenes” that take shape within the novel’s long first 
chapter.25 Yet throughout the novel, the demand to avow the productive functions of all of the 
powers of darkness mark the most significant pattern of behavior in the novel’s struggle to find 
alternative genres of being with one another. Throughout the ordinary struggles dramatized in the 
narrative, suicidal fugitivity holds a particularly important place functioning both as a symptom 
of a waning of forms of sociality within a crisis while gesturing toward the productive value of 
fantastical violence itself in the service of imagining and creating alternative social possibilities, 
formations, and structures, all in the face of, as Baldwin insists, “the few hopes we have of 
surviving the wilderness which lies before us now.”26 
 
 
RUFUS’ SUICIDAL FUGITIVITY: REVERBERATIONS OF THE FANTASTICAL 
VIOLENCE OF ALL OF THE POWERS OF DARKNESS 
 
Perhaps the world is darker and therefore more real than we have allowed ourselves to believe.  
 
James Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” 1960 
 
 
Before examining the texture and function of Rufus’ powers of darkness, namely, his 
suicidal fugitivity, I would like to highlight the ways in which Another Country makes visible 
vicissitudes of affective experiences of violence in ways that may be gathered up in the service 
of tracking the power of normativity while seeking after new modes of survival within capitalist 





violence. Where violence, as a concept, predominantly describes behavior that tends toward 
purposefully causing pain, damage, or death to someone or something, much of the novel’s 
violence is quite familiar. The physical and emotional violence Rufus wields against Leona, or 
the domestic violence that Cass suffers at the hands of Richard are both cases-in-point. Most 
vividly, readers encounter Rufus’ corporeal suicide, a violent event set in motion in the absence 
of finding more socially viable ways of valuing queer, black life in the face white power, the 
commodification of black art, and the otherwise inexorable pain of misogyny and homophobia. 
In short, in its many scenes, we recognize violence in familiar ways.  
Readers also encounter, however, other experiences of violence that register in more 
subtle, yet powerful ways. We witness, for instance, an “extraordinary violence” in Cass’ voice 
that “caused a few heads to turn;” or the way in which “the light,” as Vivaldo and Ida ascend 
from the subway, “seemed to fall with an increased hardness, examining and inciting the city 
with an unsparing violence…;” or the way in which Eric is struck as he follows Yves through 
Paris as the “violence of the music…[fills] the soft, spring air;” or even the way Vivaldo and 
Cass encounter a “violence of cars, great trucks, green buses lumbering across town, and boys, 
dark boys, pushing wooden wagons full of clothes.”27 Baldwin’s rhetoric is replete with 
references to violent affectivity that amplify the activity of the novel in ways less examined in 
scholarship. 28   
Kevin Ohi, for instance, investigates what he insists is the novel’s “refusal to specify a 
scene or expression of localized grief.”29 I contend, however, that the entirety of the novel 
functions as that very traumatic scene whose expression is made visible, recognizable, and 
avowable to readers by way of its pervasive references to affective experiences of violence. 





expression of grief, but surely readers encounter throughout the novel an affectivity organized 
and informed by countless moments of ordinary, everyday, flashpoints of trauma that constitute 
the collective crises of capitalist normativity. As Berlant has argued, “crisis is not exceptional to 
history or consciousness but a process embedded in the ordinary that unfolds in stories about 
navigating what’s overwhelming.”30 
Baldwin’s literary deployment of this latter vicissitude of violence tracks moments of 
affective intensity, specifically, the power to be affected. Yet Baldwin’s is more nuanced than 
the precognitive sensory experience of our world found in the tradition of Spinoza’s “affectus,”31 
or Deleuze’s “intensity.”32 Rather, historical and cultural experiences of normativity are 
mediated by the novel’s affective intensity. Which is to say, the vicissitudes of affective 
experiences of violence in Another Country function as a way to historically record and make 
recognizable for readers the damaging effects of normativity in its characters’ lives as they 
scramble to find alternative modes of survival.  
In each of the moments mentioned above, affective intensities register as violence in 
proximity to confrontations with normativity in its ordinary, everyday circulation. The 
extraordinary violence in Cass’ voice indexes the extent to which she experiences the trauma of 
her failing, heteronormative marriage while entertaining the possibility of a nonmonogamous 
affair with Eric. Likewise, as Vivaldo and Ida resurface from the subway tunnel into the city 
streets they experience the traumatic, unsparing violence of the daylight shining on their 
interracial pairing. Eric’s encounter with the traumatic violence of the music strikes him as he 
cruises after Yves through the streets of Paris. And yes, even the mundane circulation of traffic 
all register as traumatic violence as each seeks after non-normative modes of survival. 





power to be affected by white supremacy, misogyny, homophobia—in sum, our power to be 
affected by the modern, traumatic violence of normativity exacerbated under capitalism. Rufus’, 
however, stand apart. 
While the dramatization of Rufus’ suicide that closes chapter one occurs in the novel’s 
present, that present is informed through a series of Rufus’ wandering remembrances set in 
motion by his suicidal fugitivity that function to inform readers of the lived experience of the 
violence of normativity. Rufus’ remembrances give meaning to the opacity of his wandering 
throughout New York alongside other people, amidst the city traffic, and underneath the looming 
presence of its infrastructure. The first flashback occurs early in the chapter, as Baldwin invites 
readers to resonate alongside the fantastical violence of Rufus’ historical mode of survival in 
various ways that make vivid his experience of having lost his mode as we return to the novel’s 
present. 
Rufus stops outside a jazz bar. While he is curious about heading in, he fears humiliation 
in light of his circumstances. He stands in mere proximity to the action. As a couple exits the bar, 
the “warmth, the smell, of people, whiskey, beer and smoke” set in motion a remembrance that, 
although centered around the memory of Leona, inform readers about a confluence of life-events 
from his past. As the narrator explains, “For to remember Leona was also—somehow—to 
remember…his mother,…his father,…his sister,…the streets of Harlem, the boys on the stoops, 
the girls behind the stairs on the roofs, the white policeman who had taught him how to hate…”33 
As Berlant might say, Rufus’ remembrances mark a “gathering up” of his history, including 
“reflections” that both “mark its force” and trace the “expression involved in its circulation.”34 
For Rufus, that expression is in part informed by a memory of receiving “his first set of drums—





an imperative that announces the ways in which Rufus had remained attached to his world. 
Spoken by Rufus’ memory of his father, yet implicating all of Harlem, Baldwin writes of “the 
beat:” 
A nigger, said his father, lives his whole life, lives and dies according to a beat. Shit, he humps to 
that beat and the baby he throws up in there, well, he jumps to it and comes out nine months later 
like a goddamn tambourine. The beat: hands, feet, tambourines, drums, pianos, laughter, curses, 
razor blades; the man stiffening with a laugh and a growl and a purr and the woman moistening 
and softening with a whisper and a sigh and a cry. The beat—in Harlem in the summertime one 
could almost see it, shaking above the pavements and the roof.35 
 
If the fantastical violence of all of the powers of darkness names the method by which, Baldwin 
argues, we garner and marshal our strength, then the beat of Harlem names one of its historical 
modes of survival, having dictated the meter, tempo, and rhythm of Rufus’ circulation. Although 
itself mediated by gender-normative power—with a laugh and a growl and a purr, with a whisper 
and a sigh and a cry—Rufus’ beat carries with it a means for disrupting or “shaking up” 
normativity. Examined most immediately, is the aesthetic way in which Rufus had performed his 
survival on stage, as Vivaldo only later reflects, mentioned above, he had “never associated 
Rufus with violence,…but now he remembered how Rufus played the drums.”36 
Outside the jazz bar, as Rufus “began to walk, very slowly now, away from the music, 
with his hands in his pockets and his head down,” we enter the flashback as he remembers a 
night some seven months prior, the night he met Leona. “It had been a good night.” He was 
performing on drums in a jazz band who had been playing for an audience, the multitude, 
composed of “all kinds of people,” “white and black, high and low, people who came for the 
music and people who spent their lives in joints for other reasons.” Here, amongst the 
“musicians, who were his friends, who respected him,” Rufus is an affective participant within a 
lively crowd.37 And what’s more, the members of this crowd are primed to encounter an 





time because they sensed that, for whatever reason, this crowd was solidly with them; and the 
white people were having a good time because nobody was putting them down for being white.” 
Inviting us into a remembered space of the lived experience of the beat of black survival, the 
“joint,” as Baldwin insists, “was jumping:” 
There was some pot on the scene and [Rufus] was a little high. He was feeling great. 
And, during the last set, he came doubly alive because the saxophone player, who had been way 
out all night, took off on a terrific solo. He was a kid of about the same age as Rufus, from some 
insane place like Jersey City or Syracuse, but somewhere along the line he had discovered he 
could say it with a saxophone. He had a lot to say. He stood there, wide-legged, humping the air, 
filling his barrel chest, shivering in the rags of his twenty-odd years, and screaming through the 
horn Do you love me? Do you love me? Do you love me? And, again, Do you love me? Do you 
love me? Do you love me? This, anyway, was the question Rufus heard, the same phrase, 
unbearably, endlessly, and variously repeated, with all of the force the boy had.38 
 
Rufus’ remembrance invites readers into a space of the lived experience of black survival, a 
space at once fantastically violent and aesthetically productive. More than a mere drug-fueled 
stage performance in which the band performs from “way out,” gesturing toward some “insane 
place,” this scene assumes the character of a fantasy in other key ways. As mentioned in chapter 
three, Laplanche and Pontalis describe fantasy as an “imaginary scene in which the subject is a 
protagonist, representing the fulfillment of a wish in a manner that is distorted to a greater or 
lesser extent by defensive processes.” For Laplanche and Pontalis, fantasies function as “scripts” 
in and through which a protagonist can experience a “permutation of roles” that at once can take 
the shape of “participant” and “observer.” Baldwin’s scene of musical ensemble, here, is ripe for 
representing fantasy, for performing jazz music in an ensemble requires an intimate permutation 
of otherwise individual and improvisational musical scripts, a reciprocal form in and through 
which the protagonists both encounter the sounds of others while contributing their own, 
speaking back. And within this fantastical scene, Baldwin frames one of those rare moments in 





moment of the intense joy of affective collectivity experienced when each performer feeds off of 
and also serves one another while their subjectivities blend together, and also, with the crowd. 
While the saxophonist takes the lead, the narrator reinforces the ways in which the “men 
on the stand stayed with him, cool and at a little distance, adding and questioning and 
corroborating, holding it down” all the while knowing that “the [saxophonist] was blowing for 
every one of them.” And just as this remembered scene enters Rufus’s mind from his wandering 
present, he alludes to a past shared by the saxophonist himself. As Baldwin writes, the “boy was 
blowing with his lungs and guts out of his own short past; somewhere in that past, in the gutters 
or gang fights or gang shags; in the acrid room, on the sperm-stiffened blanket, behind marijuana 
or the needle, under the smell of piss in the precinct basement, he had received the blow from 
which he never would recover” (9). Baldwin emphasizes moments of the lived experience of 
black life from which the musical fantasy emerges in terms of violence—the gutters and the gang 
fights; the precinct basements—an appeal to police violence made vivid throughout Baldwin’s 
work. Throughout this confluence of violence, the saxophonist had “received the blow” from 
which his repeated question emerges, “Do you love me? Do you love me? Do you love me? And 
again, Do you love me? Do you love me? Do you love me?” The saxophonist’s “voice” both 
speaks for the group, while registering the group’s collective power to be affected. 
And yet more than a question, Baldwin’s syncopated italics constitutes an imperative: 
“Do…love…me.” The imperative registers a desire for the power to affect set in motion by 
shared experiences of racial violence performatively reappropriated and directed toward an 
audience who “were being assaulted by the saxophonist” (my emphasis). In these ways the 
aesthetics of the musical stage performance carry with it a shared history of, and a fantastically 





change. And the “joint” was “jumping,” which is to say, the performative, fantastical violence 
wielded by the jazz ensemble embodies a criticality not lost on the crowd. As Judith Butler 
suggests, critical performance “depends on a context and reception in which subversive 
confusions can be fostered.”39 And Baldwin dramatizes precisely such a reception within the 
underground of the jazz club. As in the face of the ensemble’s fantastical violence, he writes, the 
“silence of the listeners became strict with abruptly focused attention, cigarettes were unlit, and 
drinks stayed on the tables; and in all of the faces, even the most ruined and most dull, a curious, 
wary light appeared.”40 The change in the audiences’ collective physiognomy (cigarettes were 
unlit! Drinks stayed on the tables!) indexes their confrontation with the band’s aesthetic 
reappropriation of racial violence. The group’s power to affect transforms into the audience’s 
power to be affected. Through the affectively collective, fantastical reappropriation of violence, 
backed by Rufus’s role as metronome—as the pace-setter, as the time-keeper, as the aesthetic 
historian of the productive, lived experience of black survival—the audiences’ “focused 
attention” and their “curious” affect indexes their collective will-to-avow the fantastical violence 
of the beat of Harlem. The performance asks a question in an improvisational, violent mode to an 
audience who becomes affected, and through that affection, avows the aesthetic powers of 
darkness. In short, they loved it. 
Rufus’ participation in this fantastical space, namely a fugitive space “way out” toward 
which he “took off” made him come “doubly alive.”41 And I argue that Baldwin’s musical 
fantasy scene dramatizes the powers of darkness by making recognizable the radical aesthetics of 
black social life formed from within the violently lived experience of black social survival. As 
Jared Sexton claims, black social life is “not” lived in the “world that the world lives in” but 





encounter a fugitive space, an alternative, fantastical space formed through fantastical violence to 
which affects may attach in the absence of more readily available and viably-lived structural 
alternatives. And, as demonstrated not only by Rufus, and not only amongst his ensemble, but 
within the totality of the underground of the jazz club itself, this collectivity of Baldwin’s 
unprecedented multitude engaged in this practice of a communal, fantastical, performatively 
productive violence with joy. 
 Baldwin’s first flashback scene lays the ground for valuing an aesthetic product of the 
fantastical violence of all the powers of darkness backed by and experienced within the beat of 
survival in Harlem. By aesthetic product, I mean to characterize the jazz performance as what 
Laplanche and Pontalis describe in the “more restricted” sense of the French, “fantasme.” Set 
apart from the German, “phantasie,” which emphasizes the “world of imagination, its contents 
and the creative activity which animates it,” the French, “fantasme,” they argue, “refers to a 
specific imaginary production,” one whose performance no less directs our attention to its world 
of creative activity, but one that nonetheless emphasizes an aesthetic product.43 If in Baldwin’s 
flashback scene we encounter the collectivity of the jazz performance as an aesthetic product of 
the fantastical violence of all the powers of darkness, then he begins to address the urgency of its 
reception as readers leave the fantastical space of non-normative survival and re-enter the 
material reality of Rufus’ normative world. As Baldwin brings his readers back into the novel’s 
present, we are taken through a syncopated mixture of various flashbacks whose acceleration 
begins to crystalize for us our understanding of the intensifying conditions of Rufus’ crisis. 
* 
After he had just stepped down from stage in the Harlem jazz club, Rufus met Leona, a 





He was primed to improvise yet again. She agrees to accompany him to his friend’s after-party. 
As they move with the crowd, and with “much erotic confusion,” they “poured into the streets.” 
No longer shielded by the protective atmosphere of the underground, the threat of violence 
disrupts Rufus’ mood almost immediately. As the crowd disperses, “the policemen strolled by,” 
and Rufus “suddenly realized that Leona would soon be the only white person left.” The 
policemen function here not only as an affront to Rufus’ blackness, but also to Rufus’ and 
Leona’s sexual viability, and this made him “uneasy and his uneasiness made him angry.”44 
Readers witness a moment that registers Rufus’ power to be affected by the violence of 
normativity, a violence that would reverberate throughout Rufus and Leona’s short, strangled 
relationship. 
As Rufus and Leona begin to build their non-normative relationship, they encounter few 
resources to maintain its viability. Readers witness the misery of their experience. After Vivaldo 
stops by Rufus’ apartment, meeting Leona for the first time, the three head out on a walk in an 
effort to show Leona around. And as they had encountered the threat of policemen earlier upon 
exiting the protective cover of the jazz club, they immediately encounter, again, the violence of 
white power as they make their way out into the city.  
They encountered the big world when they went out into the Sunday streets. It stared 
unsympathetically out at them from the eyes of the passing people; and Rufus realized that he had 
not thought at all about this world and its power to hate and destroy. He had not thought at all 
about his future with Leona, for the reason that he had never considered they had one. Yet, here 
she was, clearly intending to stay if he would have her. But the price was high: trouble with the 
landlord, with the neighbors, with all the adolescents in the Village and all those who descended 
during the week ends.45 
 
Rufus and Leona are subsumed into the violent power of their broader world, a world that 
receives them, their coupling, as itself a violent affront to normativity. The fantastical 
potentiality of their spaces of fugitive life is inexorably dismantled with every glance, sneer, and 





open for new, non-normative potentialities, they encounter an absence of resources within their 
greater situatedness whose refusal to accept their arrangement drives up the price of their non-
normative potential. In short, Baldwin makes visible the absence of genres through which Rufus 
and Leona may imagine a productive future.  
And they find no resources between themselves, as Baldwin writes, “they had no 
equipment” with which to enter their world. Baldwin informs us of the ways in which Rufus’ 
attachments to ideologies of gender normativity begin to transform into a material violence 
toward Leona. “‘I love him,’ [Leona] said, helplessly, ‘I love him, I can’t help it. No matter what 
he does to me. He’s just lost and he beats me because he can’t find nothing else to hit.’” Finding 
no way to gather and marshal resources, Rufus begins engaging in corporeal violence, using 
Leona, “in whatever way he felt would humiliate her most.” And as we learn that “it was not 
love he felt during these acts of love,” but rather a sense of having been “drained” and “utterly 
unsatisfied,” Rufus begins to flee “from the raped white woman into the bars” in which he 
“began to pick fights with the white men.” Rufus’ violence disrupts Leona’s workplace, and their 
violent arguments and fights find them evicted from a series of apartments. Finding no prospects 
for work and losing touch with his everyday modes of survival, Rufus struggles as the “eyes of 
his friends told him that he was falling,” a realization that neither he nor Leona had the resources 
necessary to survive the violence of white power, nor the powers that fuel gender normativity 
manifested in his own hypermasculine behavior.46 
In the absence of resources either within their greater environment or between 
themselves, Rufus struggles to conceptualize what is happening. “‘I don’t know up from down. I 
don’t know what I’m doing no more.’”47 Rufus has no genre through which to imagine a 





in its place something much less helpful—indeed, something strikingly dangerous. Baldwin 
makes clear that where his multitude exhibited the “presence of some cancer which had been 
operating in them, invisibly, all along,” that cancer “might, now, be operating in oneself,” 
namely, in Rufus.48 In the absence of any clear way in which to conceptualize what is happening, 
Rufus begins to pathologically internalize the causes of his experience of violence in ways that 
exacerbate the intensity of his crisis. “I guess there is something the matter with my head.’”49 
And as Baldwin brings readers, now, fully into the novel’s present, after Leona’s admission into 
Bellevue and subsequent transfer to yet another “home—down South somewhere,”50 Rufus 
reflects on his violent history with Leona in conversation with Vivaldo, a reflection that makes 
vivid the intensity of Rufus’ crisis crystalized within his sensorium. Baldwin writes, 
 Yet, he was aware, perhaps for the first time in his life, that nothing would stop it, 
nothing: this was himself. Rufus was aware of every inch of Rufus. He was flesh: flesh, bone, 
muscle, fluid, orifices, hair, and skin. His body was controlled by laws he did not understand. Nor 
did he understand what force within this body had driven him into such a desolate place.51 
 
Now, firmly situated within the novel’s present alongside Rufus within his crisis, Baldwin’s 
readers encounter the lonely, destructive ways in which Rufus pathologically lodges the 
conditions of possibility for his crisis within his own body, superseding the place of his usual 
modes of survival. As Ann Cvetkovich has argued, “depression is another manifestation of forms 
of biopower that produce…an even less visible form of violence that takes the form of minds and 
lives gradually shrinking into despair and hopelessness.”52 He’s traded one historically black 
mode of survival for another, more problematic alternative. As Baldwin writes, “[Rufus] had 
fled, so he had thought, from the beat of Harlem, which was simply the beat of his own heart.” 
The violent circulation of normative biopolitics overpowers both his engagement, however 
fraught, with his usual mode of survival and his non-normative potentiality. By dramatizing 





resources necessary to understand his experience of the horrifying violence of biopower, 
Baldwin makes recognizable the otherwise “less visible” ways in which normativity can infiltrate 
non-normative potentialities and undermine their materialization from the outset. With his appeal 
to this circulation of normative violence, Baldwin writes, “whatever was coming had already 
begun,…the master switch had been thrown.”53 And we enter Rufus’ final fantasy sequence in 
real-time as he and Vivaldo head out for pizza and drinks within the crisis of the novel’s present. 
* 
 Rufus’ last experience of fantastical violence begins at Benno’s alongside Vivaldo and 
the multitude as Rufus begins to experience his present in ways that “seemed terribly strange to 
him.” Readers are invited within the contours of Rufus’ improvisational fantasy from within his 
crisis, the experience of which manifests simultaneously as an intensification and a distancing 
that, Baldwin writes, “came in waves.” “As though he remembered it from a dream,” Rufus 
“recognized faces, gestures, [and] voices.” Yet within his dreamlike state, “no one,” however 
“looked his way.” “[N]o one seemed…to recognize him.” Which is to say, Rufus struggles to 
recognize himself. Rather than hearing the voices of the others, Baldwin writes, “[a] voice spoke 
at his ear.” Within his experience, he appears disassociated from those around him. “The seats 
the others had occupied were like a chasm now between Rufus and the white boy and the white 
girl.” He is at once materially present while fantastically elsewhere, in close proximity to some 
strange holding space, a space of his suicidal fugitivity. Rufus’ experience of the air begins to 
intensify as the “air,” Baldwin writes, “was close.”54 Rufus’ fantastical experience from within 
his crisis is one in which he encounters an affectively intensified materiality—as Berlant argues, 





carry him away from that other company at the bar, washing him out into the streets of New 
York in which he experiences his newly discovered mode of suicidal survival. 
Baldwin, again, in his syncopated style, punctuates Rufus’ location within the city with 
an affectively intensified sense of materiality. As he “crossed Sheridan Square and walked 
slowly along West Fourth Street,” Rufus’s sense of proximity to those around him continues to 
expand. “He felt as removed from them, as he walked slowly along, as he might have felt from a 
fence, a farmhouse, a tree, seen from a train window: coming closer and closer, the details 
changing every instant as the eye picked them out; then pressing against the window with the 
urgency of a messenger or a child; then dropping away, diminishing, vanished, gone forever.” As 
mentioned in chapter one, “private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is 
only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital.”56 As Baldwin writes, “it was not his 
fence, his farmhouse, or his tree.”57 Yet, rather than encounter the material aesthetic of Rufus’ 
surroundings, he again encounters his world through the bourgeois sensorium influenced by 
capitalism.  
Where Berlant argues for the value of the activity within our “impasse,” the value of 
Rufus’ activity is repeatedly forestalled by the circulation of normativity, as Baldwin continues 
marking Rufus’ material location in terms of a potentiality to reconnect with his lived past only 
then washed over by the enigma of his present. As he “passed Cornelia Street,” he remembers his 
friend Eric’s old apartment, the “lamplight in the corners, Eric under the light, books falling over 
everything, and the bed unmade.” Rufus and Eric had been lovers, and as if desiring to continue 
within the memory, Rufus’ material present violently intervenes, “Eric—and he was on Sixth 
Avenue, traffic lights and the lights of taxis blazing around him.” The normal circulation of 





productive potentialities of his material world. He wanders, as Berlant would have it, 
“dogpaddling around” the “traffic,” the “taxis,” “two girls and two boys,” a “[h]alf a dozen 
men.” Treading down the subway steps, Rufus changes his last five-dollar bill, and as he passes 
the turnstile, “people came, rushing and loud, pushing past him as though they were swimmers 
and he nothing but an upright pole in the water.” Unable to reconnect to any material 
potentialities within his environment, we see that Rufus has attached to something else, a 
fantastical buoy that keeps him afloat. As he approaches the subway platform, the fantastical 
experience of his crisis intensifies as he is, again, struck by a memory from his past. Yet this 
memory evoked “something new.” Something new “began to awaken in him.” But rather than re-
situate Rufus within his historicity, Baldwin writes, “it increased his distance; it increased his 
pain.”58 And we enter Rufus’ last performance with the fantastical violence of all of the powers 
of darkness performed only to himself—intensifying the question of the necessity of the 
reception of suicidality. 
Reminiscent of his scathing polemic against Richard Wright, Baldwin’s dramatization of 
Rufus’ last violent fantasy opens with a series of questions, moves towards a series of 
statements, and closes with an appeal to an affective experience of joy. It takes shape in two acts 
separated by a disjunction. I hear the violence of Baldwin’s two-act fantasy as another 
reverberation of the everlasting potential of the fantastical violence of all of the powers of 
darkness—its potential to help us imagine and explore suicidal fugitivity as a mode of being in 
the world. But here the key has changed, or perhaps its mode; surely its seating arrangement. 
What I mean is that in Rufus’ first fantasy his protagonist-position had been an active one. 
Within that fantasy we can clearly see from whom the fantastical violence emanates. In his last 





of his multitude initiate its violence. We don’t know with whom we are asked to contend. In this 
last fantasy the initial violence emanates from an abyss, from the “violence of the deep” which is 
always-already a potential, as Baldwin repeats, “It could happen. It could happen…” The 
abysmal, watery depths make us wonder to whom Baldwin poses his question? Nor within the 
fantasy do we witness any imaginary gesture toward the creation of new genres. Which is to say, 
where in his first fantasy we encounter the value of an aesthetic product shared with an audience, 
here, within his last improvisational fantasy we encounter both an absence of an audience which 
gives way to total annihilation—an evacuation of potentiality itself. And where the lived 
experience of violence makes possible its mimetic production as fantasy, we encounter, again, 
Rufus provoked by a memory. He recalls from his childhood the way in which he “had not dared 
to let go of [his mother’s] hand” on that “dangerous” subway platform. Rufus waits, “alone with 
all these people,” “in acquired calmness, for the train,” and fantasizes: 
But suppose something, somewhere, failed, and the yellow lights went out and no one 
could see, any longer, the platform’s edge? Suppose these beams fell down? He saw the train in 
the tunnel, rushing under water, the motorman gone mad, gone blind, unable to decipher the 
lights, and the tracks gleaming and snarling senselessly upward forever, the train never stopping 
and the people screaming at windows and doors and turning on each other with all the 
accumulated fury of their blasphemed lives, everything gone out of them but murder, breaking 
limb from limb and splashing in blood, with joy—for the first time, joy, joy, after such a long 
sentence in chains, leaping out to astound the world, to astound the world again. Or, the train in 
the tunnel, the water outside, the power failing, the walls coming in, and the water not rising like 
a flood but breaking like a wave over the heads of these people, filling their crying mouths, filling 
their eyes, their hair, tearing away their clothes and discovering the secrecy which only the water, 
by now, could use. It could happen. It could happen; and he would have loved to see it happen, 
even if he perished, too.59 
 
One of Baldwin’s powers of darkness names a will-to-avow our collective historical engagement 
in violence, and Rufus’ fantastical reappropriation of violence, here, begs some questions. 
Namely, who comes to know and avow their collective engagement in violence? Whose 





modes of survival and avenues toward social change? In short, what is the value of Rufus 
suicidal fantasy? I don’t mean to be cavalier, but we know where he’s headed. 
I argue that the value of Rufus’ violent fantasy takes shape, here, in the passage’s first 
act, before the disjunction. The second sets in motion its risk. The fantasy’s first act is a fantasy 
of usurpation and avowal. In the absence of the multitude’s general will-to-avow their collective 
engagement in violence, Rufus fantasizes that the subway’s structural collapse usurps that 
demand. Rather, the multitude’s passive experience of violence manifests as an invitation-to-
violence. And as they openly accept that invitation, they encounter, “for the first time,” the joy of 
their acceptance and engagement in murder and dismemberment awash with blood. The value of 
the first act of Rufus’ fantasy is that it makes visible the multitude’s performative avowal of their 
historical deployment of violence, as their collective violence “leap[s] out to astound the world” 
of Rufus’ fantasy. Or, as Baldwin insists, leaps out “to astound the world again.” 
The violence of the second act takes a different shape. If the first act functions as a 
fantasy of usurpation and avowal, then the second act extends that usurpation, annihilating the 
possibility for avowal. Within the second act, the violence simply evacuates the multitude 
leaving in their place a violence no one can avow, a violence “which,” Baldwin writes, “only the 
water, by now, could use.” Which is to say, the violence of the second act argues no agent but 
itself. In the absence of avowal, Rufus encounters no audience within his fantasy to witness his 
fantasy’s disclosure. He’s on an imagined stage with no captive audience. He is his only witness. 
In the absence of any avowal of violence, Rufus imagines no productive way to process his 
experience, let alone imagine ways of valuing his own life. He can only pathologically 
internalize, in biopolitical fashion, the causes for his experience of violence, as Rufus has 





this second act where we encounter Rufus’ most explicit motion toward suicide. Rufus would 
rather die alongside the multitude. He would encounter its materialization, “even if he perished, 
too,” with joy. For “he would have loved to see it happen.” His death would take with it the pain 
of the violence his only recourse has been to internalize rather than share. 
As Baldwin continues to trace Rufus’ train ride north, others continue to board the train. 
Yet rather than encounter this multitude as a collective potentiality, Rufus encounters them 
estranged from one another, as Baldwin writes, “chained together in time and in space, and by 
history,…all…in a hurry to get away from each other.” Rather than tap any collective 
potentiality, Rufus declares, “We’ve been fucked for fair.”  
At 125th Street in Harlem it was “mainly black people who left.” The train becomes 
“lighter,” and Rufus “[s]uddenly he knew that he was never going home any more.”61 As he feels 
the violent presence of the whiteness, he begins to feel a connection to a place “far away from 
them.” Rufus exits 178th Street, and as he approaches the George Washington Bridge, we again 
encounter his heightened sense of materiality. Although he did “not yet see the water. He felt it. 
…it was over there…”—another sensation Blanchot describes as a heightened “attention to the 
minutiae often symptomatic in those who are about to die.”62 As Rufus approaches the center of 
the bridge, he asks a question not dissimilar from that of his saxophonist, “Ain’t I your baby, 
too?” But like in his fantasy, no one is there to respond. Dropping his head and looking “down at 
the water,” we witness Rufus’ mimetic apperception. “It was cold and the water would be cold. 
He was black and the water was black.”63 
Baldwin deployment of mimetic apprehension brings his readers to a painful affective 
and conceptual space. Within this space, readers encounter an overlap between the vicissitudes 





ears. Finding no sociality to bear witness to the disclosure of Rufus’ fantasy, Baldwin figures this 
space as a space of death—a racialized space of suicidal fugitivity, the vanishing point where 
Rufus’ lived experience of the violence of white power intersects with his conceptualization of 
his blackness itself –“He was black and the water was black.” Readers encounter Rufus’ suicide 
as a figure for the paradoxical question of all of the powers of darkness—its productive 
potentialities shot through with its potentiality to reify a violation—the paradox Baldwin insists 
that we must “accept…with joy”? It’s excruciating.  
 Of the many questions Fred Moten raises in his article, “The Case of Blackness,” there is 
one that shares with Baldwin’s this difficulty. Moten asks, “How can we fathom a social life that 
tends toward death, that enacts a kind of being-toward-death, and which, because of such a 
tendency and enactment, maintains a terribly beautiful vitality?”64 Like Baldwin, Moten 
addresses his paradoxical question by exploring the overlap of spaces. He examines what he calls 
the “unstable zone” between, on the one hand, “the fact of blackness,” namely, “the color black,” 
its concept, and on the other, the “lived experience of the black.” Moten argues that by 
considering that zone, we can begin to see the ways in which we mistake the lived experience of 
blackness for its concept.  
And we see the ways in which Rufus’ suicidal fugitivity, perhaps many of ours, resides in 
that zone between the lived experience of the violence of capitalist modernity and its 
internalized, biopolitically-reified tendency to mistake effects for causes. By paying attention to 
the value of Rufus’ suicidal fugitivity with all its consistent appeals to its social nature, its 
appeals to a multitude within the sequences themselves, we can begin to see how it is possible to 
mistranslate—to mistake Rufus’s violent suicide for a mere personal problem, a mere personal 





fugitivity and corporeal suicide present themselves more and more, here, as modes of social 
activity to which affects may attach in the absence of those who may bear witness to social 
scripts teaching us to better understand and value black experience.  
 Yet Baldwin asks us to encounter the paradox of the powers of darkness with joy, a 
difficult task for Rufus in the absence of an audience. Which is to say, where Rufus finds no 
sociality to bear witness to his fantasy’s disclosure, Baldwin does. As insisted upon in chapter 
one, suicidality is best shared, and Baldwin’s readers function as those to whom he offers his 
own mimetic reappropriation of all of the powers of darkness. Readers are invited to avow or 
disavow the power of their disclosure. As Baldwin later writes, “Perhaps such secrets, the secrets 
of everyone, were only expressed when the person laboriously dragged them into the light of the 
world, imposed them on the world, and made them part of the world’s experience.”65 
The joy Baldwin invites readers to experience is a joy toward which Moten, too, gestures. 
Within radical black aesthetics, Moten argues that we find “the troubling of and the capacity for 
the rehabilitation of the human.” Yet rather than some ontologically circumscribed, congealed 
scene of rehabilitation through which some reified subject may reemerge, Moten gestures toward 
a present-progressive “movement of becoming,” as Marx would have it.66 He writes, 
But perhaps only the dead can strive for the quickening power that animates what has been 
relegated to the pathological. Perhaps the dead are alive and escaping. Perhaps ontology is best 
understood as the imagination of this kind of escape as a kind of social gathering…Seen in this 
light, black(ness) is, in the dispossessive richness of its colors, beautiful.67 
 
Moten’s poetically syncopated use of the adverb “perhaps” stresses the uncertainty of the 
passage’s suggestion—the uneasiness associated with the aestheticization of death. Yet through 
this uncertainty there remains a present-progressive potentiality of lively aesthetic re-imagining. 
His passage privileges a lively, ongoing question rather than some set of dead propositions—a 





question that may read: How can we resuscitate from the beauty of the dead that which may 
function not merely in the service of survival, but in the service of the present-progressive 
movement of becoming of new forms of social reproduction? 
“Ain’t I your baby, too?” 
Rufus’ suicidal fugitivity functions not only as a mimetic rehearsal of black estrangement 
under capitalism in the United States, and not only as a strong critique of that shitty world, but 
also as a figure for actively imagining the material conditions of possibility for a sociality on a 
horizon, perhaps one less fugitive, not to mention less suicidal. Rufus’ suicidal fugitivity 
enunciates an imperative to imagine another world, or “another country,” as the title of 
Baldwin’s novel suggests, lest we disavow our potentiality and ignore, “perhaps,” as Baldwin 








“Until Further Notice…” 
 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to inhabit the liveliness of suicidal activity in an 
effort to highlight the ways in which its liveliness reveals an avowal of our condition of 
estrangement under capitalist modernity, on the one hand, and on the other, the ways in which 
suicidal activity—as a mode of being modern—amplifies our ability to imagine new modes and 
forms of social reproduction. Yet throughout all the scenes of suicidality this dissertation has 
examined, the suicidal protagonists return to their estranged lives, and die.  
After expressing the aesthetic value of her suicidal past, for instance, Fleur de Marie is 
admitted to a life of servitude in a convent, only to be murdered. Septimus Warren Smith, after 
situating himself within his lived history by way of his suicidal fantasies, only suffers further 
biopolitical surveillance, and is impaled. Clarissa Dalloway, for all the affectivity her suicidality 
sets in motion, remains deadened within her estranged life as an aristocratic housewife, clinging 
to the idea of a sociality her world forbids her. And, of course, Rufus, whose suicidal fugitivity 
exemplifies that the only decent American mode-of-being is always-already queer and black, is 
recovered from the Hudson, while his secret flows onward to the Atlantic. 
All of which is to say, even though we know that suicidal activity can make vivid the 
social conditions of our estrangement and the ways in which, under other conditions, we might 
mitigate our tendency toward modern suicidality itself, people still die.  
Many of us kill ourselves, and it is difficult to maintain the aesthetic affectivity that 
suicidality makes available in the face of the wreckage of capitalist modernity. As such, 
moments of suicidal affectivity appear as aesthetic flashpoints. Their value is often evanescent, 






In light of such observations, I would like to close with two observations. 
The first concerns a text published in La Révolution Surréaliste in 1925 titled, “Is Suicide 
a Solution?”  
The responses to this question are mixed. While many offer up some moralizing 
nonsense, as is to be expected, some evade the question altogether and address another of their 
own making. Others make problems with the question itself, marking the creative imagination 
that conversations about suicide set in motion. But then there is Antonin Artaud, whose response 
not only answers the question in earnest, but takes us further: 
No, suicide is still a hypothesis. I claim the right to doubt suicide the same way I doubt the rest of 
reality. For the instant and until further notice, one must horrifically doubt not existence, strictly 
speaking, which is within the grasp of pretty much anyone, but the internal undermining and the 
profound sensitivity of things, of acts, of reality. I believe in nothing to which I am not attached 
by the sensitivity of a thinking and meteoric cord, and even so I am lacking in a few too many 
meteors in action. The constructed and feeling existence of all men bothers me, and I resolutely 
abominate all reality. Suicide is nothing but the fabulous and far-off conquest of men who think 
straight, but the state itself is incomprehensible to me. The suicide of a neurasthenic lacks any 
representative value, but the mental state of a man who would have carefully determined his 
suicide, the material circumstances, and the moment of the pulling of the trigger is marvelous. I 
am ignorant of things, I am ignorant of everything concerning the human state; nothing of the 
world revolves for or in me. I suffer terribly from life. I can’t attain any state. And it is absolutely 
certain that I have long been dead: I already committed suicide. That is to say, I was suicided. But 
what would you think of an anterior suicide, of a suicide that would make us go back to where we 
started, but to the other side of existence and not that of death. That one alone would be of value 
to me…1 
 
Is suicide a solution? Artaud’s answer is a resounding “No…” And to be sure, he means 
corporeal suicide. As he follows with, “Suicide is still a hypothesis,” Artaud gestures toward 
something else, namely suicidality—the lively activity of entertaining ending one’s own life. 
And while I can only sympathize with the neurasthenic, I can’t help but agree with what follows: 
“The mental state of a man who would have carefully determined his suicide, the material 





suicidality mobilizes a sense of astonishment or wonder, it is surely marvelous, as the “mental 
state” of which Artaud writes is surely one of dynamism. 
And as Artaud continues, his comments extend something even more humane. As Breton 
suggests, we hear something “human in them.” Or, at least, we hear some humility resonant of 
Peuchet, as Artaud writes: “I am ignorant of things, I am ignorant of everything concerning the 
human state; nothing of the world revolves for or in me. I suffer terribly from life. I can’t attain 
any state.” 
Artaud then explores a bit. Like Fleur de Marie, Clarissa Dalloway, and Rufus Scott, 
Artaud poses a question: “But what would you think of an anterior suicide, of a suicide that 
would make us go back to where we started, but to the other side of existence and not that of 
death[?] That one alone would be of value to me.”  
At first glance, Artaud’s question appears naïve, as if there is some possibility for some 
blank slate—as if through suicide we could begin anew. Yet Artaud’s poses his question on the 
heels of his own inhabitation of suicidality. 
The Latin prefix, sui-, meaning “of oneself,” set ahead of a derivative of caedere, “to 
kill,” constitutes suicide as a self-reflexive act. Yet Artaud writes, “I have long been dead: I 
already committed suicide. That is to say, I was suicided.” To frame the statement in the passive 
voice—I was suicided—is an especially poignant way to frame the subject and object of suicide, 
as it calls into question an absent agent of action, or group of agents. The effect is there, but the 
cause is opaque. 
In short, Artaud knows that suicide is not merely a personal issue. It is a social one. 
What’s more, Artaud is after a conceptualization of suicidality as a productive activity 





Artaud amplifies the vitality of his thesis into the stuff of a manifesto. When it comes to 
corporeal suicide, take no such action “until further notice.” Suicidality, however, is a hypothesis 
through which we may continue to observe, analyze, and evaluate our worlds in the service of 
entertaining a better, more felicitous sociality.  
Second, in the Grundrisse, Marx critiques our desire for a romanticized, bourgeois 
sociality. He reminds us of the estranged nature of our sociality under capitalism. Then, set off in 
parentheses, as some of his most striking comments are, he writes about the forms our “social 
bond” have taken throughout history: 
(It has been said and may be said that this is precisely the beauty and the greatness of it: 
this spontaneous interconnection, this material and mental metabolism which is independent of 
the knowing and willing of individuals, and which presupposes their reciprocal independence and 
indifference. And, certainly, this objective connection is preferable to the lack of any connection, 
or to a merely local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant 
relations. Equally certain is it that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social 
interconnections before they have created them. But it is an insipid notion to conceive of this 
merely objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable 
from their nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing). This bond is their 
product. It is a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their development. The alien and 
independent character in which it presently exists vis-à-vis individuals proves only that the latter 
are still engaged in the creation of the conditions of their social life, and that they have not yet 
begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it. It is the bond natural to individuals within 
specific and limited relations of production. Universally developed individuals, whose social 
relations, as their own communal relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal 
control, are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and the universality of the 
development of wealth where this individuality becomes possible supposes production on the 
basis of exchange values as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation 
of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and the 
comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. In earlier stages of development the single 
individual seems to be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships 
in their fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a 
standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and 
this romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to 
its blessed end.)2 
 
Under capitalist modes of production, circulation, and distribution, Marx suggests that we may 
all die estranged (as examined in 1844) from the products of our creative activity, the enjoyment 





I wrote this dissertation about people like me for other people like me. And although I 
would never call into question the ways in which corporeal suicide may function as a solution for 
one’s individual suffering, I’ll be damned if it solves anything for our fellow travelers, for our 
potential fellow travelers—for the collective.  
As for the stuff of suicidal activity? That’s another story. As Miriam Hansen has it, “the 
demolition of the autonomous, self-identical individual entails an analogous transformation of 
the collective.”3 And it is the transformation of that bond that we have not yet begun, on the 
basis of our social conditions, to enjoy.  
So, fuck suicide.  









1 The popular website, Wikipedia has been offering a daunting catalog of suicides in fiction for years. See, “List of 
Suicides in Fiction,” Wikipedia, last modified August 21, 2019, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_suicides_in_fiction. 
2 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage Classics, 
1995), 617-619. For more on the meaning of Kirilov’s suicide, see Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. 
Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 97; Irina Paperno, Suicide as a Cultural Institution in 
Dostoevsky’s Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 8; Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia 
and the Politics of Modernism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 245n27. 
3 Dostoevsky, 678. 
4 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1991) 
(hereafter C3), 1011. 
5 Sorry to Bother You, directed by Boots Riley (2018; Twentieth Century Fox, 2018), DVD. 
6 Michel Foucault, quoted in and translated by Thomas Osborne, “‘Fascinated Dispossession’: Suicide and the 
Aesthetics of Freedom,” Economy and Society 34, no. 2 (May 2005): 284. 
7 Ian Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, History and Truth (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 281. 
9 Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street, in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus 
Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, tran. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002) (hereafter SW1), 477. 
10 Donald Winnicott, Playing and Reality (London & New York: Routledge, 2009), 119. I am indebted, as well, to 
Jonathan Flatley for the phrasing of this sentence. See, “(Radio On!),” Avidly, January 24, 2017, 
http://avidly.lareviewofbooks.org/2017/01/24/radio-on/. 
11 It feels almost compulsory to say this. No one could exhaust the complications surrounding the purposeful ending 
of one’s own life. Yet some travel far afield in a different direction. In his dissertation’s examination of 
representations of suicide, Christopher Damien Chung says he tries to “account for as much textual and formal detail 
as possible without supposing that it expresses a unified meaning, speaks to an overarching theoretical or political 
concern, or defines a moral position. To suppose any of these possibilities,” Chung continues, “is to produce yet 
another insensitive reading that, no matter how compassionate, rejects suicide’s resistance to interpretation, forces 
meaning where none resides” (44). For however much I admire Chung’s careful approach to a messy topic, it is my 
position that a claim about suicide’s “resistance to interpretation” is itself a unifying claim about suicide’s meaning. 
See “‘Almost Unnamable’: Suicide in the Modernist Novel” (PhD diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2008), 
44. 
12 José Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (New York & London: New York 
University Press, 2009), 147 (my emphasis), 167. 
13 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and 
Gregor Benton (London: Penguin Books, 1992) (hereafter 1844), 327. 
14 Blanchot, 104-105. 
15 Dostoevsky, 590-591. 
16 Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway (San Diego, New York, & London: Harcourt, Inc., 1981) (hereafter MD), 69-70. 
17 Marx, 1844, 335. 
18 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990), 136. 
19 Foucault, 141. 
20 Foucault, 138. 
21 Foucault, 138-139. 
22 For the most significant fin-de-siècle sociological work on suicide, see Émile Durkheim, On Suicide, Trans. Robin 
Buss (New York & London: Penguin Books, 2006 [1897]). 







24 Critical historical scholarship on suicide and its changing meanings suggest that by lodging the responsibility of 
suicide in either sickness or moral destitution, science professionals deny those who engage with suicide the 
creativity to control, let alone have a voice in articulating, the meaning of his or her own life and death. For more on 
the criticality of suicide, see Lisa Lieberman, “Romanticism and the Culture of Suicide in Nineteenth-Century 
France,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 33, no. 3 (1991); George Minois, History of Suicide: Voluntary 
Death in Western Culture, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Lisa 
Lieberman, Leaving You: The Cultural Meaning of Suicide (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003); Marsh, Suicide: Foucault, 
History and Truth; and Thomas Osborne, “‘Fascinated Dispossession’: Suicide and the Aesthetics of Freedom,” 
Economy and Society 34, no. 2 (May 2005): 280-294. Both Marsh and Osborne’s work stands apart, as each 
critically examines historical approaches to the problem of suicide in the medical sciences as a way to map the 
complex relationships between the production, dissemination and circulation of knowledge about suicide. Marsh’s 
project is invested in exposing the historical contingencies at play in the construction of knowledge about suicide in 
the hopes of imagining alternative conceptual spaces outside of pathology in which new possibilities for thought and 
action may emerge. Osborne examines suicide as an aesthetic problem of the will permeated with moral, ethical, and 
social stakes. 
25 See, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-charts/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_2017_1100w850h.jpg. 
26 Lieberman, 28. 
27 Ultimately, this tendency names the stuff of an analogy-gone-wrong. Waves of historical suicides have been 
described in the medical language of the epidemic that, at best can function in the service of a sharper argument 
about affective collectivities after which this dissertation seeks. For more on suicide-as-contagion, see Katherine 
Lynn Ryan, “Modernism’s Suicidal Impulse: Psychic Contamination and the Crowd,” (PhD diss., University of 
California, Irvine, 2014) in which she writes, “A sense of the suicidal impulse as contagious and most likely to 
spread amidst the crowded urban environment is especially prominent in the period’s scientific discourses, and this 
anxiety over public hygiene and population control emerges in a strand of modernist fiction that repeatedly portrays 
the suicidal subject as suffering from an intersubjective contagion rather than intrasubjective anomie. Thus 
challenging accepted critical narratives of urban suicide as the result of psychic isolation...suggests the necessity for 
a more epidemiological reading of self-destruction in modernist literature, and particularly point to affect as the 
source of modernism’s psychic contamination” (vi). 
28 Jennifer Michael Hecht, Stay: A History of Suicide and the Arguments Against It (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2013), 5, 26, 151. 
29 Hecht, 5. 
30 Hecht, 225. 
31 See, http://thebestamericanpoetry.typepad.com/the_best_american_poetry/2010/01/on-suicide-by-jennifer-
michael-hecht.html 
32 D.W. Winnicott, “The Value of Depression,” in Home is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst, eds. 
Clare Winnicott, Ray Shepherd, Madeleine Davis (New York & London: WW Norton & Co., 1986), 76-77. 
33 For more on Winnicott’s non-pathologizing sensitivity, see Adam Phillips, Donald Winnicott (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), 48-55. 
34 I am grateful for Drew Daniel permitting my use of his post. See Drew Daniel, “As some of you know, I’m 
writing a book about suicide,” Facebook, June 8, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/dr.drew.daniel. 
35 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 4, 1938-1940, 
ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002) (hereafter SW4), 316. 
36 Sander Lewis, “Full Audio (1 hr) of Raw ATC Transmissions from Richard ‘Beebo’ Russell - Stolen Plane 
(Subtitles),” YouTube video, 1:04:29, Posted [August 2018]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUt-W8Fcpyw.  
37 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990) 
(hereafter C1), 149 (my emphasis). 
38 The idiom “tree lawn” is a regionalism local to Northeast Ohio. For those unfamiliar, it is that space of municipal 
grass, crab grass, weeds, or whatever on which people are required to set trash on trash day. 
39 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 
1962), 311. 
40 Lewis. 
41 Death Grips, “On GP,” 2015, track 9 on The Powers that B, Death Grips. 
42 The concept of the mimetic faculty permeates Benjamin’s work. For the most significant discussion of the 
mimetic faculty, however, see: Walter Benjamin, “Doctrine of the Similar,” and “On the Mimetic Faculty,” in 






Gary Smith, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999) (hereafter SW2.2) , 694-698, 720-722. The 
most thorough secondary work on the mimetic faculty in Benjamin is found in Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Mistaking 
the Moon for a Ball,” in Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 132-162. For other work on the mimetic faculty, see, Susan Buck-
Morss, “Dream World of Mass Culture,” in The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 253-286; Matthew Potolsky, “Mimesis and Culture,” in Mimesis (New York & 
London: Routledge, 2006), 136-156; Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2014), 388-390; and Jonathan Flatley, Like Andy Warhol, (Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2017), 4-5, 4n8, 18-19, 100-101. 
43 Benjamin, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” SW2.2, 720. 
44 Benjamin, “On Astrology,” SW2.2, 684. 
45 Marx, 1844, 375. 


















































1 See, Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (London: Penguin Books, 1996). 
2 Karl Marx, 1844, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton, in Early Writings (London: Penguin Books) 
(hereafter 1844 and EW), 327. 
3 My understanding of Marx’s claim here is influenced by Gregor Benton, who argues that Marx was the first to 
disentangle objectification and alienation. Marx, Benton argues, “saw alienation rather as an aberrant form of 
objectification, which in itself is neither positive nor negative, but neutral. Alienation, for Marx, arises only under 
specific conditions – conditions under which man’s objectification of his natural powers, e.g. through work, takes on 
forms which bring his human essence into conflict with his existence.” See, “Glossary of Key Terms,” in Early 
Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 429. For the quoted 
passage, see Marx, 1844, 352. 
4 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 2, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1992) 
(hereafter C2), 299. 
5 Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin 
Books, 1973), 487. 
6 Benton makes clear Marx’s differentia between the related concepts objectification, alienation, and estrangement 
(Early Writings, 429-432). Where objectification (Vergegenständlichung) signifies mere processes of human 
activity, alienation (Entäusserung) signifies processes of congealing labor-power in the service of the capitalist in 
more obvious and “aberrant” ways (429). I understand processes of alienation, on the one hand, as one effect of 
labor’s formal subsumption under capital (see, C1, 1019-1023). I understand estrangement (Entfremdung), on the 
other hand, to name more strongly the effects of labor’s real subsumption under capital (see C1, 1025). 
7 Marx, Early Wrtings, 430. I should also note that although estrangement presupposes a separation from the effect 
of an innocuous relation, the supersession of estrangement cannot suggest a reuniting-with or return to the effect of 
an innocuous relation of production. Rather, as Marx later writes, people “are still engaged in the creation of the 
conditions of their social life, and that they have not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it” (Marx, 
Grundrisse, 162). 
8 Marx, 1844, 324, 326, 329, 334. 
9 See, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” in Collected Works, vol. 4, Marx and Engels, 1844-
1845 (International Publishers, 1976), 597-612; also, Eric A. Plaut and Kevin Anderson, eds., Marx on Suicide, 
trans. Eric A. Plaut, Gabrielle Edgecomb, and Kevin Anderson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999.) 
10 For a longer description of Marx’s editorial translation skills in “Peuchet: On Suicide,” see Plaut and Anderson, 3-
40. 
11 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 604, my italics. 
12 I am indebted to Samantha Wentling for help with this wordplay. 
13 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 605-606, 611. 
14 See, for instance, Minois, “From the French Revolution to the Twentieth Century, or, From Free Debate to 
Silence,” in History of Suicide in which Minois argues “After the break of the French Revolution, the moral 
authorities (and even the political authorities), inflamed by a spirit of reaction and restoration, worked vigorously to 
return suicide to what they felt was its rightful place among acts that are forbidden and classified as counter to 
nature. But because those authorities were no longer able to coerce people into moral conformity, they moved 
repression of suicide inward, shifting it to the individual conscience. Their efforts were all the more effective 
when—surprisingly enough—the development of the humane sciences helped, quite involuntarily, to strengthen the 
individual and collective guilt complex regarding suicide” (314-315). 
15 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 603, 609, 610, 609, 604, 603. 
16 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 603. 
17 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 604. 
18 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 597. 
19 Plaut and Anderson, 30. 
20 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 598. The full passage reads, “The annual number of suicides, which is, as it were, 
normal and recurrent among us, must be regarded as a symptom of the faulty organisation of our society; for at times 
when industry is at a standstill and in crisis, in periods of dear food and hard winters, this symptom is always more 
conspicuous and assumes an epidemic character.”  
21 So too had Durkheim, of course. For a more detailed gloss of the differences between Durkheim and Peuchet, see 






22 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 610, 611. 
23 Plaut and Anderson, 10, 12. In addition, Anderson also argues that “Peuchet: On Suicide” demonstrates Marx’s 
early interest in gender issues. 
24 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 609nb. 
25 Marx, “Peuchet: On Suicide,” 609. 
26 Marx, C1, 1019-1023, 1025-1034. 
27 For more on this “irrationality,” see Marx, C2, 113: “[An] irrationality consists in the fact that labour as the value-
forming element cannot itself possess any value, and so a certain quantity of labour cannot have a value that is 
expressed in its price, in its equivalence with a certain definite quantity of money. We know, however, that wages 
are simply a disguised form, a form in which the price of a day’s labour-power, for example, presents itself as the 
price of the labour set in motion in the course of a day by this labour-power, so that the value produced by this 
labour-power in six hours’ labour, say, is expressed as the value of its twelve-hour functioning or labour.” 
28 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1991) 
(hereafter C3), 1011. 
29 Marx, C1, 1052. 
30 Marx, C1, 1052, 270. 
31 Marx, 1844, 334, 327. 
32 In 1844, Marx makes a different case for the estrangement of people from one another in terms of our “species-
being” (327-330). Here I mean to emphasis the ways in which workers, compelled to sell their reified labor-power 
as a commodity on a “free” labor market, are forced to place themselves in opposition to one another in competition 
as a result of their material, economic conditions under capitalism. See for instance, Marx, C1, 270-272. 
33 Marx, 1844, 285. 
34 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 88-89. 
35 Marx, C1, 484; see also 554. 
36 Marx, Grundrisse, 487. 
37 Marx, 1844, 284, 298. 
38 Marx, C1, 988. 
39 Marx, Grundrisse, 487-488. 
40 Marx, C1, 1056; For more on the real subsumption of labor under capital, see C1, 1023-1025, 1034-1038.  
41 Marx, C1, 1052-1053. 
42 For more on the mystification of capital, see C1, 1052-1058. 
43 Marx, C1, 990. 
44 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 78. 
45 I am deeply indebted to Sean Lovitt for drawing my attention to this passage. See, Marx and Engels, Collected 
Works, vol. 3, Marx and Engels, 1843-1844, (International Publishers, 1975), 182. 
46 See, for instance, Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, in Collected Works, vol. 4 (hereafter HF), 203, 526. 
47 See, Marx, C1, 342, 367, 415-416. 
48 Marx, C3, 1019-1020. 
49 Marx, C1, 280. 
50 Marx, C3, 11. 
51 Marx, C3, 30-31. 
52 Marx, 1844, 342. 
53 Marx, C3, 20. 
54 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, 182. 
55 Marx, C3, 339. 
56 Marx, C3, 342-347. 
57 Marx, C3, 81. 
58 Marx argues, “The functions fulfilled by the capitalist are no more than the functions of capital – vis. The 
valorization of value by absorbing living labour – executed consciously and willingly. The capitalist functions only 
as personified capital, capital as a person, just as the worker is no more than labour personified.” See, C1, 989. The 
ways in which the capital relation animates those it embodies is one thing, but it can never serve as an alibi for the 
conscious will of the capitalist. 
59 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester & Washington: 0 Books, 2009), 15. 
60 Fisher, 69-70. 






62 Marx, 1844, 326. 
63 Marx, 1844, 342. 
64 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London & New 
York: Verso, 2005), 15. I am indebted to both John L. Stiger and Jonathan Flatley for helping frame this 
observation. 
65 Marx, Grundrisse, 162. 
66 Marx, 1844, 351-352. 
67 Heidegger, Being and Time, 102-107. 
68 See, Marx and Engels, HF, xvi-xix. 
69 Marx and Engels, HF, 687n20, 162. 
70 To be fair, here, Marx and Engels quote Szeliga as a form of critique of Szeliga’s article itself. The full passage 
reads: “We shall not follow Herr Szeliga in his further description of Marguerite [Fleur de Marie]. We shall leave 
her the satisfaction, according to Herr Szeliga’s prescription, of ‘constituting the most decisive antithesis to 
everyone’, a mysterious antithesis, as mysterious as the attributes of God” (168). Although rhetorically vertiginous, 
Marx and Engels are saying that Fleur de Marie indeed illustrates an antithesis. But rather than the antithesis that 
Szeliga’s sees (the change in Marie’s trajectory from work in a brothel to work in a convent), Marx and Engels, I 
argue, see a mysterious antithesis take shape in Marie’s suicidal activity. 
71 Marx and Engels, HF, 168, 169-170. 
72 Marx and Engels, HF, 169nf, 168. 
73 Marx and Engels, HF, 168. 
74 Marx and Engels, HF, 169-170. 
75 Marx and Engels, HF, 169. 








































1 Werner Hamacher and Kirk Wetters, “Guilt History: Benjamin’s Sketch “Capitalism as Religion,’” Diacritics 32, 
no. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 2002): 97. The full passage reads, “This devastation of being in capitalism, in Capital 
Christianity and in all of the structures, institutions, discourses, and nondiscursive experiences affected by it, is, as 
Benjamin emphasizes, ‘historically unprecedented and unheard of’ (das historisch Unerhörte).” 
2 Michael W. Jennings, “Introduction,” in The Writer of Modern Life: Essays on Baudelaire, ed. Michael W. 
Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 12. 
3 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, Second Version,” in Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Works, Volume 3, 1935-1938, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2002) (hereafter SW3), 101, 107-108, 124n10. In many ways, I read the term “nature” in this essay as 
code for capitalism, as Benjamin’s appeal to “the present conditions of production” point us directly to it. For more 
on Benjamin’s critique of capitalism in the art essay see, Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, Walter 
Benjamin: A Critical Life (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2014), 513; Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Mistaking the Moon for a 
Ball,” in Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Thodor W. Adorno (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012), 129, 132-133, 139. 
4 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 367. 
5 Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in SW4, 396. 
6 Benjamin, “On the Image of Proust,” in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 2, Part 1, ed. Michael W. 
Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999) (hereafter SW2.1), 240. 
7 For more on Benjamin’s unique style, see Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, “Introduction,” in Walter 
Benjamin: A Critical Life, 3; for the quoted passage, see, 368. 
8 For more on the “now of recognizability,” see, Benjamin, “Theory of Knowledge,” in SW1, 276-277; The Arcades 
Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), xii, 462-464, 473, 485-
486, 867, 912, 917, 942.  
9 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 45. 
10 Benjamin The Writer of Modern Life, 10. 
11 There are, however, flashpoints, as this chapter highlights. As for secondary source material on Benjamin and 
suicide, most are biographical. The most helpful is Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life. And 
although not his main focus, references to Benjamin’s thesis from the “The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire” frame the introduction to Kevin Bell, Ashes Taken for Fire: Aesthetic Modernism and the Critique of 
Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 1-33. 
12 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 70 (friends); 29, 683n15 (aunt); 127, 357-362, 377-379, 
674-676, 5 (Benjamin’s own). 
13 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 316, 314, 333-334. 
14 Benjamin, “May-June 1931,” in SW2.2, 469-470. 
15 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 333-334. 
16 Benjamin, “Diary from August 7, 1931, to the Day of My Death,” in SW2.2, 501. 
17 Benjamin, “The Destructive Character,” in SW2.2, 542. 
18 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 617. 
19 This did not, however, prevent him from taking precautions. In their extensive biography, Eiland and Jennings 
highlight four individually addressed suicide notes and a will that Benjamin drafted in July 1932 as the situation in 
Germany worsened. Benjamin had neither mailed the letters, nor registered his will. See, Walter Benjamin: A 
Critical Life, 378-379. 
20 Eiland and Jennings write, “In his letter of June 25 [1931] to Sholem he had raised the possibility that he would 
spend his birthday in Nice drinking a glass of ‘festive wine’ with ‘a rather eccentric fellow (skurrilen Burschen) 
whose path has often crossed mine in the course of my various travels’—an unmistakable indication of the 
recurrence of his suicidal feelings.” See, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 376-377. 
21 Gershom Scholem and Theodor Adorno, eds., The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 395-396. 
22 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 393. 
23 Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
The Modern Library, 2000), 281. 
24 See, Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, ed. James Strachey, trans. Joan Riviere (New York & London: W.W. 






25 D.W. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of 
Emotional Development (New York: International Universities Press, 1965), 245. 
26 Lauren Berlant, “Genre Flailing,” Capacious: Journal for Emerging Affect Inquiry, 1, no. 2 (2018): 157. 
27 See, for instance, Berlant’s own commentary on her own analysis as she writes, “Thus it is worth it for us to slow 
down to absorb her process of slowing down, maintaining balance,” in Cruel Optimism (Durham & London: Duke 
University Press, 2011), 83; for the quoted passage, see 5. 
28 Benjamin, “Diary from August 7, 1931, to the Day of My Death,” in SW2.2, 501. 
29 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 10. 
30 Berlant Cruel Optimism, 7; For more on emergence, see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 121-135. 
31 For more on Raymond Williams’s concepts (dominant, residual, emergent, pre-emergent, and structures of 
feeling) see, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 121-135. For Berlant’s concepts 
(crisis ordinariness, processes of emergence, and the impasse), see Cruel Optimism, 7, 4.  
32 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 229. 
33 Hansen’s comment concerns, more specifically, Benjamin’s idioms, “innervation,” “the mimetic faculty,” and 
“the optical unconscious.” See, Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Mistaking the Moon for a Ball,” in Cinema and Experience, 
133. 
34 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London & New York: Verso, 1998), 175. 
35 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 230. 
36 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 289. 
37 The most thorough understanding of Benjamin’s idiom is found in Hansen, “Mistaking the Moon for a Ball,” in 
Cinema and Experience, 132-162. For the passage about the mimetic as a “relational practice,” see 147 (her 
emphasis). For other work on the mimetic faculty, see, Susan Buck-Morss, “Dream World of Mass Culture,” in The 
Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 253-286; 
Matthew Potolsky, “Mimesis and Culture,” in Mimesis (New York & London: Routledge, 2006), 136-156; Howard 
Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 388-390; and Flatley, Like Andy Warhol, 4-5, 
18-19, 100-101. 
38 Borrowing from Feuerbach, Marx’s most vivid description of species-being coincides with many of Benjamin’s 
preoccupations surrounding the mimetic faculty—our sensuously embodied relations with the world, a refusal the 
duality between subject and object, and, of course, historical change. In 1844, Marx writes: 
Man as an objective sensuous being is therefore a suffering being, and because he feels his 
suffering, he is a passionate being. Passion is man’s essential power vigorously striving to attain its object. 
But man is not only a natural being; he is a human natural being; i.e. he is a being for himself and 
hence a species-being, as which he must confirm and realize himself both in his being and in his knowing. 
Consequently, human objects are not natural objects, as they immediately present themselves, nor is human 
sense, in its immediate and objective existence, human sensibility and human objectivity. Neither objective 
nor subjective nature is immediately present in a form adequate to the human being. And as everything 
natural must come into being, so man also has his process of origin in history. But for him history is a 
conscious process, and hence one which consciously supersedes itself. History is the true natural history of 
man. (391).  
For further references, see, 1844, 327-329, 351, 369, 386. For Marx’s indebtedness to Feuerbach, see Early 
Writings, 431-432.  
39 Benjamin, “Doctrine of the Similar,” in SW2.2, 695; “On the Mimetic Faculty,” in SW2.2, 720. 
40 Benjamin, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” in SW2.2, 721. 
41 Marx, 1844, 351.  
42 Hansen, 148. 
43 Benjamin, “On Astrology,” in SW2.2, 684. 
44 Seldom, perhaps, do we encounter an expression that approaches avowal, as Daniel Johnston sings, “But I…live 
my broken dreams.” See, vinceleers, “Daniel Johnston – I Live My Broken Dreams (FULL VERSION),” YouTube 
Video, 2:05, September 1, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ICLXH8wdXhk.  
45 Benjamin, “On Astrology,” in SW2.2, 685. 
46 Hansen, 147. 
47 Benjamin, “On Astrology,” in SW2.2, 685. 
48 Benjamin, “Doctrine of the Similar,” in SW2.2, 696. 






50 Benjamin, “The Significance of Beautiful Semblance” in SW3, 137 (my emphasis). 
51 I am indebted to Jonathan Flatley for pointing this out to me so clearly. See, for instance, Like Andy Warhol, 5n10. 
For Benjamin’s reference to Proust, see, “On the Image of Proust,” in SW2.1, 240-242. 
52 Benjamin, “Experience and Poverty,” in SW2.2, 735. I am indebted to Eiland and Jennings for pointing this 
simple, yet foundational essay out to me. See, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 513. 
53 Although Benjamin began engaging with Marxist anti-capitalist thought around 1929, I would suggest Benjamin’s 
introduction to Capital was not so incidental in light of his years-long struggle to creatively respond to Adorno’s 
criticisms found in their correspondences discussed more below. See, “Exchange with Theodor W. Adorno on the 
Essay “Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” in SW3, 50-67; Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Ernst 
Bloch, Bertolt Brecht, and Georg Lukács, Aesthetics and Politics (Verso, 1980), 120-126; “Exchange with Theodor 
W. Adorno on “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 99-115. For Benjamin’s reading of Marx in 
general, and Capital, see, Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 320, 502. 
54 For more see chapter one. 
55 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 111. 
56 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 9, 581. 
57 See, Hansen, 139: “Unlike Frankfurt School critiques of technology from Dialectic of Enlightenment through 
Habermas, Benjamin does not assume an instrumentalist trajectory from mythical cunning to capitalist-industrialist 
modernity.” 
58 See, Theodor Adorno, “Exchange with Theodor W. Adorno on the Essay ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth 
Century,’” in SW3, 57, 59. 
59 Benjamin, One-Way Street, in SW1, 481. 
60 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 458. 
61 For more on this artform, see Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 145-147. 
62 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 107. 
63 I am focused, here, on the historical ways in which technology has functioned in the service of different groups of 
people. Although each acknowledge the role of capitalism in second technology, for a more Technik-focused 
account of first and second technology in Benjamin, see both Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 138-162 and Eiland 
and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 513-518. 
64 To be sure, what I suggest here can be found more thoroughly discussed in C1 in terms of capitalism’s tendency 
toward an increase in the organic composition of capital, 762-870. 
65 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art” in SW3, 107. 
66 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art” in SW3, 107-108. 
67 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 101; “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, 
Third Version,” in SW4, 251-252. 
68 Marx, C1, 798. The full passage reads: “The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and 
energy of its growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productivity of its 
labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army. The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, 
also develop the labour-power at its disposal. The relative mass of the industrial reserve army thus increases with the 
potential energy of wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is 
the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to the amount of torture it has to 
undergo in the form of labour. The more extensive, finally, the pauperized sections of the working class and the 
industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist 
accumulation.” 
69 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 101, 107-108, 124n10. 
70 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 513. 
71 Of course Benjamin highlights film as his special technological focus. But we also know that his argument is not 
bound to film at the exclusion of other artforms, nor their technologies. See Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 
108. 
72 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 124n10. 
73 Marx, C1, 149 (my emphasis). 
74 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 513. 
75 Hansen, 139. 
76 Benjamin, quoted in Hansen, 132. See also, Hansen, 322n1. 






78 Benjamin, “The Significance of Beautiful Semblance,” in SW3, 137. 
79 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 328-329; for the passage in Marx, see C1, 548-549. 
80 Marx, C1, 988. 
81 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 31. 
82 Marx, C1, 163. There are several vivid and playful passages (among all the others) in Marx regarding the 
commodity fetish. See, for example, C1, 163-164 (as dancing tables), 176-177 (as vocalizations), 1003-1004 (as 
autonomous powers endowed with a will and a soul). 
83 I mean to highlight, here, an observation in Capital I do not see cited often enough: “It is true that x can be 
changed into x+∆x even in the absence of the capitalist process of production, but not if we postulate that the rival 
members of society confront each other as persons, that they deal with each other only as the owners of 
commodities, and that they come into contact with each other only in this capacity (this excludes slavery, etc.) And 
secondly, if we postulate further that the social product should be produced as a commodity. (This excludes all social 
formations in which the use-value is the main point as far as the immediate producers are concerned, and the excess 
produce at most is transformed into a commodity.)” See, Marx, C1, 976-977.  
84 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 13-14. 
85 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 14, 19. 
86 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 14. 
87 All quoted passages come from Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 17, 31, and 
34. 
88 Baudelaire, cited in Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 33. 
89 Marx, C1, 270; See also, Marx, C2, 113. 
90 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 33. 
91 Marx, C2, 113. The full passage reads: “[An] irrationality consists in the fact that labour as the value-forming 
element cannot itself possess any value, and so a certain quantity of labour cannot have a value that is expressed in 
its price, in its equivalence with a certain definite quantity of money. We know, however, that wages are simply a 
disguised form, a form in which the price of a day’s labour-power, for example, presents itself as the price of the 
labour set in motion in the course of a day by this labour-power, so that the value produced by this labour-power in 
six hours’ labour, say, is expressed as the value of its twelve-hour functioning or labour.” 
92 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 124n10. 
93 Eiland and Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 513. 
94 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 124n10. 
95 Hansen, 139. 
96 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” in SW3, 124n10. 
97 Marx, C1, 990; for Marx’s drafting of the appendix to Capital, see C1, 943. 
98 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 51. 
99 Benjamin, “The Knowledge That the First Material on Which the Mimetic Faculty Tested Itself,” in SW3, 253. 
100 Benjamin, “On Astrology,” in SW2.2, 684. 
101 Hansen, 140. 
102 Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in SW4, 396. 
103 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 45. 
104 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 48. 
105 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 60 (my emphasis). 
106 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 48. 
107 Benjamin’s work regarding the history of modern suicide is perhaps best found, as are many things, in The 
Arcades Project, especially Convolutes C, J, and a Social Movement. 
108 Minois, 315-316. 
109 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 45 (my emphasis), 46 (Benjamin’s 
emphasis), 46. 
110 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 52. 
111 Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 52. 
112 I am graciously indebted to both Wenqing Kang and Yanjiang Hu for our conversations about this greeting. 











1 Woolf, The Diary of Virginia Woolf: Volume Two: 1920-1924, Anne Oliver Bell, ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace 
& Company, 1978) (hereafter D2), 167. 
2 Woolf, D2, 167. 
3 John Keats died of consumption, misdiagnosed by his doctor, James Clark. In his final, reportedly excruciating 
days, Keats sought ways to obtain opium in an effort to end his insufferable illness, and of course, his life. While I 
can find no evidence that Woolf was aware of the circumstances of Keats’ death, she nonetheless had become 
preoccupied with the value of thinking about death, specifically one’s own, in anticipation of the publication and 
reception of her third novel, Jacob’s Room. For more on Keats and his doctor, see Sue Brown, Joseph Severn, A 
Life: The Rewards of Friendship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
4 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, vol. XIV, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1914-1916) (hereafter “MM”), 244. 
5 Woolf, D2, 199. 
6 Woolf, D2, 207-08. 
7 Woolf, “The Hours”: The British Museum Manuscript of Mrs. Dalloway, transcribed and ed., Helen M. Wussow 
(New York: Pace University Press, 2010) (hereafter TH), 412. 
8 Woolf, MD, 31, 35-36, 67, 88, 83, 88. 
9 Woolf, MD, 122, 98, 142. 
10 Woolf, D2, 248. 
11 Arthur F. Bethea, and Elyse Graham and Pericles Lewis situate Woolf’s novel in conversation with the changing 
roles of religion in twentieth-century public life. See, Arthur F. Bethea, “Septimus Smith, the War-Shattered Christ 
Substitute in Mrs. Dalloway,” The Explicator 68, no. 4 (2010): 249-252; Elyse Graham and Pericles Lewis, “Private 
Religion, Public Mourning, and Mrs. Dalloway,” Modern Philology 111, no. 1 (2013): 88-106. Katherine Lynn 
Ryan examines Woolf’s work alongside crowd theory and affective contagion in the face of population increase. 
See, Katherine Lynn Ryan, “Modernism’s Suicidal Impulse: Psychic Contamination and the Crowd” (PhD diss., 
University of California, Irvine, 2014.) Deborah Guth, Joseph Allen Boone, Christopher Damien Chung, Victor 
Brombert, and Molly Hite all approach Mrs. Dalloway in terms of Woolf’s experimental narrative technique, 
spanning from mythico-literary modes (Guth), to the therapeutic value of narration (Bromert), to more opaque, 
experimental narration (Boone and Hite), to experimental narrative’s foreclosure of meaning (Chung). See, Deborah 
Guth, “Rituals of Self-Deception: Clarissa Dalloway’s Final Moment of Vision,” Twentieth Century Literature 36, 
no. 1 (1990): 35-42; Joseph Allen Boone, Libidinal Currents: Sexuality and the Shaping of Modernism (Chicago & 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998; Christopher Damien Chung, “‘Almost Unnamable’: Suicide in the 
Modernist Novel” (PhD diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2008); Victor Brombert, “Virginia Woolf—“Death 
Is the Enemy,” The Hudson Review 63, no. 3 (2010): 429-444; Molly Hite, “Tonal Cues and Uncertain Values: 
Affect and Ethics in Mrs. Dalloway,” Narrative 18, no. 3 (2010): 249-275. Jean Thomson, Kaley Joyes, and 
Gabrielle Myers, all examine Mrs. Dalloway in terms of failures of modernity, namely epiphenomenal trauma, and 
the impossible struggle to recuperate war-fragmented psyches in the wake of World War I. See, Jean Thomson, 
“Virginia Woolf and the Case of Septimus Smith,” The San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal 23, no. 3 
(2004): 55-71; Kaley Joyes, “Failed Witnessing in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway,” Woolf Studies Annual 14 
(2008): 69-89; Gabrielle Myers, “‘Spread Like a Veil Upon a Rock’: Septimus and the Trench Poets of World War 
I,” English 60, no. 230 (2011): 212-228. And finally, Peter Knox-Shaw, Christine Froula, Yelena Furman, and 
Kathryn Van Wert all also study Woolf in terms of post-war trauma, yet in a reparative way. Rather than 
highlighting the impossibility of recuperation in the face of failures and losses, each of these scholars approach Mrs. 
Dalloway in ways that illuminate the pedagogical value of Woolf’s work. Knox-Shaw’s archival work examines 
post-World War I British legal proceedings concerning shell-shocked veterans, pin-pointing the ways in which 
Woolf’s reader must approach Septimus Warren Smith from a more critical, sympathetic position. Froula 
approaches Mrs. Dalloway as a communal post-war elegy for a traumatized Europe, calling attention to the ways in 
which Woolf asks her readers to imagine a better future after the war. Furman details the historical and literary 
influence of Fyodor Dostoevsky in Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, putting in conversation intertextual relationships 
between Dostoevsky’s Nikolai Vsevolodovich Stavrogin and Woolf’s Septimus Warren Smith. And Van Wert’s 
meticulously-researched archival work scours through early drafts of Woolf’s “The Hours”: The British Museum 
Manuscript of Mrs. Dalloway and draws out the ways in which Woolf’s early characterization of Septimus offered a 
much more detailed back-story than the shell-shocked veteran of Mrs. Dalloway, complicating the status of Woolf’s 






Shaw, “The Otherness of Septimus Warren Smith,” The Durham University Journal 87, no. 1 (1995): 99-110; 
Christine Froula, Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury Avant-Garde: War, Civilization, Modernity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005); Yelena Furman, “Translating Dostoevskii, Writing a Novel of One’s Own: The 
Place of ‘Stavrogin’s Confession’ in the Creation of Mrs. Dalloway,” The Modern Language Review 104, no. 4 
(2009): 1081-1097; Kathryn Van Wert, “The Early Life of Septimus Smith,” Journal of Modern Literature 36, no. 1 
(2012): 71-89. 
12 Woolf, D2, 178. 
13 Woolf, D2, 199. 
14 Woolf, D2, 248. 
15 Woolf, D2, 209. 
16 Woolf, D2, 248. 
17 For the most thorough examination of the ways in which both Clarissa and Septimus’ same-sex sexuality 
materialize throughout the novel, see, Julie Abraham, “Virginia Woolf and the Sexual Histories of Literature,” in 
Are Girls Necessary?: Lesbian Writing and Modern Histories (New York & London: Routledge, 1996). Yet while 
Clarissa and Septimus’ same-sex preoccupations no doubt play a significant role within the development of Mrs. 
Dalloway, this chapter’s focus privileges what I argue is a more totalizing preoccupation, namely the affective value 
of thinking about death and suicide, no doubt influenced by, among other things, same-sex desire. 
18 Woolf, MD, 32. 
19 Woolf, TH, 425. 
20 Woolf, TH, 425. 
21 Woolf, TH, 412. 
22 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976) (hereafter OG), 163-164. 
23 Derrida, OG, 143, 163. 
24 Woolf, MD, 28. 
25 Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man, revised edition, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, Eduardo Cadava, and 
Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) (hereafter MPdM), 21. 
26 Woolf, MD, 25, 140 (my emphasis). 
27 Woolf, MD, 86, 70 (my emphasis). 
28 Woolf, MD, 152. 
29 Woolf, MD, 9. 
30 Woolf, MD, 86. 
31 Woolf, MD, 87. 
32 Woolf, MD, 92. 
33 Derrida, MPdM, 33. 
34 Woolf, MD, 16. 
35 Woolf, MD, 183. 
36 Woolf, MD, 25, 70. 
37 Freud, “MM,” 245. 
38 Woolf, MD, 86. 
39 Woolf, TH, 417. 
40 Woolf, MD, 86. 
41 Freud, “MM,” 249. 
42 Freud, “The Ego and the Super-Ego (Ego Ideal),” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIX, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1923-1925), 29. Both 
Judith Butler and Jonathan Flatley examine the history of Freud’s theorizations along these lines, specifically the 
possibility of ego-formation as conditioned by loss. Butler observes, “melancholia refuses to acknowledge loss, and 
in this sense ‘preserves’ its lost objects as psychic effects.” “Considered closely,” Butler argues, Freud makes clear 
“that there can be no ego without melancholia, that the ego’s loss is constitutive.” Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: 
Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 182, 171. Flatley also examines Freud’s work, 
arguing that Freud placed “the melancholic mechanism at the very origin of subject formation,” that the ego is 
“constituted by…losses” and “contains, like an archive or archeological site,” the history of lost objects such that 
“our losses become us.” Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping, 49. Although de Man and Derrida did not write 
explicitly of psychoanalytic theorizations of melancholia, their theorizations about death and subjectivity evoked 






a movement in which an interiorizing idealization takes in itself or upon itself the body and voice of the other, the 
other’s visage and person, ideally and quasi-literally devouring them” (MPdM 34). 
43 Freud, “MM,” 251-52. 
44 Freud, “MM,” 244. 
45 Freud, “MM,” 252. 
46 Woolf, MD, 16. 
47 See André Breton’s response in “Is Suicide a Solution?,” La Révolution Surréaliste, no. 2, (1925). 
48 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 107. 
49 Woolf, D2, 272. 
50 Woolf, TH, 60-62. 
51 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 104-05. 
52 Woolf, TH, 419. 
53 Woolf, TH, 420. 
54 Woolf, D2, 203 (my emphasis). 
55 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 48. 
56 Woolf, TH, 425. 
57 Hite, 252. 
58 Woolf, MD, 9. 
59 Woolf, MD, 84. 
60 Woolf, TH, 420 (my emphasis). 
61 Woolf, D2, 203. 
62 Woolf, D2, 265. 
63 Woolf, TH, 411. 
64 Woolf, TH, 423, 412. 
65 Woolf, TH, 412. 
66 Woolf, TH, 416. 
67 Woolf, TH, 420. 
68 Woolf, TH, 419. 
69 Woolf, MD, 56. 
70 Woolf, MD, 68-69. 
71 I am deeply indebted to the wording of Judith Butler’s similar claim in The Psychic Life of Power. “For the 
melancholic, breaking the attachment constitutes a second loss of the object” (192). 
72 While Molly Hoff suggests Woolf’s “ode” alludes to Milton’s, we can see the ways in which Woolf’s focus on 
time also privileges Freud’s with regard to mourning. Yet I am indebted to Huff’s connection between Woolf’s 
appeal to Thessaly and the historical significance of Thessaly with regard to mourning. For more, see Molly Huff, 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway: Invisible Presences (Clemson, SC: Clemson University Digital Press, 2009), 116; 
for Freud, see “MM,” 252. 
73 Woolf, MD, 69-70. 
74 Woolf, MD, 139. 
75 Woolf, MD, 140. 
76 See chapters one through three of part one, division one of Heidegger, Being and Time, 65-148. 
77 Woolf, MD, 15, 139. 
78 Woolf, MD, 142. 
79 Donald Winnicott, “Primitive Emotional Development,” in Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1975 [1945]), 153. 
80 Adam Phillips, Winnicott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 127. Although it is unreasonable to offer 
every instance of Winnicott’s preference for affect over cognition and metaphysics, for some key passages, see 
Winnicott, “Communicating and Not Communicating Leading to a Study of Certain Opposites” and Winnicott, 
“Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self,” in The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: 
Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1965 [1960]) 
from which the above and following passages originate: “I suggest that an important basis for ego development lies 
in this area of the individual’s communicating with subjective phenomena, which alone gives the feeling of real” 
(188 my emphasis); “The infant’s ego is building up strength and in consequence is getting towards a state in which 
id-demands will be felt as part of the self, and not as environmental” (141 my emphasis); “The best example I can 






had always been looking for a means of getting to her True Self” (142 my emphasis); “When I had said that I 
recognized his non-existence he felt that he had been communicated with for the first time” (151). Also, Winnicott, 
The Location of Cultural Experience,” in Playing and Reality (London & New York: Routledge Classics: 1971 
[1967]) in which Winnicott wrote: “We now see that it is not instinctual satisfaction that makes a baby begin to be, 
to feel that life is real, to find life worth living” (133 my emphasis); “The potential space happens only in relation to 
a feeling of confidence on the part of the baby, that is, confidence related to the dependability of the mother-figure or 
environmental elements, confidence being the evidence of dependability that is becoming introjected” (135 
Winnicott’s emphasis). 
81 Woolf, MD, 142-143. 
82 Woolf, MD, 143. 
83 Woolf, MD, 144. 
84 Derrida, MPdM, 39. 
85 Derrida, MPdM, 38. 
86 Freud, “MM,” 245. 
87 Freud, “MM,” 255. 
88 Freud, “MM,” 245. 
89 Derrida, MPdM, 38; de Man, cited in MPdM, 24-25. 
90 Derrida, MPdM, 38, 34. 
91 Derrida, MPdM, 24. 
92 Derrida, MPdM, 28. 
93 Woolf, TH, 23. 
94 Derrida, MPdM, 25. 
95 Derrida, MPdM, 24. 
96 Derrida, MPdM, 21. 
97 Allison Bechdel, Funhome: A Family Tragicomic (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 
2007), 80. 
98 Derrida, MPdM, 19-20. 
99 Derrida, MPdM, 39. 
100 Derrida, MPdM, 129. 
101 Derrida, MPdM, 32. 
102 Derrida, MPdM, 132 (my emphasis). 
103 Woolf, MD, 153. 
104 Knox-Shaw, 106. 
105 Woolf, TH, 412. 
106 Woolf, MD, 9. 
107 Derrida, MPdM, 28. 
108 Woolf, MD, 10. 
109 Woolf, MD, 35, 184. 
110 Woolf, TH, 415, 412. 
111 Woolf, MD, 152-153. 
112 I am indebted to both Fredric Jameson and Jonathan Flatley for this claim. For more on modernity, 
modernization, and modernism, see Jameson Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1991); Flatley, Affective Mapping. 
113 Woolf, TH, 415. 
114 Woolf, MD, 48. 
115 Woolf, MD, 121. 
116 Woolf, MD, 121 (my emphasis). 
117 Woolf, MD, 122. 
118 Woolf, MD, 122. 
119 Woolf, MD, 142. 
120 Minois, History of Suicide, 280, 286. 
121 Woolf, MD, 185 (my emphasis). 
122 Woolf, MD, 183-184. 
123 Woolf, MD, 186. 






125 Woolf, MD, 186. 
126 Foucault, quoted in and translated by Thomas Osborne, “‘Fascinated Dispossession’: Suicide and the Aesthetics 
of Freedom,” Economy and Society 34, no. 2 (May 2005): 284. 
127 Woolf, TH, 411. 
128 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (London: The 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973) (hereafter LPA), 281; While Laplanche and Pontalis 
discuss the distinctions between ‘phantasie’ (German) and ‘fantasme’ (French) that influence the distinction between 
phantasy and fantasy in English, I use the English term fantasy for convenience. 
129 Laplanche and Pontalis, “Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality,” The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 
49, no. 1 (1968): 17. 
130 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analsysis, 284. 
131 Albeit not the focus of this chapter, we can also see the ways in which other characters’ desires take shape as 
well; Peter Walsh’s involvements, for instance index his desire for Clarissa, or for some clumsy solicitude with 
women in general; Doris Kilman’s attachments toward Elizabeth reveals a host of anxieties and desires about class 
and sexuality; and also, Lady Burton, Dr. Holmes and Sir Bradshaw’s actions throughout the novel reveal their 
shared desire for power, be it personal, professional, or political. While the novel’s ancillary characters do not so 
vividly engage with fantasy in particular, nonetheless, Mrs. Dalloway stages a rehearsal whose diegesis piques our 
curiosities about the potential affirmation and fulfillment of its characters’ individual and sometimes shared desires. 
132 Woolf, D2, 272. 
133 Woolf, TH, 415. 
134 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, 284. 
135 Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (London: Routledge, 2011), 204n. 
136 Woolf, MD, 76 (my emphasis). 
137 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 204n. 
138 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1981), 102. 
139 Woolf, MD, 17. 
140 Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 183 (my emphasis). 
141 Woolf, MD, 16, 21. 
142 Woolf, MD, 25. 
143 Woolf, MD, 26. 
144 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 136. 
145 Woolf, MD, 92. 
146 Woolf, MD, 93 (my emphasis). 
147 Woolf, MD, 83. 
148 Woolf, MD, 88. 
149 Woolf, MD, 86. 
150 Woolf, MD, 86. 
151 Woolf, MD, 23. 
152 Woolf, MD, 94, 96. 
153 Woolf, MD, 96. 
154 Woolf, MD, 96. 
155 Woolf, MD, 22, 58, 99. 
156 Woolf, MD, 94. 
157 Woolf, MD, 96. 
158 Knox-Shaw, 99-100. 
159 Woolf, MD, 149. 
160 Woolf, MD, 93, 3. 
161 Woolf, MD, 121. 
162 Woolf, D2, 283n. 
163 Knox-Shaw, 101-102. 
164 Woolf, MD, 91, 34. 
165 In addition to Julie Abraham’s brilliant work, cited above, for more on the history of same-sex sexual desire, see 
Sharon Marcus, Between Women: Friendship, Desire, and Marriage in Victorian England (Princeton & Oxford: 






Metropolis, 1918-1957 (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). For the quoted passage, see 
MD, 66. 
166 Woolf, MD, 32. 
167 Marx, C1, 1024. 
168 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 140-141. 
169 Heidegger, Being and Time, 277. 
170 Heidegger, Being and Time, 311. 
171 Heidegger, Being and Time, 277. 






















































1 James Baldwin, Another Country (New York: Vintage International, 1993 [1962]) (hereafter AC), 11, 17, 70, 20. 
2 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2011), 6. 
3 Baldwin, AC, 21, 46 (my emphasis), 3, 66, 5. 
4 Jack Halberstam, “The Wild Beyond: With and for the Undercommons,” in Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s The 
Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study (Minor Compositions, 2013), 11. For more on fugitivity, see, 
Nathaniel Mackey, Paracritical Hinge: Essays, Talks, Notes, Interviews (University of Iowa Press, 2018), 181-198; 
Moten, In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Moten, 
“The Case of Blackness,” Criticism 50, no. 2 (2008): 177-218.  
5 Moten, In the Break, 14. 
6 Baldwin, AC, 3, 41 (my emphasis), 54. 
7 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in SW4, 316. 
8 Virginia Jackson, “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” Los Angeles Review of Books (April 12, 2015), 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/function-criticism-present-time/#!. 
9 Baldwin, AC, 121. 
10 Baldwin, “Everybody’s Protest Novel” in James Baldwin: Collected Essays, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: The 
Library of America, 1998) (hereafter CE), 11. 
11 Baldwin, “Everybody’s Protest Novel,” in CE, 18. 
12 Baldwin, “Everybody’s Protest Novel,” in CE, 12, 13. 
13 Marx, 1844, 327. 
14 Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, 147. 
15 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 252. 
16 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 247, 253. 
17 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 251. 
18 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 251, 266. 
19 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 248, 267. 
20 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 266-267. 
21 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 267. 
22 Baldwin, “Everybody’s Protest Novel,” in CE 13. 
23 The trick, then, for Hardt, is to find ways of “discovering the means” of privileging those affective experiences 
that are helpful while forestalling or precluding those that harm us. See, Michael Hardt, “The Power to be Affected,” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 28, no. 3 (2015): 215-216. 
24 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 267. 
25 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 12. 
26 Baldwin, “Alas, Poor Richard,” in CE, 268. 
27 Baldwin, AC, 275, 142 (my emphasis), 216 (my emphasis), 109-110 (my emphasis). 
28 Critics have approached the question of Another Country’s seeking-after form in a variety of ways. Set apart from 
more comparative works that discuss Baldwin’s influences (See, Theodore L Gross, “The Idealism of Negro 
Literature in America,” Phylon 30, no. 1 (1969): 5-10; Maria R. Bloshteyn, “Rage and Revolt: Dostoevsky and 
Three African-American Writers,” Comparative Literature Studies 38, no 4 (2001): 277-309),  scholarship on 
Another Country tends towards several predominant varieties that circulate around the extent to which we see 
productive changes within the lives of its characters. Some critics tend, on the one side, to read a gesture toward 
some promise or achievement of some subjectivity capable of transcending sexual, racial, or national identity either 
within the textual world of the novel itself (See, Michael F. Lynch, “Beyond Guilt and Innocence: Redemptive 
Suffering and Love in Baldwin’s Another Country” Obsidian II 7, no. 1-2 (1992); Ernesto Javier Martínez, “Dying 
to Know: Identity and Self-Knowledge in Baldwin’s Another Country” PMLA 124, no. 3 (2009): 782-797), or within 
the broader, extra-textual world of the its publication (See, Sarah Beebe Fryer, “Retreat from Experience: Despair 
and Suicide in James Baldwin’s Novels,” The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association 19, no. 1 
(1986): 21-28). On the other side, however, some critics highlight the privileged status of struggle, blockage, and 
foreclosure in Another Country that emphasizes the impossibility for the transcendence of the subject. And again, 
we find arguments whose stakes either remain within the world of the text (See, Kevin Ohi, “‘I’m not the Boy You 
Want’: Sexuality, ‘Race,’ and Thwarted Revelation in Baldwin’s Another Country,” African American Review 33, 
no. 2 (1999): 261-281; Amy Reddinger, “‘Just Enough for the City’: Limitations of Space in Baldwin’s Another 






world (See, Robert Scott, “Rhetoric, Black Power, and Baldwin’s ‘Another Country,’” Journal of Black Studies 1, 
no. 1 (1970): 21-34; Stefanie Dunning, “Parallel Perversions: Interracial and Same Sexuality in James Baldwin’s 
Another Country,” MELUS 26, no. 4 (2001); Katy Ryan, “Falling in Public: Larsen’s Passing, McCarthy’s The 
Group, and Baldwin’s Another Country,” Studies in the Novel 36, no. 1 (2004): 95-119; Keith Mitchell, “Locating 
the South and Jim Crow Violence in James Baldwin’s Another Country and William Gardner Smith’s The Last of 
the Conquerors,” Obsidian: Literature in the African Diaspora 9, no. 2 (2008): 26-42). While circulating primarily 
around the novel’s other characters, their own struggles, and their (im)possibilities, the lion’s share of scholarship on 
Another Country reads Rufus as either a figure for some grand sacrifice, or for an absolute foreclosure of possibility. 
My scholarship is different.  
29 Ohi, 271. Kevin Ohi persuasively examines the ways in which the novel’s characters struggle to mourn Rufus’ 
suicide, “looking for the secret locked in his heart and sealed away in his death,” a secret neither they, nor Ohi, I 
argue, can identify (275). For Ohi, this unavowable secret is “nowhere specified,” but rather assumes a purely 
structural function within the novel, “one which gives the characters, like the novel itself, their coherence, and marks 
their unutterable sadness” (264). Which is to say, Ohi, borrowing from Abraham and Torok, reads Rufus’ traumatic 
suicide and its function throughout the novel as a “figure of the crypt,” a melancholically incorporated 
temporalization whose experience remains unspeakable, unavowable for its other characters (278). Rather than 
witness some extravagant “unveiling of a self” that Ohi correctly criticizes within the broader academic work on 
Baldwin, he argues that readers encounter “only [a] process of unveiling” “the lack at the center of all subjectivity” 
which, by and large, is persuasive (279, 280). As readers proceed throughout the novel, we encounter Cass and 
Richard’s struggle to navigate viable ways in which to maintain their heteropatriarchical marriage, Vivaldo and 
Ida’s struggle to navigate viable ways to maintain their interracial arrangement, and Eric and Yves’ struggle to 
navigate what for Eric amounts to his inability to “decide” how he wants to sexually navigate his immanent reunion 
with Yves by the close of the novel. Along the way, nowhere do readers encounter an “unveiling of a self” capable 
of navigating its way out of what becomes for each character a shared position within their collective impasse. The 
gesture monumentalized within the novel’s title, Ohi argues, thus gestures “not” toward some “utopia to which we 
can escape to freedom,” but rather functions as a play on the “sustaining illusion that such an impossible utopia 
might be possible.” Rather than to a place of reconciliation, Ohi argues that Baldwin directs us to a place of 
mourning, the place of “the crypt within and without the text” that we should look for Baldwin’s social critique 
(280). I imagine my argument as a rejoinder to Ohi’s that emphasizes the ways in which violence and trauma 
pervade the novel’s action. 
30 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 10; For more on the ordinariness of affective life, see Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings 
(Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 2005) and Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting 
(Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 2012); Sharon Patricia Holland, The Erotic Life of Racism 
(Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2012); Ann Cvetkovich Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 2012). 
31 See Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (London: Penguin Classics, 1996). 
32 Gilles Deleuze, “Spinoza,” (lecture, Vinvennes, January 24, 1978), available at Les Cours De Gilles Deleuze, 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/14. 
33 Baldwin, AC, 6. 
34 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 81-82. 
35 Baldwin, AC, 6-7. 
36 Baldwin, AC, 66. 
37 Baldwin, AC, 6, 8, 5. 
38 Baldwin, AC, 8. 
39 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York & London: Routledge, 2006), 
189). 
40 Baldwin, AC, 8. 
41 Baldwin, AC, 8. 
42 Jared Sexton, “The Social life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism,” InTensions Journal, 
no. 5 (Fall/Winter 2011): 28. 
43 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, 281. 
44 Baldwin, AC, 10-11. 
45 Baldwin, AC, 27-28. 
46 Baldwin, AC, 60, 59, 53. 






48 Baldwin, AC, 29. 
49 Baldwin, AC, 67. 
50 Baldwin, AC, 78. 
51 Baldwin, AC, 54. 
52 Cvetkovich, 13. 
53 Baldwin, AC, 6, 70-71. 
54 Baldwin, AC, 73, 78, 73 (my emphasis), 82 (my emphasis), 75. 
55 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 4. 
56 Marx, 1844, 351-352. 
57 Baldwin, AC, 84 (my emphasis). 
58 Baldwin, AC, 84. 
59 Baldwin, AC , 85. 
60 Baldwin, AC, 67. 
61 Baldwin, AC, 86. 
62 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 104-105. 
63 Baldwin, AC, 87. 
64 Moten, “The Case of Blackness,” 188. 
65 Baldwin, AC, 112. 
66 Moten, “The Case of Blackness,” 211; Quoted passage from Marx, 214. For original, see Marx, Grundrisse, 488. 
67 Moten, “The Case of Blackness,” 212. 










































1 “Is Suicide a Solution,” La Révolution Surréaliste, no. 2, (1925). 
2 Marx, Grundrisse, 161-162. 

















































UNDER THE SIGN OF SUICIDE 
by 
THEODORE EMMANUEL PRASSINOS 
DECEMBER 2019 
Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Flatley 
Major: English 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
“Under the Sign of Suicide,” examines modernist writers’ intense and sustained 
preoccupation with and representations of suicide. Beyond numerous essays on the topic, we also 
find many fictional characters such as Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Svidrigailov and Kirilov both taken 
by gunshot, Stavrogin and Smerdyakov both by hanging. We also find Franz Kafka’s George 
Bendemann who takes his life by drowning, and Virginia Woolf’s Septimus Smith by impaling, 
Her character, Rhoda, dies off a cliff. In American literature, we find Edna Pontellier, Quentin 
Compson, Clare Kendry, Semour Glass, Teddy McArdle, Willy Loman, Tod Clifton, and on and 
on. This list is surely not exhaustive. And yet while at first glance modernism’s preoccupation 
with suicide may appear disturbing, distasteful, or at worst, morbid, my dissertation wagers a 
surprisingly counter-intuitive gesture. I argue that representations of suicide in modernist 
literature (specifically works by Walter Benjamin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Virginia Woolf, and 
James Baldwin) function not in terms of some pathological exhibitionism, or perhaps worse, as 
some stigma-prone practice about which we must remain silent. Rather, I argue that by reading a 
little more closely and by paying attention to the varied yet subtle conditions of suicide’s 






ways: first, as a critique of our modern world, and secondly, as a way to imagine how we could 
begin to repair our broken relation to this world. “Under the Sign of Suicide” inhabits the 
liveliness of suicidal activity in an effort to highlight the ways in which its liveliness reveals an 
avowal of our condition of estrangement under capitalist modernity, on the one hand, and on the 
other, the ways in which suicidal activity—as a mode of being modern—amplifies our ability to 
imagine new modes and forms of social reproduction. Which is to say, modernist representations 
of suicide invite readers to imagine how our world needs to change. In short, rather than 
perpetuate various stigmas of silence surrounding suicide and suicidal behavior, my dissertation 
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